Even as Moscow’s engagement deepens, African governments increasingly treat Russia as one among several partners – not an indispensable ally.
At last week’s Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a familiar promise, aiming to more than double annual trade with African countries – this time to over US$50 billion. His pledge at the inaugural 2019 summit to increase trade to US$40 billion within five years was never achieved; bilateral trade stood at roughly US$27 billion in 2025.
But focusing on Moscow’s struggle to deliver on its promises risks overlooking a more consequential development.
Since 2019, Russia has secured strategic influence across Africa without matching its rivals’ financial resources or commercial footprint. Meanwhile, many African governments have become skilled at exploiting competition among external powers, treating Russia as one of several significant external partners rather than an indispensable ally.
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This reflects the central paradox of Russia’s re-engagement with Africa. Moscow is expanding its geopolitical reach despite its comparatively limited economic capacity, while African states gain greater diplomatic leeway without necessarily securing the expected developmental benefits.
The latest summit provided evidence of both trends. Delegations from 48 African countries attended, including 21 heads of state – slightly more than the 17 leaders at the 2023 summit, although still below 2019’s 43. The gathering produced 146 signed documents, compared with 161 publicly disclosed agreements in 2023, as well as a 2027-29 action plan and declarations on political cooperation and the civilian applications of artificial intelligence.
These developments reflect an increasingly institutionalised, but not necessarily economically consequential, relationship. For African governments, the distinction between declarations and viable projects is becoming more important.
Moreover, the geopolitical environment surrounding Russia-Africa ties has fundamentally changed since 2019. What began as Moscow’s attempt to reclaim influence lost after the Soviet Union’s collapse has become an effort to counter Western diplomatic pressure, diversify partnerships and mitigate the economic fallout of the Ukraine conflict.
The war has reinforced both Russia’s interest in Africa and the limits of what it can offer. Many Western governments thought Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine would encourage African countries to distance themselves from Moscow. Instead, most resisted pressure to choose sides, recognising that continued engagement with Russia does not preclude cooperation with their other international partners.
Moscow has also learnt that geopolitical influence does not necessarily depend on matching the economic heft of its competitors. Rather than trying to replicate China’s expansive infrastructure investments or the European Union’s extensive commercial and development partnerships, Russia has focused on areas where relatively modest commitments can generate substantial political returns.
In the Sahel and parts of Central Africa, this means security cooperation, arms supplies, military training and regime protection, sometimes accompanied by preferential access to mineral resources. Such arrangements offer immediate benefits to governments seeking alternatives to Western security partnerships. For Russia, they provide access and political sway at a fraction of the cost associated with infrastructure investments or development programmes.
In effect, Russia has become more adept at converting its comparatively limited resources into disproportionate geopolitical influence. But leverage over African political elites should not be confused with developmental impact. Security arrangements that strengthen incumbent governments do not necessarily improve civilian protection, institutional accountability or long-term stability. Moreover, Russia’s expanded security role in the Sahel is yet to make the region safer.
The figures show these limitations. Russia’s approximately US$27 billion in trade with Africa in 2025 is dwarfed by China’s US$348 billion. Trade is concentrated in relatively few countries, particularly in North Africa, but much of this is one-way, largely comprising Russian exports (notably grain, petroleum products, metals and fertilisers).
Russia’s ability to address this imbalance is further constrained by the Ukraine war. Its draft 2027 budget allocates roughly US$203 billion (35% of federal spending) to defence. That limits Moscow’s ability to underwrite the large-scale infrastructure and industrial investments many African governments increasingly demand.
This does not mean Russia has nothing economically valuable to offer. Its grain and fertiliser exports remain important to several African economies, while nuclear energy cooperation presents opportunities for countries seeking to diversify their energy systems. Egypt’s El Dabaa nuclear power plant illustrates the scale of these ambitions, while prospective projects elsewhere, including Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda, could deepen Russia’s footprint.
But these projects also reveal the gap between pledges and implementation. Nuclear cooperation agreements can precede construction by many years, while financing, technical capacity and regulatory requirements remain substantial barriers. Ghana’s announcement of Russian support for a proposed 2 000-megawatt nuclear power plant is another ambitious commitment that will depend on expeditious delivery.
There is also a more uncomfortable dimension to the relationship. The Ukraine war has drawn Africans into Russia’s military, raising questions about the costs of the partnership. Investigations document recruitment of over 3 000 Africans from about 40 countries into Russia’s armed forces. Hundreds have died.
After the summit, Kenya and Ghana announced renewed Russian assurances that their nationals would no longer be recruited into its military. Russia’s appeal as a defender of sovereignty and an alternative to Western interference now sits uneasily alongside allegations that some of its recruitment networks have exploited vulnerable Africans.
African governments increasingly recognise that their relationships with external powers can be used to strengthen their bargaining positions. They need not restrict themselves to one geopolitical camp when alternatives are available from India, Türkiye, the Gulf states and others.
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These overlapping offers create opportunities to negotiate better terms, diversify dependencies and extract concessions. Russia’s primary geopolitical competition in Africa is consequently not necessarily China, whose economic reach it cannot replicate, but Western actors whose longstanding political and security relationships it seeks to displace in selected countries.
However, having more partners does not translate into greater strategic autonomy. Benefits depend on whether African governments can convert diplomatic attention into tangible gains for their economies and people. Otherwise, diversification risks reproducing patterns of dependency under a broader range of external patrons.
Russia has become adept at gaining standing in Africa without becoming economically indispensable. African governments now need to show they can convert that influence, and the competition surrounding it, into developmental gains on their own terms.
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Priyal Singh, ISS Senior Research Consultant and Signal Risk Geopolitical Analyst
Denys Reva, Researcher, Transnational Threats and Organised Crime, ISS Pretoria
