Addis Abeba — For more than three decades, Somaliland has occupied a peculiar and increasingly indefensible position in international politics. It fulfills every empirical and legal criterion of statehood: clearly defined borders rooted in colonial demarcations, a permanent and civically engaged population, functioning government institutions, and a demonstrable capacity to conduct foreign relations. Yet for most of its modern existence, Somaliland has remained absent from formal international recognition, treated as a diplomatic afterthought rather than a political reality.
As one senior African diplomat once remarked in private, “If Somaliland were judged on performance rather than politics, its recognition would not even be controversial.” That observation captures the heart of the paradox. Somaliland’s exclusion exposes a structural failure within the contemporary international system–one in which strategic inertia, rigid diplomatic conventions, and the sensitivities of authoritarian regimes routinely outweigh measurable success in governance, security, and democratic legitimacy.
With the arrival of 2026, however, this paradox is becoming increasingly untenable. The “Somaliland question,” long confined to academic debates and legal footnotes, has moved decisively into the center of Red Sea and Horn of Africa geopolitics. Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland in early 2024, followed by Israel’s formal recognition in December 2025, has forced the international community to confront a reality it has deferred for more than thirty years: the functional state in Hargeisa can no longer be held hostage to the chronic dysfunction of Mogadishu.
Restoration, not secession
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The most persistent misconception surrounding Somaliland is the casual and inaccurate application of the term “secession.” In legal and historical terms, Somaliland is not a breakaway province seeking to manufacture sovereignty. It is a previously recognized state reasserting a sovereignty that was voluntarily suspended and never legally extinguished.
On 26 June 1960, the former British Somaliland Protectorate attained full independence. It was recognized by 35 United Nations member states, including all five permanent members of the Security Council. This independence was not symbolic or transitional. It was formal, sovereign, and internationally acknowledged.
Crucially, Somaliland’s sovereignty was registered in the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), Volume 374, Registration No. 5349–a bilateral agreement between the independent Government of Somaliland and the United Kingdom. Under Article 102 of the UN Charter, such registration is reserved exclusively for sovereign entities capable of treaty-making. As one international law expert has noted, “UN treaty registration is not ceremonial; it is a legal affirmation of sovereign capacity.”
Days later, Somaliland entered a voluntary political union with the former Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic. That union, however, was never consolidated through a single, mutually ratified legal instrument. The African Union’s 2005 Fact-Finding Mission confirmed this omission, stating that the union “was not ratified” and lacked a formal legal foundation.
When the Somali state collapsed in 1991–following systematic violence, mass displacement, and the aerial bombardment of northern cities by the Siad Barre regime–Somaliland did not secede. As one legal scholar summarized succinctly, “You cannot secede from a union that was never legally consummated.” Somaliland withdrew from a failed political arrangement and restored the sovereignty it had exercised and registered decades earlier.
While Somalia’s post-1991 reconstruction was driven largely by externally managed state-building projects, Somaliland pursued a fundamentally different trajectory. Stability emerged not from international conferences or foreign blueprints, but from internal reconciliation and local consensus.
A series of indigenous clan conferences throughout the 1990s laid the foundation for a hybrid political system that blended customary authority with constitutional governance. This model, often misunderstood by external observers, has proven remarkably resilient. At its core is the Guurti, the institutionalized Council of Elders, which serves as a culturally grounded check on executive authority and a mechanism for conflict mediation.
As one African governance specialist observed, “Somaliland succeeded because it localized democracy rather than importing it wholesale.” This hybrid system has overseen multiple peaceful transfers of power through competitive elections–an achievement that remains rare in the Horn of Africa.
Resistance to Somaliland’s re-emergence is sustained by a coalition of status-quo powers whose objections are driven less by law than by interest.”
Institutionally, Somaliland operates its own currency, issues biometric passports, and maintains an independent central bank and judiciary. Its security apparatus has effectively insulated the territory from the extremist violence that has plagued much of the region, all without the permanent presence of foreign peacekeepers. In contrast, Somalia’s federal government remains heavily dependent on the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to sustain even basic state authority.
