Addis Abeba — The 39th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), convened in Addis Abeba from 11 to 15 February 2026, occurred at a moment when the continent’s developmental aspirations were in direct collision with a fracturing global order. While the summit’s official theme, ‘Water as a Vital Resource for Life, Development, and Sustainability,‘ sought to prioritize the ‘Africa Water Vision 2063,’ the proceedings were profoundly overshadowed by the agenda of catastrophic instability. The AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, utilized the opening plenary to deliver a stark indictment of the international community’s failure to prevent the ‘extermination’ of populations in Gaza and the nearly three-year-old implosion of Sudan, which has collectively challenged the consciences of global leadership.
This sense of existential crisis is not merely a regional phenomenon; it is a definitive symptom of what Charles Kupchan, a prominent scholar in international affairs, describes as the ‘Coming Global Turn‘–a redistribution of power and ideological authority where no single state or political model maintains a center of gravity in the multipolarity of the post-Cold War global order. Once carved up by 19th-century European empires, the Horn of Africa is again a chessboard for global and regional powers, but this time the players are more numerous, the stakes are higher, and the pursuit of strategic depth is driving a relentless competition for ports, bases, and allegiances.
Regional Security Complex: Neo-colonialism meets neo-realism
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The contemporary scramble for the Horn of Africa is best analyzed through an integrated framework of Neo-realism, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), and the theory of ‘Multiple Modernities.’ Firstly, through the lens of Neo-realism, the behavior of states in the Horn and the external powers penetrating them is driven by an anarchic international system where security, access to maritime corridors, and strategic depth are the primary currencies of survival. This is particularly evident in the way Middle Eastern powers have effectively integrated the Horn into their own security complexes, treating the Red Sea not as a geographic barrier but as a bridge for the projection of influence.
Secondly, in ‘No One’s World,’ Charles Kupchan provides the clearest understanding of the current transition. He argues that the West’s material and ideological dominance is ending, giving rise to an era where emerging powers neither defer to the West’s lead nor converge toward the Western liberal model. In this ‘next world,’ autocrats in the Persian Gulf and strongmen in Africa challenge the universality of the Western model, creating a global landscape characterized by political and ideological diversity, argues Kupchan.
Within the volatility of the new scramble, the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea over maritime access requires a measured and cautious scholarly approach.”
Thirdly, the failure of international law to mitigate the current scramble is a manifestation of what Antje Wiener, a German political scientist and international relations scholar, describes as ‘Deep Contestations’ of the Liberal International Order (LIO). According to Wiener, deep contestation reveals a substantive disagreement not just with routine policies but with the foundational elements of the order itself. In the Horn, the foundational norm of territorial integrity is under its greatest strain since the end of the Cold War, catalyzed by Israel’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland on 26 December, 2025. This move, described as being ‘in the spirit of the Abraham Accords,‘ shattered decades of international consensus regarding Somalia’s sovereignty and demonstrated that in contemporary realpolitik, functional stability and strategic utility often outweigh legal status.
Furthermore, the LIO’s perceived ‘incapacity’ to resolve the Nile water dispute or provide effective mediation in Sudan has led African states to seek alternatives within the BRICS framework, signaling a rejection of the ‘intrusiveness without inclusiveness’ that has historically characterized Western engagement.
Horn of Africa: Peninsula of peril, promise
The Horn of Africa (HoA), the northeastern region of the African continent, consists mainly of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Though not necessarily recognized as such on its own terms, in broader strategic discourses, the Horn is extended to encompass Sudan, South Sudan, and Kenya. The major imperative for understanding the Horn is its strategic and geopolitical peculiarity. Positioned along the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, the Horn dominates the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a strategic maritime chokepoint responsible for a significant proportion of international trade between the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. This route traverses the lion’s share of the worldwide flow of production, encompassing huge quantities of oil and manufactured commodities. Hence, the Horn of Africa functions as a ‘cauldron of contradictions’ where local vulnerabilities provide the fuel for the new scramble.
Firstly, the region is experiencing demographic fury, with Ethiopia’s population projected to surpass 150 million by 2030, creating an urgent and existential need for resource security and employment. This massive youth bulge represents a potential engine for growth, yet under current governance models, it serves as a source of domestic pressure that compels leaders to pursue aggressive external strategies to secure economic lifelines.
Secondly, environmental stress has reached a historic tipping point; the failure of consecutive rainy seasons across Somalia and southern Ethiopia has left 20 to 25 million people in need of urgent assistance, demonstrating that climate shocks do not merely create humanitarian needs but accelerate geopolitical conflict by reinforcing factional control over dwindling resources.
Thirdly, the region is defined by a complex state spectrum, featuring a typical fragile polity converging with fraught geopolitics, with nations like Somalia wracked by dysfunctional governance due to state failure and regimes with highly militarized power, such as Eritrea. Cross-border kinship ties that make domestic insecurities inevitable and regional spillovers. Groups like the Afars and Somalis straddle multiple national borders, ensuring that a crisis in Mogadishu or Djibouti immediately impacts the security of Addis Abeba. This interdependence is a core feature of the Horn’s Regional Security Complex, yet the weakness of regional organizations like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has prevented the formation of an integrated security pattern.
