President Emmanuel Macron has called for a “rebalanced”, “equal-to-equal” partnership between France and African countries, signalling a continued shift away from the military-heavy approach that long defined France’s presence on the continent.
Speaking at the Élysée Palace during France’s annual meeting with ambassadors on Thursday, Macron said French policy towards Africa had undergone a fundamental change since 2017, when he declared in Ouagadougou: “There no longer is a French policy for Africa.”
France, he said, now sought partnerships that were not based primarily on historical or linguistic ties and did not automatically prioritise French-speaking countries.
A central element of this shift has been the overhaul of France’s military footprint in Africa.
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Since Macron came to power in 2017, France has ended or drastically reduced its military presence in Central and West Africa, withdrawing troops from Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal.
Macron said France had “completely changed its mindset” on Africa since his speech in Ouagadougou, insisting that the reduction of its military presence, notably in Mali and Burkina, was a necessary correction rather than a retreat.
“We reviewed, and rightly so, our military bases,” he said, adding that France had “removed the military component that was no longer understood by countries and by younger generations”, while rebuilding “relevant” partnerships, notably in Benin.
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Obliged to adapt
Seidik Abba, a Nigerien academic specialising in the Sahel, contests the idea that France drove these changes.
“It is not true to say that it was France that decided to withdraw,” he told RFI, pointing to pressure from African governments and growing hostility among young people who viewed French bases and the CFA franc as relics of colonialism.
For security analyst Emmanuel Dupuy, head of the Institute for European Perspective and Security Studies, Macron’s reference to Ouagadougou obscures how different the context was in 2017. At the time, France’s Sahel strategy was underpinned by the apparent success of Operation Serval and, later, Barkhane – missions that directed French military might against jihadists.
“There was a form of politico-military euphoria,” Dupuy said, with African governments actively requesting French security support. That environment has since collapsed, following coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and France’s expulsion from all three.
He describes the current phase as one of reluctant realism, with Paris “obliged to adapt” to a disengagement it did not choose.
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Boosting economic ties
With its military role curtailed, Paris is now seeking to “play another card”, Abba said, with greater emphasis on economic ties.
“As Macron himself has said, French companies need to be more aggressive and we need to move away from multinationals such as Bolloré and Total and work more closely with SMEs and French start-ups,” the analyst noted.
Macron said France’s renewed Africa policy would place greater emphasis on entrepreneurship, cultural and creative industries, and sport. Reaching young people and engaging with diasporas is seen as a crucial step.
In particular, France is seeking to expand relations with English-speaking African countries, moving beyond its traditional francophone partners.
“This is driven both by political considerations but above all the desire to gain market share and bring added value to the French economy,” Abba says.
Anglophone Africa
The French president pointed to a planned Africa summit in Nairobi in May 2026 as a milestone, describing it as “a very important meeting that will help embody this genuine revolution in our approach”.
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz have been invited, illustrating what Macron said was a change in mindset.
Dupuy, however, sees the pivot to East Africa as an implicit admission of weakness. France, he argues, failed to consolidate influence in its former spheres and is now seeking opportunities in regions dominated by China, India and the United States.
“France is very poorly equipped – perhaps even completely disarmed – to be credible in this region of the world,” he said, noting intense competition over infrastructure corridors and strategic trade routes linking the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
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Battle of narratives
Beyond economics and culture, Macron stressed the importance of countering disinformation, warning that France was losing ground in what he described as a “battle of narratives”.
“We must not lose this battle,” he said, arguing that French interests were also defended through countering disinformation and responding to accusations that France represented a new colonial power. Such narratives, he said, often drew on “anti-colonial”, “anti-European” and “anti-French” discourse and required a more robust response.
Dupuy is less alarmist. While acknowledging growing anti-French sentiment, he points to persistent demand for French support in certain security crises. France’s recent intervention in Benin, which helped stabilise President Patrice Talon’s government in the face of an attempted coup, was one such example.
“There is a paradox,” he said. “France is criticised for militarism, yet welcomed when its support proves decisive.”
Double standards?
Macron’s Africa policy has come under scrutiny for its uneven response to military coups.
A recent opinion piece in Benin’s La Nouvelle Tribune accused Macron of double standards in taking a hard line against juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while being more accommodating towards coup leaders in Gabon, Guinea and Chad. The writer said France’s selective approach undermines its democratic discourse and fuels anti-French sentiment.
Dupuy acknowledges the double standard, but argues that not all coups should be treated the same.
He suggests that the succession of Mahamat Déby in Chad in 2021 was a power transfer tacitly tolerated by France, rather than a putsch, and that military takeovers in Gabon and Guinea followed deeply contested electoral processes rather than explicit ruptures with Paris.
Elections, coups and crackdowns: Africa’s mixed democratic record in 2025
Gabon and Guinea have since embarked on transition processes, Dupuy explains, giving their leaders a degree of international legitimacy absent in the Sahel states, “where no credible electoral timelines exist”.
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Yet Guinean military leader Mamadi Doumbouya had earlier pledged not to stand, and major opposition parties were barred from running. La Nouvelle Tribune criticised Macron’s decision to congratulate him on his election victory regardless.
“There is a democratic problem, for sure,” Dupuy said, “but you cannot call for elections on the one hand, validate the electoral process by observing the polls and talking about the need for transition, and at the same time fail to welcome the fact that this transition is taking place.”
‘Recognising’ Africa
In his speech, Macron also said France was closely monitoring crises in Sudan, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region.
Dupuy was doubtful about France’s influence in such conflicts. “Everyone knows that France has no weight on the question of Sudan,” he said. And on the Great Lakes, “France has been marginalised by the Washington summit” that produced an historic peace deal between DR Congo and Rwanda.
While France is “in a phase of decline” on the African continent, he says we “shouldn’t completely bury” France’s presence. In addition to its soft power in sport, culture, the arts, heritage and returning artefacts, France, he argues, needs “to support Africans in their emergence as a power in their own right”.
“As the Americans are leaving the UN, we could take advantage of this to impose an African state as a permanent member of the Security Council,” the analyst suggested.
“President Macron made recognising Palestine his priority for 2025, and it worked. He could make bringing one or two African countries onto the Security Council his objective for 2026.
“It would be a game changer, just like recognising Palestine was.”