Berbera, logic of strategic realism
Somaliland’s political stability has been reinforced by strategic economic choices, none more consequential than the redevelopment of the Port of Berbera. The DP World-backed investment transformed Berbera from a neglected harbor into a modern logistics hub, reshaping regional trade dynamics.
For landlocked Ethiopia, Berbera has evolved from a supplementary outlet into a core pillar of national economic security. Ethiopian policymakers have increasingly acknowledged that “diversifying access to the sea is not optional–it is existential.” The Berbera Corridor offers Addis Abeba not only logistical redundancy but also strategic autonomy in a volatile region.
The 2024 Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland reflected this logic. It was not an ideological gesture but a pragmatic alignment based on infrastructure, geography, and mutual interest. As one regional analyst put it, “This is what strategic realism looks like in the Horn of Africa–states partnering with what works.”
Opponents of Somaliland’s recognition frequently invoke uti possidetis juris, the sanctity of inherited colonial borders. Yet history demonstrates that this principle has never been applied uniformly. Eritrea, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste all achieved recognition through political exception. Kosovo’s independence was justified on humanitarian and self-determination grounds. As a former African Union official once admitted candidly, “Territorial integrity has always been flexible–except when Somaliland is involved.”
Resistance to Somaliland’s re-emergence is sustained by a coalition of status-quo powers whose objections are driven less by law than by interest. Turkey and Qatar perceive a recognized Somaliland as a threat to their extensive political and military investments in Mogadishu. China opposes recognition not out of concern for Somali unity but to suppress any precedent that could embolden self-determination movements elsewhere, particularly in relation to Taiwan. Djibouti, meanwhile, views a recognized Berbera as a direct challenge to its long-standing dominance over Ethiopian transit. The result is a diplomatic environment in which a functioning democracy is penalized for its success, while chronic instability is rewarded with perpetual international indulgence.
The 2025 rupture, Red Sea realignment
That stalemate fractured decisively on 26 December 2025, when Israel formally recognized Somaliland as a sovereign state–the first UN member to do so. Israeli officials framed the move within the strategic logic of the Abraham Accords, emphasizing that “reliability and stability, not slogans, define real partnerships.”
The timing was not accidental. Throughout 2025, the Red Sea emerged as a focal point of global insecurity, marked by Houthi attacks, disrupted shipping lanes, and intensifying great-power competition. In this context, Somaliland’s strategic coastline along the Bab al-Mandab Strait assumed renewed importance. As one Western naval analyst warned, “You cannot secure one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors while ignoring its most stable coastline.” Recognition provides the legal and institutional framework necessary for maritime security cooperation, counter-terrorism coordination, and intelligence sharing–capabilities that a fragmented Somalia cannot reliably offer.
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The continued hesitation of Western democracies–particularly the United States and the United Kingdom–now appears less like caution and more like strategic drift. By deferring to an ill-defined “African Union consensus,” Western powers have effectively outsourced leadership to a status quo that rewards chronic failure while penalizing democratic success. As one former Western diplomat in the region observed, “We keep betting on a future Somalia while ignoring a present Somaliland.” This posture inadvertently empowers authoritarian actors and undermines the very principles–democracy, accountability, stability–that Western policy claims to promote.
Conclusion
Somaliland represents the clearest test of the international liberal order’s credibility. It exposes the widening gap between professed principles and practiced policy. Continued silence is not neutrality; it is a political choice–one that prioritizes diplomatic convenience over the lived reality of more than five million people who built peace, institutions, and democracy without trusteeship.
The African Union’s own 2005 mission concluded that Somaliland is “clothed with the relevant attributes of a modern state.” With Ethiopia’s strategic engagement and Israel’s formal recognition, the issue has crossed a threshold of irreversibility. As one senior Horn of Africa diplomat recently put it, “The question is no longer whether Somaliland qualifies as a state, but whether the international system can survive its own contradictions.”
It is time to replace the geopolitics of fear with the governance of truth. The rightful occupant of the seat has returned. The world must finally stop pretending the chair is empty. AS
Editor’s Note: Adam Daud Ahmed is a political and security analyst specializing in the Horn of Africa, with a focus on democracy, regional geopolitics, and counterterrorism. He can be reached at [email protected]
