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Africa: The Widening Scope of Africa’s Militant Islamist Threat

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Africa: The Widening Scope of Africa’s Militant Islamist Threat


Increasingly capable and organized militant Islamist groups in the Sahel, Somalia, and the Lake Chad Basin continue to expand their reach and lethality.

Highlights

  • Fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups in Africa continue to occur at near record levels. The 23,968 fatalities, an increase of 24 percent from 2024, reflect increased violence in nearly every theater. The reported 8,375 violent events linked to these groups were the highest ever reported on the continent.
  • The Sahel continues to experience the greatest number of militant Islamist group-linked fatalities of any region on the continent–a position the Sahel has maintained for the past 5 years. The elevated number of reported fatalities in the Sahel persists despite growing restrictions on reporting from the region that are likely undercounting the severity of this violence.
  • Heavy-handed tactics by security forces in the Sahel are continuing to drive jihadist recruitment. Fatalities linked to violence against civilians by the armed forces and allied militias in Mali and Burkina Faso, collectively, have exceeded those attributed to militant Islamist groups since 2023.
  • Somalia saw the biggest surge in reported fatalities across all regions–reflecting a heightened level of battles with armed forces across multiple states. The 8,813 deaths linked to al Shabaab and the Islamic State (ISIS) over the past year represent a 93-percent increase from the previous year.
  • The Lake Chad Basin also saw a 28-percent increase in fatalities from the previous year, demonstrating the continued threat from Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), mostly in northeast Nigeria. Meanwhile, there are indications that militant Islamist groups such as Ansaru and Boko Haram have also become more active in northwestern Nigeria, compounding the security threat posed by organized criminal groups (referred to as bandits) in this region.
  • Collectively–the Sahel, Somalia, and Lake Chad Basin–account for 98 percent of all militant Islamist group-linked fatalities in Africa.


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Sahel

  • Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger continued to face intense pressure from militant Islamist groups, which have pushed southward and into more populated areas in each of these countries. The nearly 9,826 reported fatalities in this region account for 41 percent of all deaths linked to militant Islamist groups in Africa.

The Sahel accounts for 41 percent of all deaths linked to militant Islamist groups in Africa.

  • This violence was largely driven by the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) coalition, which was linked to 78 percent of the fatalities in the region (and 2,502 out of the 3,039 reported events). In Mali, for example, the JNIM coalition has executed a wave of attacks on military bases from Timbuktu in the north to Bamako in the south and Keyes in the west (including near the borders with Senegal and Mauritania). Since September 2025, the coalition has targeted the importation of fuel into the country along key economic corridors from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, causing price spikes and major economic disruptions.
  • Burkina Faso continues to experience the highest levels of violence in the Sahel, accounting for 50 percent of all militant Islamist-linked fatalities in the region. Mali represents over 29 percent of these fatalities, while Niger 17 percent. The percentage for Niger represents a sharp increase from the 7 percent recorded in 2023, when there was a military coup against the democratically elected government of President Mohamed Bazoum.
  • JNIM affiliates enjoy substantial freedom of movement in Burkina Faso. The group has also increased its direct and large-scale attacks on urban centers. In May 2025, JNIM claimed to have killed 200 Burkina Faso soldiers in Djibo, the capital of Soum Province, and another 60 in Sollé of Loroum Province.
  • Millions of Burkinabe have been displaced, but current and accurate numbers are unknown. The junta in Burkina Faso has been accused of preventing some communities from fleeing in order to present the areas as stable.

JNIM has used the repression and violence against civilians by the military juntas in Burkina Faso and Mali to drive recruitment.

  • JNIM has used the repression and violence against civilians by the military juntas in Burkina Faso and Mali–as well as atrocities against civilians by junta-aligned Russian paramilitary groups–to drive recruitment.
  • The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) was linked to 19 percent of the reported fatalities in the Sahel. Based largely in western Niger and eastern Mali, ISGS has distinguished itself by the level of violence against civilians. In Niger, for example, ISGS was reportedly responsible for roughly 94 percent of the civilian fatalities (approximately 650), a 144-percent increase from the previous year.
  • ISGS appears to be consolidating a sanctuary north of Niamey, positioning itself for deeper incursions into Niger. As a result, Niger saw a 51-percent increase in violent activity linked to militant Islamist groups over the past year.
  • The past year has also seen growing competition between JNIM and ISGS, with multiple clashes between the two militant groups in western Burkina Faso and northern Mali, around Gao and Timbuktu.
  • The southward expansion of the Sahelian militant Islamist groups continues to put great pressure on the coastal West African countries.
  • This has been most acute in Benin, where the 305 militant Islamist-linked fatalities were the deadliest on record, and a 76-percent increase from the prior year. Underscoring its intentions, the JNIM leadership appointed an emir for Benin.
  • In Togo, fighters linked to the JNIM coalition killed at least 54 civilians and 8 soldiers over the past year. Located near the Togolese border, Kpendjal Prefecture is the Togolese region worst-hit by jihadist attacks.
  • For the first time, JNIM has claimed attacks in Nigeria that have killed soldiers in Kwara State over the past year. These attacks have occurred in a forested region bordering Benin and the Nigerian States of Kwara and Niger, where JNIM’s ally, Ansaru, also conducted multiple attacks in 2025.
  • Numerous reports suggest that ISGS has also expanded into northwest Nigeria from Niger via groups identified as Lakurawa. Lakurawa is a local moniker given to jihadist cells that emerged in the border regions of northwestern Nigeria from Niger. The alignments these jihadists have are unclear: there is evidence of Lakurawa cells cooperating with JNIM, ISGS, and Boko Haram. The activity attributed to Lakurawa accounts for 3 percent of fatalities (299 deaths) in this theater.

