The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in March 2026 marks the end of a political era in the Middle Eastern country. Khamenei was killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s capital, Tehran. This has triggered a war drawing in numerous countries across the Middle East.
The Horn of Africa and Red Sea regions, which link Africa and the Middle East, share a dense web of military, political and economic interactions that enable crises on one shore to quickly affect the other. Here, Somalia, Eritrea, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti sit along one of the world’s most important trade and geopolitical corridors.
But the consequences of Khamenei’s death may be less dramatic than many expect. This is because power in Iran is dispersed across entrenched institutions and security elites who are capable of preserving regime continuity.
The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea
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Iran is no stranger to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. During the 1990s and 2000s, Tehran established security and economic ties with several countries, notably Sudan, to gain a foothold along the Red Sea.
Iran’s influence waned, however, during the 2010s as Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, increased their diplomatic, financial and military presence.
As a political scientist studying Middle Eastern and African security, I have followed Iran’s regional engagement for years. From my perspective, events in Iran and the Gulf matter to African countries because conflicts, arms flows and rivalries can easily spill across shores in a single strategic region.
Three intertwined dynamics shape how Khamenei’s death affects the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
Firstly, Tehran’s influence here has declined over the past decade. This is with the exception of Yemen, where Iran supports the Houthi movement, which has previously attacked Israeli-linked vessels.
Read more: Global power shifts are playing out in the Red Sea region: why this is where the rules are changing
Secondly, the way this latest conflict was triggered and has escalated may be more important than a change in Iranian leadership. It could contribute to a broader erosion of moderation.
Thirdly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Iran’s powerful military force – is set to play a pivotal role in the post-Khamenei transition.
This is significant for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Iran’s engagement here has largely relied on unconventional methods. Naval manoeuvres are an example, such as the long-term deployment in the Red Sea of the Iranian vessel Saviz, which has served as a logistical and intelligence platform. The country has also deployed military advisers and established arms networks to transport Iranian weapons.
Any future leadership closely aligned with the IRGC is likely to keep using these low-cost tools.
In this sense, continuity will likely prevail over rupture. Iran’s ambitions are filtered through a sober assessment of constraints that the ongoing war may entrench.
Iran’s shifting priorities
Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has considered itself a middle power with legitimate claims to regional pre-eminence. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa gradually became part of Iran’s expanded strategic geography.
Following the consolidation of the regime promoted by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Khamenei – who took over in 1989 after his predecessor’s death – progressively translated Iran’s ambition into strategic depth.
This aimed to extend Iran’s security perimeter beyond its borders through alliances, proxies and low-cost commitments.
In the 2000s, Iran cultivated close ties with Sudan and Eritrea.
It established naval access points in the two countries and used soft power tools, such as development aid and religious networks. It considered the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which is between Yemen and Djibouti, vital for countering Saudi and Israeli influence and maintaining alternative trade routes.
The limitations of this expansion became apparent, however.
Iran’s ambitions soon came up against reality. The country’s economy was weakened by sanctions linked to its nuclear programme and US withdrawal from a 2015 nuclear deal.
Read more: Iran will respond to US-Israeli strikes as existential threats to the regime – because they are
Meanwhile, political power remained fragmented across competing institutions. Domestic pressures, including economic hardship and periodic protest movements, were mounting. Instability in neighbouring states such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen made long-term regional power projection costly and uncertain.
After 2015, Saudi Arabia increased its engagement in the Horn of Africa through financial aid, diplomatic pressure and military cooperation linked to the war in Yemen.
Seeking logistical support along the Red Sea and aiming to counter Iran’s influence near the Bab el-Mandeb strait, Saudi Arabia strengthened its ties with regional governments. This prompted Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea to sever or scale back their relations with Tehran. They effectively aligned themselves with Saudi Arabia and its allies. Iran redirected resources to higher-priority theatres of war, such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen.
For a decade, therefore, Tehran’s presence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea has become more selective and opportunistic. Iran has relied on indirect leverage there, such as Houthi operations, rather than direct expansion.
Khamenei’s death is likely to reinforce rather than reverse the trend. In fact, the outcome of the current war and the start of a delicate succession process could prompt an even more cautious approach abroad.
Worsening fragility
Although a change in Iranian leadership may not alter the approach to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, the dynamics that led to the recent conflict may have an impact on the region.
The scale and visibility of the Israeli-US attack – and Iran’s direct retaliation – signal something deeper: the erosion of thresholds in the use of force.
Iran is not buying time and avoiding direct confrontation while limiting the manoeuvre room of its rivals.
This could usher in a period of “anything goes”.
Regional actors, from Gulf states to local governments, are likely to feel increasingly justified in bypassing established security norms. The Red Sea has already become a crowded arena. External powers are projecting their strength. Local states are exploiting competition among them. The reshuffling of forces triggered by the war in Iran will have repercussions throughout the region.
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In such a context, characterised by multiple hierarchies, even a reduction of Iranian capabilities could have knock-on effects.
The region’s fragility – as seen in civil war in Sudan, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, instability in Somalia and the heavy presence of military bases along maritime routes – amplifies these risks.
In other words, the question is not whether Iran will suddenly expand into east Africa. It is whether the regional climate will shift towards fewer restrictions and greater acceptance of coercive tools.
If escalation becomes normalised in the heart of the Middle East – the region’s most interconnected theatre – the fallout could be felt in places like the Horn of Africa.
Uncertainty in the short term
Khamenei’s death is likely to generate uncertainty in the short term at the regional level, but will lead to continuity in the long term.
Over time, Tehran has adopted what can be termed a “realist defence” doctrine – deterrence through a strong indirect presence, but at reduced cost and risk.
Iran’s view of international politics as a zero-sum game – where one actor’s gain is another’s loss – and its desire to reduce the influence of its rivals are not merely the result of personal legacies. Rather, they are deeply rooted in the country’s identity.
For the Horn of Africa, this means that Tehran is likely to remain a secondary but persistent player: active enough to hinder its rivals’ strategies, yet restrained enough to avoid major commitments.
Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste