Addis Abeba — The Horn of Africa, long shaped by strategic interests and colonial legacies, is once again emerging as a center of intense diplomatic engagement. With this development, Ethiopia has increasingly positioned itself as a proactive regional actor, adopting a multipolar diplomatic strategy to overcome the limitations of its landlocked geography. In contrast, Egypt has pursued a more defensive foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and what it perceives as threats to its Red Sea security doctrine. Somalia occupies a strategically ambiguous space, balancing the influence of these two regional powers while contending with ongoing internal instability. Meanwhile, Somaliland has attracted unexpected diplomatic attention, skillfully leveraging its coastal geography to establish new international partnerships.
This commentary examines three key pillars of Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive foreign policy: the management of the GERD, the strategic push for maritime access through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, and the country’s calibrated response to shifting global power dynamics, exemplified by its accession to BRICS. By analyzing the reactions of regional actors, the article explores how the Horn of Africa is being reshaped–not solely by conflict, but by competing visions of sovereignty, regional alignment, and political agency.
Pillar One: GERD as a geopolitical declaration
Ethiopia has firmly established its position on the GERD, grounded in a strong doctrine of sovereignty and legal autonomy. Rejecting any arrangement that would impose legally binding conditions on the filling or operation of the dam–particularly regarding the filling–Addis Abeba has adopted a stance of legal minimalism. Rather than entering into new treaties that could constrain its sovereign rights, Ethiopia refers to the 2015 Declaration of Principles (DoP) as a sufficient framework for cooperation, emphasizing that the agreement does not require further legal ratification.
While critics often portray this position as obstinate or obstructionist, it is more accurately described as a calculated assertion of post-colonial water rights. Notably, Ethiopia’s approach is not based on military escalation, nor does it expend excessive diplomatic capital. Instead, it reaffirms the normative principle that upstream riparian states possess equal and inherent rights to utilize transboundary water resources for national development.
In this context, the GERD has evolved into more than a hydroelectric project; it has become a geopolitical statement. It symbolically rejects the legacy of colonial-era water-sharing arrangements–particularly the 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreements, which heavily favored Egypt. As such, the GERD stands as a symbol of African self-determination, transforming Ethiopia’s pursuit of equitable access to natural resources into a broader pan-African narrative of liberation and resistance to externally imposed legal constraints.
The successful articulation of this narrative significantly enhances Ethiopia’s strategic autonomy, both globally and regionally. Consequently, the GERD stands as the foundational pillar of Ethiopia’s burgeoning geopolitical doctrine: a reordering of Nile Basin geopolitics premised on national independence, a reinterpretation of existing legal frameworks, and a rebalancing of regional power dynamics.
Pillar Two: MoU with Somaliland
Ethiopia’s most geopolitically ambitious undertaking in recent memory occurred in January 2024, with the signing of a MoU with Somaliland, a de facto but not a de jure republic. As stated in the official readout, the MoU is intended to “pave the way to realize the aspiration of Ethiopia to secure access to the sea and diversify its access to seaports.” This marks a significant departure from Ethiopia’s traditionally cautious foreign policy ethos and reflects a broader shift towards a more assertive, interest-driven approach to international relations.
At the core of the MoU lies Ethiopia’s most pressing strategic concern: sovereign access to the sea. Since Eritrea’s secession in 1993, rendering Ethiopia landlocked, the nation has predominantly relied on foreign ports–primarily Djibouti–for virtually all its maritime trade. While previous Ethiopian administrations pursued this objective through discreet diplomacy and commercial agreements, the current government has adopted a more assertive strategy, aiming to fundamentally reshape regional geopolitics. The MoU with Somaliland, therefore, represents a decisive move towards achieving both maritime and military freedom.
The GERD has evolved into more than a hydroelectric project; it has become a geopolitical statement.”
The international response was swift and varied. The Arab League issued a critique, subtly targeting Ethiopia’s ambitions by citing the potential for militarization of the Red Sea by non-littoral states as a significant threat. Egypt, already embroiled in a contentious dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD, also criticized the MoU, asserting that the agreement constitutes an egregious interference in the Red Sea’s precarious balance. These reactions underscore the destabilizing implications of Ethiopia’s new foreign policy trajectory. Addis Abeba’s actions clearly indicate that the status quo is no longer acceptable; indeed, Ethiopia is actively participating in defining a new one.
It’s noteworthy that the MoU also signals a broader shift in African diplomatic trends, moving from normative principles towards realpolitik. By signing an MoU with Somaliland, despite Somalia’s continued assertion of sovereignty over the territory and the African Union’s adherence to colonial-era boundaries, Ethiopia has prioritized its strategic interests over multilateral consensus. This step signifies a measured diplomatic maturity, dictated by pragmatic reasoning rather than ideological agreement. It also foreshadows a renewed willingness to act unilaterally, particularly concerning crucial national interests such as maritime access.
This development carries significant strategic implications. A potential Ethiopian presence in Berbera would position the nation in close proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical maritime choke point connecting the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal. Such a presence would not only enhance Ethiopia’s strategic reach but also further entrench it within the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean-Red Sea corridor–an increasingly contested space involving global powers like China, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Russia, and the United States. In this context, gaining port access isn’t merely an end in itself; it’s an effort by Ethiopia to become an indispensable component in the strategic calculations of key global and regional actors.
