Launching on Friday, South Africa’s joint naval exercise with China, Russia and Iran goes beyond manoeuvres at sea. The drills signal determination to project influence in southern Africa, a region that holds growing strategic importance for Moscow and Beijing.
The Mosi-3 exercise will run for a week off the coast of Cape Town, under Chinese leadership, with South Africa acting as host.
In a statement, the South African Navy said the manoeuvres would involve vessels from Brics+, a grouping that has recently expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates.
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In reality, however, the exercise is largely a coming-together of China, Russia and Iran.
Tellingly, the Mosi drills – a multinational naval exercise hosted by South Africa every two years – were rebranded at the last minute as “Will for Peace”. According to the South African National Defence Force, the chosen theme is “joint actions to ensure the safety of shipping and maritime economic activities”.
It is an ambitious objective, although the number of ships involved will be modest.
China is sending two vessels, the guided-missile destroyer Tangshan and the supply ship Taihu. Russia is deploying a corvette equipped with a helicopter, while Iran is contributing its 103rd flotilla.
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An exercise in influence
By welcoming Iranian vessels for the first time, South Africa’s latest naval exercise has broken with tradition – a move that is seen as a clear sign of converging interests between Iran, China and Russia.
All three share an ambition to challenge what they see as a Western-dominated international order.
The deployment is taking place not far from French-controlled waters in the Indian Ocean, and the French military is watching closely.
“I think it’s mainly a signal,” one senior officer told RFI, speaking anonymously. “They’re not going to achieve real naval interoperability in a week, but they are sending a strategic message. They are showing that they can project power far from home.”
The timing is also no coincidence. With shipping routes being diverted away from the Red Sea because of tensions linked to attacks by Houthi rebels from Yemen, there is renewed interest in asserting a presence around the Cape of Good Hope – the maritime crossroads between the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic.
“The fact that they changed the name of the exercise to ‘Will for Peace’ at the last minute is revealing,” the officer added. “The message is implicit: the Americans use force against countries in the Global South, such as Venezuela, while they present themselves as a bloc united around peace.”
Chinese ‘geopolitics of debt’
While the three guest nations are not necessarily pursuing identical goals in the southern Indian Ocean, together they are flexing their respective muscles and marking out an area of interest.
Over the past two decades, Beijing has become Africa’s leading trading partner and bilateral creditor, with southern Africa playing a central role in Chinese strategy.
China’s influence in the western Indian Ocean is also built on infrastructure, notably through the Belt and Road Initiative.
In Madagascar, Tanzania and Mozambique, it is financing and constructing ports, roads and energy projects.
China’s expanding footprint allows Beijing to secure fishing rights, protect its maritime trade flows and potentially lay the groundwork for future military facilities.
“It fits perfectly with their largely commercial offer,” the French officer notes. “Because they are buyers and lenders, it’s the geopolitics of debt. But it also adds another layer, by showing that they now have growing military capabilities in a world where power is becoming more and more significant.”
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Moscow seeks to offset isolation
For Moscow, the war in Ukraine has only heightened Africa’s strategic importance.
Russia’s engagement in southern Africa reflects a need to offset the political and economic isolation brought about by Western sanctions imposed since 2022.
Diplomatically, the region is seen by Moscow as a valuable “reservoir” of support. At the United Nations General Assembly, several southern African countries – including Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania – have abstained or declined to back resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.
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And when it comes to energy, European sanctions are pushing Russia to diversify its partnerships in Africa.
In the Mozambique Channel, this approach translates into offers of energy and security cooperation, particularly to Mozambique, Madagascar and the Comoros.
According to French military sources in the region, these relationships are often built on a predatory model, combining military assistance with influence operations.
“Unlike the Chinese, who focus on economics, the Russians are far more active on the military front,” one officer explained to RFI. “They are promoting anti-French narratives in Madagascar and the Comoros.”
The region also serves as a transit route for Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet“, giving Moscow a clear interest in securing these waters.
As for Iran, its participation in the exercise above all signals strategic solidarity with Russia – and, by extension, with China.
In southern Africa, China and Russia present their approach as one of “equal partnerships”.
However, behind this strategy lies a different logic. By institutionalising their naval presence through exercises such as Mosi-3, both countries are showcasing their strength and asserting their geopolitical ambitions in a region that is growing ever more strategically important.
This article has been adapted from the original in French by RFI’s Frank Alexandre.
