Africa: The AU Has Frozen the Somaliland Debate – Political Solutions Are Needed

Africa: The AU Has Frozen the Somaliland Debate – Political Solutions Are Needed


Israel’s Somaliland recognition generated unusual cohesion in Africa and beyond, but condemnation hasn’t delivered a consensual solution.

Israel’s December 2025 recognition of Somaliland, a secessionist northern part of Somalia, set off a series of political and diplomatic shockwaves in the Horn of Africa and Arabic Peninsula. In a region already facing acute tensions amid global geopolitical reconfigurations, how the African Union (AU) handles the fallout will be key.

Somalia rejected the move as an infringement on its territorial integrity. Most regional and international organisations including the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, United Nations (UN), European Union and Arab League condemned Israel’s actions, citing violations of international law, the AU’s Constitutive Act and the UN Charter.

Some countries known for their opposition to Somaliland’s independence, such as Djibouti, Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, reacted similarly. Others kept silent in an attitude of ‘wait and see’.


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For the AU, any unilateral claim of sovereignty is an irritant. Its highest decision-making body, the Peace and Security Council, strongly condemned Israel’s position, saying: ‘No actor has the authority or standing to alter the territorial configuration of an AU Member State.’ However, this strong wording froze the discussion without providing a consensual solution.

Somaliland’s quest for international recognition symbolises various dimensions of African post-colonial statehood. It raises questions around the criteria for sovereignty and has legal, political, geopolitical and regional implications.

Somaliland gained independence from Great Britain on 26 June 1960. After Somalia secured independence from the Italian-administered UN Trusteeship on 1 July 1960, the Republic of Somalia was formed as a union of former British Somaliland and Somalia Italiana. However, following the outbreak of civil war in 1969 and the collapse of Somalia’s central government, Somaliland declared independence in 1991.

From a strict legal perspective, the AU often invokes the commitment of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, to the intangibility of borders inherited from colonisation. The principle was established in 1964 in Cairo to avoid the multiplication of irredentist claims that could have destabilised newly established states. The Cairo Declaration has since been a cornerstone of the AU’s normative framework.

However, advocates of Somaliland’s independence use the same principle to justify its quest for sovereignty. The entity’s independence was achieved within the borders of British Somaliland. The decision to form a union with Somalia was its own, and so, supporters say, Somaliland has the right to reverse its decision.

The relative stability and regular alternation of power in Somaliland’s elections are also cited by advocates of the country’s independence.

Rather than making a legal case, the AU would be better served by advancing a political argument grounded in respect for the territorial integrity of its member states. That paves the way for political solutions as the preferred means of resolving internal tensions. The AU is also wary of setting a precedent that could have far-reaching consequences in the Horn of Africa, the only region where secession has led to the creation of new states.

Eritrea and South Sudan seceded from Ethiopia and Sudan in 1993 and 2011 respectively. The severe post-liberation challenges these two newly established countries face, characterised by authoritarian repression and intense internal conflict, do not serve Somaliland’s cause.

New states in the region tend to inherit the same problems as pre-existing states. Their structural foundations were compromised long before the clamour for independence. As a result, new states fail to realise their envisioned objectives, owing to numerous factors, including the act of separation itself.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has generated an unusual degree of cohesion among regional actors and AU member states against Somaliland. This is because it stems from the actions of an external actor and violates a sacrosanct AU principle: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For the AU, the Somaliland question represents a particularly acute challenge: it has reiterated a normative principle in the face of a crisis, but lacks the operational means to enforce it. At a time when the AU’s peace and security framework is under review, member states should propose innovative ways to empower the AU Commission to enforce its principles.

The Somaliland question is also a reminder that, despite being deployed in Somalia since 2007, the AU has allowed this issue to fester until it became vulnerable to instrumentalisation by external actors.

For Somalia, Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition, combined with the strong internal support it enjoys, directly undermines pan-Somalism, the country’s implicit state ideology. Somali nationalism is grounded in the idea that all Somalis should be united in a single nation, as they share a common identity, culture, and language.

The pursuit of that political project led to wars in East Africa. Over the years, Somalia has gradually abandoned its ambition of unifying Somali-inhabited territories in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

In this context, Somaliland’s entrenched secessionist project questions not only the viability of Somalia within its current borders, but also challenges the foundations of pan-Somalism, an ideology grounded on contested assumptions.