The implications of the MoU extend beyond logistical and military considerations. It signals a fundamental shift in Ethiopia’s foreign policy–from a survivalist, dependency-driven posture to one rooted in strategic independence and assertive regionalism. The willingness to engage with a de facto state, even at the expense of established diplomatic norms, reflects a broader departure from ideology-centered diplomacy toward a realpolitik, interest-based approach. In doing so, Ethiopia has made it clear that it is no longer confined by the constraints of passive diplomacy. Instead, it is prepared to take calculated risks in pursuit of its long-term national interests.
Furthermore, the MoU has come to symbolize a serious recalibration of Ethiopia’s strategic outlook. It challenges conventional understandings of sovereignty, redefines the security architecture of the Horn of Africa, and positions Ethiopia as a rising geopolitical actor in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions. This emerging foreign policy direction is likely to be characterized by a renewed and necessary focus on national interest, regional influence, and maritime ambition. Crucially, this development suggests that Ethiopia is not only solidifying its position as a continental land power but is also laying the groundwork to become a maritime power–one capable of projecting its interests across the region in the 21st century.
Pillar Three: BRICS accession
Ethiopia has also repositioned itself as a skillful actor within the evolving multipolar world order, navigating a path between traditional Western alliances and the rising influence of the Global South. Amid growing international competition, Addis Abeba has adopted a delicate diplomatic balancing act–maintaining critical development assistance from Western partners while actively engaging with emerging power blocs such as BRICS.
This dual-track strategy was exemplified by Ethiopia’s accession to the BRICS–a significant geopolitical shift. However, Ethiopian officials were careful to frame this move not as a rejection of the West, but as an economic diversification effort. They emphasized that the decision aimed to expand opportunities for economic growth and development, rather than alienate long-standing partners, particularly the United States. This nuanced approach has enabled Ethiopia to sustain cooperation in vital areas such as food security, public health, and humanitarian aid–sectors where U.S. support remains highly significant. This diplomatic balancing act represents one of Ethiopia’s most understated yet remarkable achievements. Despite its increasing alignment with Global South powers, Ethiopia has continued to receive substantial U.S. aid.
Ethiopia’s ability to maintain strong ties with the West while deepening its cooperation with BRICS members–especially China, Russia, and India–demonstrates a sophisticated practice of diplomatic compartmentalization. Rather than provoking tensions with Western donors, Ethiopian diplomats have prioritized shared humanitarian and development goals, even as Addis Abeba actively courts non-Western partners under the BRICS framework.
This strategic maneuvering has yielded tangible benefits. By tapping into BRICS-backed development financing and other alternative diplomatic channels, Ethiopia has broadened its access to capital, reduced dependence on Western political conditions, and enhanced its international agency. Most importantly, this approach has enabled Ethiopia to avoid the vulnerabilities associated with over-reliance on a single geopolitical bloc, thereby strengthening its capacity to pursue an independent and diversified foreign policy.
The MoU [with Somaliland] signals a broader shift in African diplomatic trends, moving from normative principles towards realpolitik.”
Furthermore, a significant diplomatic realignment is underway in the greater Horn of Africa. The decline of Cold War militaristic affiliations has ushered in a new transactional era within the international system. In this emergent order, ideological adherence holds less sway than the tangible utility derived from engagement with diverse patrons. Both Somaliland and Ethiopia have, to a notable extent, capitalized on this fluid environment to enhance their geostrategic positions.
Despite its lack of formal recognition, Somaliland has developed meaningful partnerships–most notably with the United Arab Emirates–and, significantly, has entered into a historic port-access agreement with Ethiopia. These developments underscore a growing shift away from recognition as the sole measure of international legitimacy. In contexts where trade, security, and infrastructure are at stake, transactional interests are increasingly taking precedence.
In stark contrast, despite its strong relations with Western powers and Gulf allies, Egypt’s capacity to exert regional influence has been constrained by geographical limitations and the increasing assertiveness of other regional actors. Similarly, Somalia remains reliant on Western and Turkish support for its security, yet it lacks the strategic agility to diversify its international relationships to the extent that Ethiopia has achieved.
Finally, it is important to highlight that Ethiopia’s foreign policy illustrates how engagement with BRICS and continued cooperation with Western donors are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they serve as complementary instruments within a coherent foreign policy framework. This reflects a more nuanced form of strategic autonomy–one grounded in the practical imperatives of national development. As the global power structure continues to shift, Ethiopia’s approach may well serve as a model for other Global South nations seeking to navigate a multipolar world without compromising essential partnerships.
Regional Reactions: Defensive postures, strategic ambiguity
Ethiopia’s assertive diplomacy has triggered significant, though varied, reactions from key regional actors, primarily Egypt and Somalia. Egypt’s foreign policy in the Horn is predicated on two fundamental interests: preserving its historical water entitlements from the Nile and maintaining a preeminent strategic position in the Red Sea. Ethiopia’s actions have directly challenged both these interests. Cairo, in response, has pursued a policy of defensive activism, employing signaling, alliance building, and legalism in an effort to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence.
