African countries face an uphill battle in holding digital companies accountable for the use of their platforms in Russia’s war effort.
An investigation into the war being waged by Russia in Ukraine has found that Western digital resources are being used to dupe African and other nationals into joining a covert and decentralised military recruitment campaign. This campaign increasingly appears to depend on supplies of infantry from outside of Russia.
The research by iLAB, the technical investigations team of Code for Africa and partners, found that 289 digital assets were used to lure men from African and other ‘global south’ countries using false advertising, forged endorsements and promises of generous benefits.
These assets ranged from websites to fake domains and social media profiles that originated in Russia and Belarus but were hosted on Western servers. The researchers describe it as a major ‘organised criminal enterprise’ involving a shadowy web of actors and franchisees.
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Furthermore, the war in Russia is being sold, they say, ‘using tools from the countries who oppose it’ – that is, Western tech companies. These companies’ off-the-shelf products are being ‘hijacked’ and repurposed by criminal networks.
Media reports suggest that more than 3 000 Africans have been recruited into the Russian armed forces from Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana and Kenya – and roughly one in five of those identified has been killed.
In South Africa, a high-profile case has put the issue in the spotlight as radio presenter Nonkululeko Mantula and four others are accused of allegedly recruiting men to fight in Russia. In February, the South African foreign ministry began the process of repatriating 17 citizens who had been duped into travelling to Russia and forced to fight on the frontline against Ukraine.
In its investigation, iLab found that many African nationals had been ‘tricked into joining up’ having responded to ‘ordinary’ recruitment ads for construction work, visa assistance or even film roles. Many of the sites, which shared common IP addresses, are based on websites that are ‘disposable’ as part of what investigators call a ‘burn and replace’ strategy.
Investigators traced a ‘decentralised recruitment campaign’ involving up to 33 recruitment operations based on four key ‘brands’, some of which made unsubstantiated claims that they represented the Russian state. Common links such as shared IP addresses suggest common control, say the researchers, who believe the military recruiters are a ‘combination of Russian companies, and freelancers from elsewhere in the world.’
iLab argues that companies like Meta, TikTok and Google – through whom the recruitment advertisements are placed – could do more to close in on the criminals. Some websites claim to be endorsed by Western media, using ‘fake mastheads.’ They are then marketed on social media – breaking the platforms’ own rules.
Meta has already detected and removed content from some campaigns, but it often swiftly resurfaces. The investigators say criminals use artificial intelligence to ‘spin up a new site’ and hide their identities by using fake or ‘synthetic personae’ on platforms like Facebook. They argue that getting the platforms to investigate billing records and account details could help identify the criminals.
‘Our aim in exposing the mechanics,’ says Justin Arenstein, who leads Code for Africa, ‘is to force the technology companies to act and to trigger regulators to police these abuses more closely. The abuses we are exposing aren’t just things that “advanced” nations can tackle. All countries have laws against fraud, human trafficking and organised crime or criminal conspiracy.’
Attorney Tina Power, Managing Director of South Africa-based public interest law consultancy Power Law Africa, agrees that ‘enhanced transparency, stronger accountability mechanisms, and regulators willing to enforce them are exactly what is needed.’
However, she cautions that ‘holding platforms to account is, at present, complicated by procedural questions of jurisdiction and enforcement.’ She says these challenges ‘are not insurmountable, but they cannot be sidelined and must be addressed alongside the substantive fight.’
Kenya has had some success in dealing with in-person recruitment into the Russian military. Earlier this year, the head of rogue recruitment firm Global Face Human Resources, Festus Arasa Omwamba, was charged with recruiting 22 Kenyans ‘for the purpose of exploitation by means of deception.’ The victims were rescued from a building just outside Nairobi before they could travel to Russia.
However, trying to hold digital platforms to account – most of which are domiciled outside the African continent – may present a bigger challenge.
Encouragingly, Power notes that ‘domestic litigation and law reform efforts are beginning to build the necessary tools and mechanisms, alongside regional work by the African Commission [on Human and Peoples’ Rights], to develop guidelines for states on information integrity and platform accountability.’
Possibly the biggest challenge is the speed at which criminal networks are adapting their tactics, compared to the relatively slow pace of regulation, and arguably, the political will among leaders in ‘target’ countries to challenge such campaigns. This is especially the case in countries where geopolitical sensitivities are a factor.
Tech platforms have been resistant to tightening rules, fearing allegations of censorship. However, the damage of enabling human trafficking for the purpose of recruiting African and other nationals to fight in a foreign war, which breaks some host country laws, could have repercussions way beyond the boardroom.
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Karen Allen, ISS Consultant and former BBC foreign correspondent
