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Africa: Peacekeeping Funding Cuts Mean Africa Must Rethink Security

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Africa: Peacekeeping Funding Cuts Mean Africa Must Rethink Security


African governments must avoid replacing one dependency with another while building more accountable, fit-for-purpose security systems.

Given slow economic growth, a large youth bulge and destabilising external engagement such as from Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Africa is set to become more unstable in the next few years.

Both the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program show that global instability has increased and spread since the COVID-19 pandemic, with the number of active armed conflicts reaching historic highs. Africa is particularly affected, given that international support for its conflict prevention and management has nosedived.

There is no shortage of deployable troops on the continent. Africa currently provides over half of all United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, but UN funding is under pressure. At US$5.6 billion, the UN’s peacekeeping budget accounts for less than 0.2% of the world’s military.


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Africa’s 54 countries provide only 1%-2% of the UN peacekeeping budget. The UN Security Council’s five permanent members (P5) account for 62%, reflecting their large economies and role in approving missions.

Many UN member states do not pay their fees, but the largest outstanding amount is from the United States (US). US payments have plummeted, including arrears of US$1.8 billion to the peacekeeping budget.

This follows a US Congress decision to cap contributions at 25% of the total peacekeeping allocation, rather than their 26.9% obligation set by the UN General Assembly. For next year, the relevant congressional sub-committee has proposed a 60% reduction in US peacekeeping funds, contingent on various UN reform demands.

Meanwhile, China’s role in peacekeeping has grown. It is the only P5 member to contribute troops to UN missions in meaningful numbers, and its assessed share of the UN peacekeeping budget has steadily increased, accounting for 23.8% in 2026, up from 18.7% in 2024.

Given the UN’s reluctance to deploy missions in high-risk areas such as Somalia, the African Union (AU) has long sought a mechanism through which the UN could contribute to regional missions. This culminated in UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which allows up to 75% of AU-led peace support operations to be funded through UN-assessed contributions. But this remains unimplemented.

Unlike UN peacekeeping, there are no automatic funding mechanisms for AU missions, which rely on ad hoc donor pledges. That results in shortfalls, delayed payments and limited ability to plan properly. The AU’s US$400 million Peace Fund has disbursed only a few million dollars for early response and mediation support. The total fund would barely cover a single major AU mission for one year.

If the US slashes its UN peacekeeping funding, it is unlikely that others, including China, would fill the gap in the current constrained-growth context. The most prominent non-UN or non-AU emerging practice is for the US and others, like the European Union (EU), to bilaterally fund national security force deployment in another country.

Examples include the deployment of Kenyan police and military in Haiti, and troops from Rwanda in northern Mozambique. The former was paid by the US, the latter partly by the EU, with France playing a strong role to secure TotalEnergies’ liquified natural gas investments in Mozambique.

Among many external partners, Turkey appears to have gone furthest in integrating commercial interests with security provision. Its recent oil drilling off Somalia’s coast is an example of the benefits of such support, which includes infrastructure projects, construction contracts and trade agreements.

These examples point to a more commercially anchored model of security provision, where external support is tied to protecting strategic assets and mineral supply chains.

There are also other models. Russia’s Wagner/Africa Corps props up Mali’s military regime, among others, and US Africa Command forces have been supporting Nigerian and Somali armed forces. UAE-backed Colombian mercenaries have reportedly supported Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, while reports regularly surface of government-hired foreign contractors active in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Private military companies may be cheaper than UN forces, but the fear is that they adopt heavy-handed tactics with little regard for due process or civilian protection, as occurred with Wagner/Africa Corps in Mali.

Responsibility for Africa’s security rests first with national governments, not other countries. And although structural drivers of conflict must be considered, poor governance is the central source of violence and instability in Africa. More effective and developmental governance is essential for long-term peace. The challenge is how to first stabilise violence-torn countries to enable better governance to take root.

For starters, African countries should tailor their security structures and spending to their actual security challenges, including protecting remote rural areas, securing borders and ensuring the rule of law.

This also means stepping away from inherited European models poorly suited to many African contexts, such as defining the military’s purpose as defending against external, conventional attack. For many African states, the most pressing threats are domestic. Instead of purchasing high-end military equipment, such as fighter jets, resources should be used to buy helicopters and train soldiers in police support, rural safety and counter-insurgency.