Somalia

  • Somalia saw a surge in violence linked to militant Islamist groups over the past year, resulting in a 93-percent increase in fatalities (from 4,561 to 8,813)–a record high. The spike represents the largest annual shift recorded in any region on the continent and follows a marked lull in fatalities during the previous year.
  • This rise in violence was largely attributed to a doubling in fatalities linked to battles (6,051) and remote violence (2,676). The latter accounts for more than half of the remote violence-linked deaths in Africa over the past year, highlighting the growing use of drones and air strikes in this theater.
  • Alternating battles between Somali security forces and al Shabaab accounted for 2,650 reported violent events and 7,052 fatalities. An al Shabaab offensive led to major gains for the militant group in central and southern regions of Somalia, bringing it within 50 km of Mogadishu. A counter offensive by the Somali National Army, federal member states, and aligned militias–in coordination with AUSSOM forces–recaptured several towns in the Lower Shabelle region described as al Shabaab “strongholds and safe havens.” Danab forces subsequently captured towns just 30 km from Jilib, al Shabaab’s de facto capital.
  • Links between al Shabaab and the Houthis in Yemen have continued to deepen with increased levels of training and purchases of advanced weapons. Al Shabaab reportedly allocates about a quarter of its operational funds to acquiring arms from the Houthis and AQAP in Yemen.
  • A year-long offensive led by Puntland Security Forces with the support of U.S. and UAE airstrikes in the north of Somalia accounted for 1,675 reported fatalities linked to ISIS’s affiliate in Somalia. Once numbering more than 1,000 fighters and earning an estimated $4 million annually, ISIS lost most of its Somalia-based fighters as a result of these battles. ISIS’s Somalia affiliate had been a key coordination, management, and financial hub for ISIS globally.

Lake Chad Basin

  • The Lake Chad Basin saw a 28-percent increase in fatalities (from 3,734 to 4,779) linked to militant Islamist activity over the past year, making it the deadliest year for this theater since 2015, when Boko Haram was at its height and the Lake Chad Basin experienced over 11,700 deaths. This jump in fatalities also reverses a 5-year trend of incremental reductions in lethal violence in this region.
  • There was a 62-percent increase in battle-related fatalities (from 1,959 to 3,168), demonstrating that much of the increased violence in this theater was due to clashes between security forces and the militant groups.
  • 87 percent of the deaths linked to militant Islamist groups in the Lake Chad Basin over the past year were in Nigeria. By comparison, fatalities in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger all declined. The drop in Cameroon (which resulted in 425 deaths and 8 percent of the regional total) is noteworthy in that northern Cameroon had seen growing levels of militant violence since 2022.
  • Boko Haram was linked to 56 percent of the fatalities in the Lake Chad Basin, the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) to 43 percent.
  • While cooperative at times, these groups have regularly clashed around Lake Chad in the past year. Boko Haram, supported by mercenaries from Chad and Libya, evicted ISWA from the Lake Chad islands, though ISWA still retains a significant presence in Nigeria’s Borno State.
  • ISWA remains a formidable threat and is estimated to have overrun at least 16 Nigerian military bases in the past year. ISWA’s use of IEDs and advanced reconnaissance drones has elevated the threat posed to the Nigerian military.
  • The past year was also noteworthy for the rising violence of militant Islamist groups in northwestern Nigeria. Most notable has been the re-emergence of Ansaru, which separated from Boko Haram in 2012 and has since been allied with AQIM and the JNIM coalition. Ansaru’s area of operations has shifted from Kaduna State in 2020 to Kwara and Niger States over the past year, bringing its activities closer to the Benin border.
  • Boko Haram’s Sadiku faction has also been active in northwestern Nigeria, particularly in Niger State, close to Kwara State. Groups affiliated with Lakurawa, which are currently operating mostly in Kebbi and Sokoto States, have also been cooperating with the Sadiku faction since 2023.
  • Kwara and Niger States, consequently, saw a doubling in fatalities (from 60 to 126) linked to militant Islamist groups over the past year.
  • Organized criminal gangs, commonly known as bandits, continue to cause the most armed violence in northwestern Nigeria. The kidnapping of 253 children from a Catholic school in Niger State was the work of bandits. Bandits also ambushed three military bases in Niger and Kaduna States. These illustrations show how bandits are mimicking jihadist activity in the region, while jihadists are adopting tactics from bandit groups (including cattle rustling, extortion, and looting).
  • In addition to the increased pace of battles with militant groups, security forces in the Lake Chad Basin have made some notable arrests of jihadist leaders in the past year. In Chad, the military apprehended the youngest son of Mohamed Yusef, founder of Boko Haram. He was with six others attempting to create a new cell on the Chadian side of the Lake Chad region. Meanwhile, Ansaru’s leadership, including the head of its Mahmuda faction, was arrested during a series of operations by Nigeria’s security and intelligence services.