Africa: Mounting Fatalities Linked to Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Amid Shifting Tactics

Fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in Africa surpassed 20,000 deaths for the fourth consecutive year, underscoring the resiliency of militant groups across the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, and Mozambique.

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Highlights

The record 23,872 fatalities linked to African militant Islamist groups over the past year sustain a pace of more than 20,000 such deaths observed since 2023.

The rising level of annual fatalities (for the 12 months ending in mid-2026) was propelled by a 60-percent spike in deaths in the Lake Chad Basin and Mozambique.

The Sahel accounts for 42 percent of total reported fatalities in Africa, followed by 28 percent each from Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin.

These regional patterns mirror the trajectory of militant Islamist violence in Africa in recent years. Of roughly 166,000 people killed by extremist violence in Africa over the past decade, 92 percent were in the Sahel, Somalia, and the Lake Chad Basin.

Although 15 African countries experienced some degree of militant Islamist violence over the past year, 94 percent of these fatalities have occurred in 5 countries: Somalia, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

The pace of violence has accelerated: the 23,872 fatalities over the past year reflect a 77-percent increase from 2021.

The pace of this violence has accelerated. The 23,872 fatalities over the past year reflect a 77-percent increase from the 13,507 deaths in 2021 and a nearly 150-percent spike from the 10,002 deaths reported in 2017.

Four out of the five theaters have seen an increase in fatalities over this decade. Only North Africa oversaw the opposite trajectory.

The past year also saw a 42-percent increase in fatalities (from 4,221 to 5,980 deaths) linked to remote violence. Over 90 percent of these are from airstrikes. However, fatalities linked to drones are growing, reflecting the shifting tactics employed by both African militaries and militant Islamist groups.

Sahel

The 9,928 reported fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel are more than any other region in Africa.

The 9,928 reported fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel (primarily Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) are more than any other region in Africa. This continues a pattern observed since 2022. Since then, there have been nearly 49,000 deaths linked to violent extremism in the Sahel.
The worsening security situation in the Sahel is likely an undercount given the growing restrictions on reporting by the ruling military juntas in each of the Sahelian countries.
This deterioration has been punctuated over the past year by a series of high-profile attacks by militant groups. In May 2025, the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) coalition launched a wave of large-scale, coordinated attacks across north and east Burkina Faso. In September, JNIM orchestrated a country-wide fuel blockade in Mali resulting in power outages and dry taps in Bamako. In April of 2026, JNIM attacked Bamako and other cities of Mali while the separatist group, Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), took over Kidal in northern Mali. In June, JNIM attacked Niger’s Niamey airport.
These battlefield setbacks have also resulted in significant casualties and loss of materiel by the Russian paramilitary force Africa Corps, the leading backer of the Sahelian military juntas.

There have been nearly 49,000 deaths linked to violent extremism in the Sahel since 2022.

The JNIM coalition of militant Islamist groups is the most lethal in the region, accounting for 76 percent of all militant-linked fatalities.
It has been a decade since the JNIM coalition was officially formed in March of 2017. The Sahel has subsequently seen a roughly 22-fold increase in fatalities linked to militant Islamist activity. The multicity attacks and ability to disrupt key infrastructure across Mali and Burkina Faso reflect JNIM’s growing levels of sophistication and coordination.
The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), operating mostly on the border areas of the Sahelian states, is linked to 19 percent of militant Islamist group fatalities (1,842 deaths) in the region. ISGS has successfully held onto Mali’s Ménaka region despite attempts by both the military and JNIM to dislodge it. ISGS continues to launch attacks on military positions in Niger, such as the one on the Niamey airport in January 2026.

ISGS has been distinctive for its use of violence against civilians, accounting for 47 percent of all such civilian fatalities in the Sahel. This is the second highest civilian fatality rate by a militant Islamist group on the continent. Niger is the focus of much of this violence. Civilian deaths represent roughly 35 percent of all fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups in Niger–a higher rate than elsewhere in the region.
The militaries in Mali and Burkina Faso–and their Russian counterparts–continue to be linked to more civilian fatalities than JNIM and ISGS combined, contributing to militant Islamist recruitment.

The past year has seen a 78-percent decline in fatalities in both Benin and Togo.

Recent years have seen a concerted effort by the Sahelian militant Islamist groups to expand into the bordering coastal West African countries, especially Benin and Togo. Controlling the trade routes into Burkina Faso and Mali would further boost the revenues to be leveraged by JNIM and ISGS.
The past year has seen a 78-percent decline in fatalities in both Benin (from 277 to 81 deaths) and Togo (from 194 to 43 deaths). This is likely largely linked to the stabilization efforts mobilized by these countries. Nonetheless, expectations are that JNIM will continue to try to expand its presence in these countries as well as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.