Besides, the region offers a logical battleground for power dynamics, as states seek security and influence over critical navigation routes and regional centers of global logistics. A paradigmatic example of this is Djibouti, hosting multiple foreign military powers, including the United States, China, France, Italy, and Japan, all operating within its confines. To this effect, the region remains a pre-complex, exhibiting bilateral security interdependence but failing to link these into a collective framework due to external penetration from the superpowers and Middle Eastern and Gulf states.
Colonial legacy, Ethiopia’s sea access imperative
The historical roots of the current scramble are embedded in the colonial cartographies of the late 19th century, which disrupted centuries of organic regional interaction. Firstly, the 1884 Hewett Treaty and the 1900 Italo-Ethiopian agreement are often revisited today as evidence of colonial injustices that severed Ethiopia’s historical and legitimate ties to the Red Sea. During the reign of Emperor Menelik II, Ethiopia was a conscious rival to European imperial expansion, defeating Italy at Adwa in 1896, yet the subsequent colonial consolidation of Eritrea left the Ethiopian state permanently vulnerable to the maritime designs of foreign powers.
Secondly, the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952 under UN Resolution 390 A(V) was intended to provide a durable solution to Ethiopia’s maritime needs. However, the erosion of federation arrangements and the subsequent 30-year war of independence ultimately left Ethiopia landlocked in 1993, a transition that Acceptance of Eritrea’s independence by the then-transitional leader Meles Zenawi continues to provoke resentment across Ethiopia’s current political spectrum.
Thirdly, the colonial legacy has created a ‘vortex effect’ where regionalized conflicts are intensified by the interventions of global powers seeking to fill the void left by decaying national institutions. During the Cold War, the Horn was a primary laboratory for superpower competition, characterized by the Soviet Union and the United States frequently switching allegiances between Ethiopia and Somalia to secure the strategic port of Berbera and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
Today, the logic of the scramble remains neo-realist, as Ethiopia depends on the Port of Djibouti for 90% of its trade, a situation that has been described as a ‘geographic prison’ by Ethiopian authorities, restricting strategic autonomy. This historical trauma informs Ethiopia’s contemporary quest for sea access, which is framed not as territorial expansionism but as the legitimate pursuit of economic sovereignty.
Assab: Path from division to dividend
Within the volatility of the new scramble, the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea over maritime access requires a measured and cautious scholarly approach. Firstly, it must be argued that Ethiopia has a legitimate national interest in securing reliable, sovereign-linked access to the sea, particularly through the Port of Assab. For a nation populated by over 120 million, maritime access is not an optional pursuit or a symbolic prestige project; it is a structural condition for national growth, economic competitiveness, and sovereign resilience. The historical precedent for this interest is robust; between 1991 and 1998, Ethiopia accessed Assab under peaceful, commercially sound conditions, demonstrating that such access is entirely compatible with Eritrean autonomy.
Secondly, the quest for Assab must be answered through peaceful choreography and the application of international legal frameworks rather than coercive force. International law offers a pathway through the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), where Article 125 recognizes the right of landlocked states to freedom of transit to and from the sea. While such rights are subject to bilateral agreement, legal scholars propose the establishment of a ‘sovereign easement’ or a jointly administered Special Economic and Logistics Zone in Assab, potentially overseen by the African Union or UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Such a solution would transform Assab from a symbol of division into a site of regional convergence, providing economic dividends for both Asmara and Addis Abeba. It is imperative that Ethiopia avoid rhetorical frames that evoke irredentism, as the language of force would only erode the moral high ground and invite international rebuke in an already fragile Red Sea order.
Middle East Spillover: Gulf rivalries, proxy wars in Horn
The instability of the Middle East has metastasized across the Red Sea, turning the Horn into a primary laboratory for competing geopolitical models. Firstly, the ‘Israel-Somaliland Episode’ involving Israel’s recognition of Hargeisa on 26 December, 2025, represents a dramatic strategic move designed to secure a foothold opposite Yemen and establish an early warning system against Houthi movements. This recognition has created an ‘Israeli node’ in the Horn that invites hostile attention from regional actors like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, potentially escalating proxy conflicts and threatening the cohesion of the Somali Republic.
The instability of the Middle East has metastasized across the Red Sea, turning the Horn into a primary laboratory for competing geopolitical models.”
Secondly, the openly confrontational rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become the major destabilizing factor in the region. A definitive rupture occurred on 30 December, 2025, when Saudi airstrikes targeted a UAE-linked weapons shipment in the Yemeni port of Mukalla, signaling a shift toward active containment of Emirati influence in the Red Sea.
Thirdly, this Gulf schism has created a ‘Sudanization’ risk where local actors play Riyadh and Abu Dhabi against each other to secure funding and weaponry, leading to the durable partition of territory and the hollowing out of national institutions. The UAE has been accused of providing logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan through multi-billion-dollar investments and discreet military channels, while Saudi Arabia and its ally Egypt largely support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), utilizing Turkish-made drones in the conflict. This competition for ports and bases has effectively sidelined regional institutions, as states in the Horn are forced to choose sides in a brawl that serves the domestic political pressures of foreign patrons rather than the developmental needs of local populations.
