Addis Abeba — In August 2022, President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud announced that his administration would launch a “total war” against the Al-Qaida-linked militant group Al-Shabaab. The declaration came in the aftermath of a deadly hotel siege in Mogadishu, which left at least 21 people dead and more than 100 wounded. In his address, the president acknowledged the nation’s collective grief, stating that he understood the Somali people were weary of “endless mourning” and the repeated loss of loved ones in terrorist attacks. He urged citizens to brace themselves for a full-scale offensive against what he described as “ruthless terrorists who are hostile to the country’s peace.”
Three years on from that declaration, Somalia faces the grim reality of a strategic unraveling. What was once presented as a bold campaign to reclaim national sovereignty has instead revealed significant shortcomings in Mogadishu’s leadership and underscored the vulnerability of its security apparatus.
President Hassan’s declaration of “total war” echoed the triumphalist counterterrorism rhetoric often heard in African capitals. However, the reality on the ground told a different story. Even as he addressed the nation in 2022, intense fighting was underway between Matabaan and Maxaas, led by Hawadle clan militias with support from Ayr contingents. Their grassroots offensive compelled militants to abandon checkpoints that had been under their control for more than a decade, offering Mogadishu a rare and significant opportunity to stabilize newly liberated areas.
Rather than capitalizing on these gains, the federal government appropriated the narrative without committing adequate territorial holding forces, initiating meaningful clan reconciliation efforts, or establishing effective governance structures. By 2024, all districts recaptured by Hawadle fighters had fallen back into Al-Shabaab’s hands–highlighting Mogadishu’s persistent failure to convert tactical advances into lasting strategic success.
The human and material toll of the campaign has been staggering. Somalia has lost an estimated 3,700 regular troops and 2,054 Macawisleey militia fighters, with more than 9,600 wounded. Al-Shabaab has seized 171 combat vehicles and destroyed an additional 92. Entire military units have been decimated, including 20,000 national forces–comprising 10,000 troops trained in Eritrea and another 10,000 funded by the United Arab Emirates under the Abu Dujaana and Abu Hebel formations.
Among the casualties were 132 officers, including four generals and thirteen colonels, who were killed in battles spanning from Cowsweyne to Galcad. The material losses were not limited to ground vehicles; seventeen U.S.-supplied drones were either lost or crashed. Desertions have become widespread, with more than 4,300 regular troops abandoning their posts, alongside 620 deserters from the Abu Dujaana special forces.
Al-Shabaab’s resilience is political as much as military, exploiting grievances against corruption and neglect to embed itself as de facto authority.”
Somalia’s security leadership has been reshuffled with such frequency that operational continuity is impossible. Within three years, the country cycled through multiple ministers, army commanders, and intelligence chiefs. Defense ministers averaged just four months in office, while military chiefs saw three complete turnovers. This revolving door, rooted in clan arithmetic governance, resulted in at least four major offensives collapsing mid-campaign due to abrupt leadership changes.
Expanding shadow state of Al-Shabaab
While Mogadishu struggles to pay its soldiers, Al-Shabaab entrenched itself as a shadow state, operating over 140 Sharia courts and 86 schools in the Bay and Bakool regions. It controls tax collection on 60% of major trade routes, using revenues to finance recruitment and governance. Al-Shabaab’s resilience is political as much as military, exploiting grievances against corruption and neglect to embed itself as de facto authority.
Amid battlefield disasters, President Hassan’s administration diverted attention to contesting Somaliland’s affairs. Reports indicate that Mogadishu allocated millions to undermine Somaliland’s port deal with Ethiopia in 2024 and deployed 500 elite troops to its border. These forces were transferred from Galgaduud and Lower Shabelle, enabling Al-Shabaab to recapture Ceelbuur and Galcad. While militants advanced, Mogadishu prioritized destabilizing Somaliland rather than countering terrorism within its own collapsing borders.
President Hassan continues to trumpet “One Person, One Vote” as evidence of democratic progress. In reality, it is a tactic to engineer a rigged electoral process confined to Mogadishu–a city it does not fully control. The notion that Somalia can hold free and fair elections under current conditions is an illusion designed for international donors.
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Intelligence assessments suggest that Al-Shabaab is preparing to intensify its campaign against Mogadishu. The group’s strategy appears to involve a combination of economic sabotage–specifically targeting port operations, which account for 68% of government revenue–alongside targeted assassinations and coordinated military offensives. In 2025 alone, Al-Shabaab has executed seventeen high-profile assassinations, underscoring the extent of its infiltration and its apparent superiority in intelligence operations.
Currently, Somalia stands on the brink. The harsh reality is clear: Al-Shabaab is not simply enduring–it is gaining ground. Unless the country’s leadership moves beyond superficial reforms and embraces a bold strategic overhaul grounded in honest governance and inclusive national mobilization, preventing the fall of Mogadishu may prove increasingly difficult. AS
Editor’s Note: Adam Daud Ahmed, a Horn of Africa political and security analyst in Hargeisa, Somaliland, specializes in geopolitics, counterterrorism, and democratization. He holds a master’s degree in international relations.