In response to the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding, Egypt issued a strong statement declaring that “no landlocked country would be allowed to build a naval base in the Red Sea.” However, Cairo currently lacks the logistical capacity to unilaterally enforce such a position. Its relationship with Somalia has largely been symbolic, serving more to reaffirm Egypt’s presence as a regional actor than to produce any concrete diplomatic or military front against Ethiopia.
Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa is now characterized by pragmatic alliances, astute strategic maneuvering, and calculated ambiguity.”
On the other hand, Somalia’s diplomatic response to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU has been characterized by minimalistic eloquence, reflecting what might be described as a posture of controlled ambiguity. The Somali government faces a dual challenge: on one hand, defending its sovereignty and jurisdiction over Somaliland as an internationally recognized entity; on the other, navigating the complex geopolitics shaped by its limited enforcement capacity and regional isolation.
Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the government in Mogadishu has vocally condemned the MoU as a violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. However, it has been careful not to frame the agreement as a casus belli, a conscious decision that speaks to considerations beyond mere expediency. Geographic proximity, the fact that Ethiopia and Somalia share major trade routes, and Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia through the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) have all constrained Mogadishu’s capacity to escalate the dispute. Domestically, Somalia continues to grapple with fragmented governance, chronic insecurity, and weak institutions–factors that further inhibit the formulation of an assertive foreign policy.
This cautious ambiguity, while tactically risk-averse, has effectively placed Ethiopia in a strong diplomatic position. Addis Abeba has reframed its relationship with Somaliland, emphasizing that it does not constitute a breach of Somalia’s sovereignty but rather represents a negotiation process grounded in mutual benefit–particularly access to the sea and trade. Ethiopia’s appeals to regional integration, port security, and economic growth have quietly resonated with certain African and Gulf states, thereby undermining Somalia’s efforts to rally a consensus against the agreement.
Although Egypt and the Arab League have traditionally expressed symbolic solidarity with Mogadishu, their support has largely remained declarative rather than substantive. Meanwhile, Ethiopia has advanced a proactive foreign policy rooted in non-alignment and South-South cooperation, aligning closely with BRICS member states and cultivating new partnerships. This approach has weakened Egypt’s ability to mobilize a unified Arab-African coalition in defense of Somalia, leaving Mogadishu increasingly isolated.
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Somalia has refrained from internationalizing the dispute or escalating it to a level of substantial deterrence, leaving it vulnerable to Ethiopia’s more nuanced and multifaceted diplomacy. While Somalia maintains a morally and legally superior position, Ethiopia has skillfully inverted the narrative, redefining the dispute not as aggression but as a matter of infrastructure development, energy, and regional maritime connectivity. In this context, Somalia’s silence cannot be interpreted as strategic; rather, it reflects institutional paralysis. Such an ineffective response risks conferring de facto legitimacy on Ethiopia’s actions and jeopardizing Somalia’s prospects in future negotiations.
Consequently, Somalia’s inability to mount a coherent counter-diplomacy risks rendering its sovereignty claims purely rhetorical, as Addis Ababa continues to expand its influence and normalize relations with non-traditional partners like Somaliland.
Redrawing geopolitical equation
The evolving diplomatic landscape in the Horn of Africa has given rise to a new regional equation, marked by several defining dynamics. Foremost among these is the shift from multilateralism to bilateralism. Regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have largely proven ineffective in addressing emerging disputes. This institutional weakness has created space for bilateral engagements, enabling states to advance their strategic interests outside traditional frameworks.
A second notable trend is the ascendancy of strategic action over legal discourse. A clear divergence has emerged between the approaches of countries like Egypt and Somalia–that rely heavily on legal frameworks to assert sovereignty–and those of Ethiopia and Somaliland, countries that prioritize direct, outcome-driven strategies. This development reflects a broader regional pattern in which practical, strategic gains are increasingly valued over rigid legal interpretations.
Thirdly, ambiguity has become a powerful diplomatic instrument. Strategic silence now serves as an effective tool, allowing actors across the region to de-escalate tensions while retaining the flexibility to adapt their positions. This deliberate ambiguity has enabled stakeholders to navigate complex geopolitical realities without foreclosing future diplomatic options.
Conclusion
Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa is now characterized by pragmatic alliances, astute strategic maneuvering, and calculated ambiguity. Through its assertive strategic endeavors, Ethiopia has maintained autonomy over its pivotal national project, the GERD; advanced its efforts to secure maritime access via the MoU with Somaliland; and obtained membership in the influential BRICS bloc. Through these efforts, Ethiopia is actively reshaping the regional landscape.
In contrast, Egypt and Somalia appear to be struggling to adapt, with their reactive and defensive approaches proving insufficient to stem Ethiopia’s growing strategic momentum. The future of the region will likely be shaped less by traditional legal agreements and more by the strategic positioning and diplomatic agility of its key actors, with Ethiopia currently at the forefront. AS
Editor’s Note: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at [email protected]
