There are moments when a forum stops being a gathering and becomes a mirror. The Lomé Peace and Security Forum (11-12 October 2025) did exactly that–a quiet reframing of African peace and security through the lens of technological power. It exposed a shift African policymakers still treat as peripheral: the future of peace will be shaped less by territorial control and more by technological sovereignty.
Somalia and the illusion of process
Across the Horn and the Great Lakes — Somalia included — peace frameworks have multiplied. Yet instability endures. The problem has never been a shortage of processes; it is the persistence of incentives that make disorder more rewarding than reform.
Somalia is a clear example. UNOSOM’s state-building attempt in the 1990s collapsed when external authority confronted entrenched clan power. The 2000 Arta process excluded key factions and lacked territorial legitimacy, but held international legitimacy. The 2002-04 Mbagathi/Nairobi process produced a federal project dependent on Ethiopian military protection, hardening domestic resistance and accelerating insurgency.
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Different formats, same logic: frameworks were projected downwards while political and economic incentives pulled in the opposite direction. The 4.5 clan formula, intended as compromise, instead entrenched elite bargains, derailed competitive politics, and locked power into cyclical renegotiation.
Today, months before the end of the federal mandate — and decades after the illusion of durable peace processes — Somalia still lacks agreement on how power should be shared, transferred, or contested. The constitutional review is unresolved, federal-state relations are strained, the security command structure is disputed, and the electoral model itself remains open. These are not procedural gaps; they reflect a deeper governance vacuum where ambiguity functions as political currency; unclear rules advantage those with leverage.
Instability as a political economy
Somalia’s conflict is not simply the absence of order — it is a political economy with predictable incentives. Development assistance funds the state. Donor-driven political activity sustains domestic commercial ecosystems — from hotels to private security companies — that would shrink without the international presence. External militaries bear much of the cost of securing strategic areas.
Al-Shabaab, meanwhile, maintains a parallel taxation system across trade routes and marketplaces. While recent financial regulations have tightened formal banking, the group continues to extract revenue through cash-based networks that rival the state’s reach in several regions.
In this context, crisis generates predictable returns while reform yields uncertain ones. Instability is not accidental; it is rational. And the same incentives that sustain political fragility now shape Africa’s technological future.
This is where Lomé’s discussion becomes relevant: Africa’s sovereignty dilemma is no longer just political — it is infrastructural, and increasingly digital.
The digital mirror
Lomé made the shift unmistakable. In the Artificial Intelligence and Peace session, H. E. Cina Lawson, Dr Rosa Tsegaye, Noami Mwelu Kilungu, Prof. Saida Belouali, Prof. Ori Swed, and H. E. Ismail Chergui outlined a reality Africa rarely confronts directly: the continent is inside the global AI ecosystem, but not on its own terms.
This is not only about data extraction; it is about digital colonialism in practice — the concentration of data infrastructure, algorithmic design, outside African jurisdictions. Even where digital tools exist, many states lack the institutional and technical capacity to deploy them strategically for economic development, public administration, or security.
The issue is not only data-mining or a digital divide. It is built on older issues: governance gaps, uneven institutional development, limited technical capacity, and the absence of local infrastructure that can anchor long-term digital systems. Even where digital platforms exist, the ability to analyse, govern, and strategically deploy them remains limited. Control is far from the current reality. The practical path forward is not simply “owning the data,” but investing in the infrastructure and institutions that can leap Africa’s ability to shape, manage, and operationalise these technologies at scale.
Somalia’s technological dependency
Somalia’s security institutions demonstrate how political dependency is now mirrored in digital form. Drone warfare reveals the gap between sovereignty and capacity: Somali territory is monitored and targeted by systems — from US MQ-9s to Turkish TB2s and Akinci UCAVs — whose data, algorithms, and command structures lie outside Somali jurisdiction. Even when Somalia uses these tools, it does not own the architecture that governs them.
A similar pattern shapes domestic governance. Elements of NISA’s data platforms, biometric identification systems, and border and immigration infrastructure are hosted externally or managed through foreign contractors. Sensitive information about population movement, identity, and national security can reside outside the state’s control.
These are not only technical gaps; they are political ones. Somalia’s sovereignty cannot be outsourced indefinitely — whether in security or in the digital space.
The continental stakes
As major development partners redirect portions of their budgets towards climate adaptation, digital public infrastructure, and emerging AI governance, African states — especially fragile ones — will face pressure to adapt to shifting funding priorities. For countries like Somalia, this may reduce support for traditional peacebuilding and security assistance at a moment when governance weaknesses remain acute.
The Lomé Forum underscored three priorities:
Africa-controlled digital infrastructure
Critical data should be stored and governed within African jurisdictions, not offshore.
Indigenous technical capacity
The continent needs engineers, coders, and data scientists who can build and oversee critical systems.
Norms for AI in peace and security
Governments must develop ethical frameworks that prevent external exploitation and internal abuse.
These conversations are not abstract. AI and digital infrastructure are becoming the next terrain where sovereignty is negotiated, contested, and potentially lost.
Lomé as a turning point
Lomé 2025 reframed sovereignty in a way African security debates have long sidestepped: power now lies as much in the design of digital systems as in the control of territory. The tools that can predict violence, counter/track manipulation, or govern borders exist — but they can entrench dependency as easily as they can promote stability.
Africa’s next peace frontier will be digital. The question is whether the continent will shape that future — or whether it will simply inherit systems built elsewhere, with priorities not its own.
Subeida Mukhtar is a policy researcher and writer focused on technology, peacebuilding, and African regional cooperation. A former Secretary General of the Benadir Regional Administration and Mogadishu Municipality, she bridges governance practice with research on digital sovereignty and political settlements across the Horn of Africa. A proud Howard University alumna, she writes on the intersection of power, technology, and policy.