Sahelian militant Islamist groups have made inroads into northwest Nigeria over the past year. Fatalities linked to these groups have risen from zero in 2024, to 136 in 2025, and 504 in 2026. Both JNIM and ISGS appear to be collaborating with other armed groups in Nigeria – from Boko Haram’s Sadiku Faction, Ansaru, and Lakurawa, as well as various criminal gangs (locally known as bandits). Lakurawa has become especially active with fatalities linked to this group rising from 136 to 509 over the past year. The convergence of violent extremist and organized criminal activity poses a new and growing security challenge for Nigerian authorities.

Somalia

Somalia has averaged roughly 7,350 annual fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups since 2023, making it the second deadliest (after the Sahel) on the continent.

With the growing use of air strikes and drone deployments, remote violence now accounts for roughly 40 percent of fatalities in Somalia.

95 percent of these fatalities are tied to al Shabaab, which is the best resourced militant Islamist group in Africa with an estimated annual revenue of $200 million and control over large swaths of territory.
The sustained high level of violence in recent years is reflected in an 88 percent increase in average annual fatalities (from 3,900 to 7,350) from a decade earlier.
Battle-related fatalities have typically accounted for over 70 percent of recorded deaths in the Somalia theater, reflecting the back-and-forth effort to control territory and key transport routes. With the growing use of air strikes and drone deployments, this rate has shifted. Remote violence now accounts for roughly 40 percent of fatalities.
Al Shabaab represents a regional security threat with its evolving and expansive illicit revenue generation schemes traversing East Africa and the Red Sea region.
Al Shabaab’s growing ties to the Houthi paramilitary group in Yemen are elevating the capacity of both groups to take destabilizing actions, including the disruption of maritime traffic through the Bab al Mandab Strait.
Al Shabaab is also linked to piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia. The resurgent piracy that started in 2023 alongside Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea increases risks to commercial shipping traffic, causing billions of dollars in economic losses and increased transport costs.

Lake Chad Basin

The Lake Chad Basin experienced a 60-percent surge in fatalities linked to militant Islamist group violence over the past year (from 4,153 to 6,643 deaths). This follows a 4-year period of stable or declining fatalities.
The sharp increase in fatalities was largely an outcome of a 92-percent increase in battle-related deaths, underscoring a stepped-up effort by the Nigerian armed forces and other militaries in the region to confront the militant groups.

The escalation in fatalities was tied to both Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), which account for roughly the same number of fatalities overall–a pattern that has persisted since 2024.
ISWA was linked to an 85-percent spike in deaths (from 1,905 to 3,520) over the past year. Of these, 2,493 were battle-related fatalities, marking a 140-percent increase from the previous year. Illustratively, ISWA escalated attacks on Nigerian military outposts scattered across Borno State. It also increased pressure on the Cameroonian communities along the borders of Nigeria, and Chad, to extort as much as possible from their economies.

The sharp increase in Lake Chad Basin fatalities was largely an outcome of a 92-percent increase in battle-related deaths, underscoring a stepped-up effort to confront the militant groups.

Boko Haram has been linked to a steady increase in violence against civilians over the past 5 years, resulting in a tripling in the number of civilian deaths (from 188 to 724) during this time. In the past year, Boko Haram was responsible for 65 percent of the fatalities linked to violence against civilians in the region. Since 2021, Boko Haram has incurred more than double the fatalities on civilians than ISWA.

While comprising the border regions of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, the epicenter of violence for the Lake Chad Basin theater remains the three northeastern states of Nigeria (Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa), which account for 91 percent of all fatalities in the region. However, Boko Haram has also been reportedly stepping up operations in northern Cameroon, southwestern Chad, and southeastern Niger, targeting civilians, military forces, and rival ISWA militants. Both groups are successfully recruiting from local communities in Cameroon that have faced years of economic disruption and insecurity. Nonetheless, fatalities in Cameroon have declined by 45 percent since their peak in 2024.

The convergence of violent extremist and criminal groups [in northwest Nigeria] has made the security challenges in this region increasingly complex.

Boko Haram has also become increasingly visible in parts of northwestern Nigeria, where it has not historically had much presence. Boko Haram cells have been seen in Kebbi State, Dutsin Maiqardaji mountain of Zamfara State, and the Kainji Lake National Park that straddles Niger and Kwara States. The Sadiku Faction of Boko Haram has conducted multiple attacks and kidnappings from these locations and Oyo State, further south along the Benin Border.
Ansaru cells have also been linked to violent events in northwestern Nigeria since 2020, which has been a hotbed of organized gang violence (i.e., bandits) involving extortion, kidnappings, and property seizures. Estimates are that these criminal groups have been responsible for more than 2,700 annual fatalities (not included in the figures above). The convergence of violent extremist and criminal groups–and increasingly the spillover of militant Islamist cells from the Sahel–has made the security challenges in this region increasingly complex.

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