China’s strategic anchor, neo-colonial influence
China’s engagement with the Horn of Africa represents a sophisticated evolution of influence that blends ‘soft power’ infrastructure with ‘hard power’ security engagement. Firstly, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a growing role in China’s Africa strategy, utilizing professional military education (PME) for African officers and participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) to build goodwill and secure access to strategic locations. By 2023, China was the second-largest financial contributor to UN PKOs and had deployed over 30,000 personnel to the continent, allowing Beijing to protect its massive investments while minimizing its visible unilateral military footprint. China has long invested economically and strategically in the Horn, including its military base in Djibouti and infrastructure projects like the Djibouti Addis Abeba railway.
Secondly, Beijing faces ‘dueling priorities‘ in the Horn, balancing its desperate need for energy security in Sudan with its desire to be viewed as a responsible global leader. China remains Sudan’s largest trading partner and has invested billions in its oil infrastructure, a symbiotic relationship that critics label as ‘neo-colonialism with Chinese characteristics.’
Thirdly, the role of Chinese arms sales is a critical component of the new scramble. China’s arms sales are often driven by a ‘no-strings-attached’ policy, providing weaponry to states isolated by Western sanctions due to human rights concerns. China has consistently used its veto power in the UN Security Council to dilute or block sanctions related to the Darfur conflict, defending arms transfers as ‘sovereign business.’
India’s role, BRICS membership, and Western dilemma
India and the BRICS bloc have emerged as significant alternative poles of influence, offering the Horn of Africa a different path toward modernization. Firstly, India has redefined Africa as a central axis of its ‘maritime statecraft,’ implemented through the SAGAR and MAHASAGAR doctrines. During his visit to Ethiopia in December 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi elevated bilateral relations to a strategic partnership, focusing on a ‘resilience and redundancy’ model that provides non-colonial security solutions centered on capacity-building and digital infrastructure.
The future of the Horn of Africa depends on its ability to navigate the Western dilemma ….”
Secondly, Ethiopia’s entry into the BRICS bloc in 2024 has created a ‘Western dilemma’ for the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. While BRICS membership offers access to alternative development finance through the New Development Bank (NDB) without policy conditionalities, Ethiopia remains dependent on Western-led institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for debt restructuring.
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Thirdly, this strategic hedging, deepening ties with China and Russia for infrastructure and defense while maintaining dialogue with the West for economic stabilization, is a pragmatic response to the ‘Global Turn.’ However, this multi-alignment carries the risk of waning confidence among Eastern partners if Addis Abeba is perceived as surrendering its economic sovereignty to the Bretton Woods institutions.
Conclusion
The 39th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, held in February 2026, serves as a poignant reminder that the Horn of Africa’s developmental aspirations are currently in a direct collision with a fracturing global order. This modern scramble for the region is no longer a simple bilateral competition but a complex ‘cauldron of contradictions’ where the decline of Western ideological dominance has given way to a ‘Coming Global Turn’. Within this shift, the Horn has transformed into a strategic chessboard where a multitude of players, ranging from Middle Eastern powers to the BRICS bloc, are pursuing maritime corridors and strategic depth at the expense of regional stability.
The traditional norms of the Liberal International Order are facing ‘Deep Contestations,’ most notably evidenced by the shattering of international consensus regarding Somalia’s sovereignty following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in late 2025. This erosion of legal certainty is mirrored by the ‘Sudanization’ risk fueled by the confrontational rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which threatens to hollow out national institutions in favor of proxy interests. Consequently, the region remains trapped in a pre-complex state, where bilateral security interdependencies fail to coalesce into a meaningful collective framework due to constant external penetration.
To escape this geographic prison, particularly regarding Ethiopia’s quest for sea access, the region must pivot from coercive rhetoric toward ‘peaceful choreography’ and the application of international legal frameworks like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By establishing innovative solutions such as sovereign easements or jointly administered economic zones, historical traumas like the loss of the Port of Assab can be transformed into catalysts for regional convergence. Such a transition would allow the Horn to move beyond being a laboratory for foreign geopolitical models and instead leverage its demographic fury and strategic position to secure true economic sovereignty.
Ultimately, the future of the Horn of Africa depends on its ability to navigate the Western dilemma by balancing essential engagement with Bretton Woods institutions against the burgeoning influence of the Chinese and Indian anchors. As the African Union strives to prioritize water and sustainability, it must simultaneously address the shadow agenda of instability that threatens to undermine these very goals.
For the Horn’s inhabitants, the hope for social order and national growth consistently falls short of the threat of being drawn into relentless power struggles with ‘no winner’ driven by external intervention. Only through an integrated security pattern that prioritizes local developmental needs over foreign strategic whims can the ‘Peninsula of Peril’ finally realize its immense promise as a resilient and autonomous global hub. AS
Editor’s Note: Hassen Mama Muse is a lawyer based in Addis Abeba. He can be contacted at [email protected]
Fikadu T. Ayanie (PhD) is an author, researcher, and assistant professor of Governance and Development Studies at Jimma University. He can be contacted at [email protected]