For many decades, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Mali constituted one of the most integrated spaces of human and economic circulation in West Africa. Beyond simple geographical neighbours, these three former French colonies are linked by intense commercial exchange, ancient cross-border mobilities, and social and family ties.
This interdependence is reflected in Ivorian demography. According to UN estimates, Côte d’Ivoire was home to around 2.56 million international migrants in 2020, around 10% of its total population, of whom more than 1.3 million originate from Burkina Faso and more than 500,000 from Mali. These two communities form the most important foreign people in Ivorian territory.
However, since 2020 this historical closeness has been severely tested by mounting political, security and diplomatic tension. That is, since the arrival in power of the military regimes in Mali (2020 and 2021) and Burkina Faso (2022).
Côte d’Ivoire did not approve the Malian and burkinabè coups d’État
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The deterioration in relations between Côte d’Ivoire and its Sahelian neighbours follows a series of military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso. In Bamako (the capital of Mali), soldiers overturned President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in August 2020, before consolidating their grip on power with a second coup in May 2021, bringing Assimi Goïta to the head of the transition. In Burkina Faso, two successive coups in January and September 2022 led to captain Ibrahim Traoré coming to power in a context of persistent security crisis.
Faced with these changes, Côte d’Ivoire, as an influential member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has sustained and participated in the official positions of the organisation condemning the coups and demanding a return to constitutional order in these countries.
Côte d’Ivoire, led by Alassane Ouattara, thus supported the sanctions determined by ECOWAS, including notably the suspension of Mali and Burkina Faso from the community’s authority, the imposition of travel bans, and blocks on meeting transition leaders, as well as economic and financial measures with commercial and financial restrictions aimed at constraining the military authorities and reestablishing constitutional order.
In Bamako and in Ouagadougou (capital of Burkina Faso), the transitional authorities have vigorously rejected these measures, characterising them as ‘unjust’, ‘inhumane’ and contrary to the principle of state sovereignty. The juntas have denounced what they consider to be direct interference in their interior affairs, judging that ECOWAS has distanced itself from its pan-African vocation.
This rejection has been accompanied by recurrent accusations according to which the regional organisation is acting under the influence of external powers, in particular France, with the supposed support of certain nearby countries including Côte d’Ivoire. A series of consequent events have crystallised relations between these states.
The affair of the 49 Ivorian soldiers arrested in Mali
A first episode marked the increasing stand-off between Bamako and Abidjan (capital of Côte d’Ivoire): the affair of the 49 Ivorian soldiers arrested in Mali in July 2022. On 10 July, these soldiers were challenged on arrival at Bamako international airport by the Malian transitional authorities. The soldiers were accused by the junta of entering Malian territory without authorisation and of comprising a group of mercenaries, suspected of attacking state security.
The reaction of Côte d’Ivoire was immediate. Abidjan categorically refuted the accusations, countering that the soldiers were taking part in a logistical secondment to support the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and that they had no hostile intention.
The affair soon took on major diplomatic dimensions. The Ivorian government demanded the immediate liberation of the soldiers, condemned what it characterised as hostage-taking, and of political instrumentalisation of Malian justice. To the contrary, for Bamako it was about defending its sovereignty and affirming effective control of foreign forces present on its soil.
In December 2022, after months of detention, Malian justice condemned 46 of the soldiers to 20 years in prison whilst three women were condemned to the death penalty in absentia. These decisions unleashed strong diplomatic tension, marked by exchanges of official communications and international pressure, notably by the UN and regional organisations.
Finally in 2023, the president of the Malian transition, Assimi Goïta, accorded a presidential pardon to the 49 soldiers, justifying the measure as a gesture of peace and dialogue within the framework of regional relations.
Though after this episode was over, the Malian junta continued to maintain a hostile discourse towards Côte d’Ivoire which it suspected of acting to influence internal Malian affairs.
Burkina Faso openly accuses Côte d’Ivoire of attempts at destabilisation
Burkina Faso is fuelling open defiance towards Côte d’Ivoire, expressed though repeated accusations of attempts at destabilisation. Since taking power in September 2022, the junta, led by captain Ibrahim Traoré, has not ceased to condemn what it considers to be hostile interference coming from its southern neighbour.
In a televised speech in July 2024, Ibrahim Traoré affirmed that ‘in Abidjan there is well and truly a centre of operations to destabilise’ his country, whilst at the same time making clear that he had ‘nothing against the Ivorian people but something against those who are leading Côte d’Ivoire’.
These accusations have been repeated on many occasions by the burkinabè authorities, notably in declarations by the Minister for Security affirming that individuals residing in Côte d’Ivoire would be implicated in subversion projects against the regime. In April 2025, Ouagadougou announced it had foiled a ‘major plot’ aiming to undermine the stability of the country, affirming that the presumed masters of the project were found to be ‘localised in Côte d’Ivoire’.
Faced with these repeated accusations, Côte d’Ivoire firmly rejected any role in destabilisation attempts, denouncing ‘unfounded allegations aiming to justify the authoritarian position of the burkinabè regime’.
Mali and Burkina Faso decide to no longer walk with Côte d’Ivoire
In a context of sharpened tensions, Mali and Burkina Faso have chosen to progressively break their cooperation with Côte d’Ivoire and other states in ECOWAS.
This rupture has translated into the creation of a new regional configuration, the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES), instituted on 16 September 2023. This alliance constitutes a strategic response to the diplomatic pressures of ECOWAS and a signal of sovereign affirmation.
Accompanied by Niger which also experienced a coup d’État in July 2023, and shares similar positions of defiance towards West African institutions, these Sahelian states are trying to mutualise their security, defence and development efforts outside of the traditional regional frameworks. The official withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS (an organisation in which Côte d’Ivoire has played a driving role) was effective as of 29 January 2025.
The Alino Faso affair, a new locus of diplomatic tensions
Another episode is aggravating the stand-off between Ouagadougou and Abidjan: the death in detention in July 2025 of the burkinabè influencer Alain Christophe Traoré, best known as his pseudonym Alino Faso.
Based in Côte d’Ivoire since 2021, Faso is popular on social media and overtly favourable to the burkinabè transition authorities. He was arrested in January 2025 and detained at the police training school in Abidjan. The Ivorian authorities accuse him of sharing ‘intelligence with a foreign state’, of plotting against state authority, and of spreading false information that risked harming national stability.
On 24 July 2025, the prosecutor of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire announced that Alino Faso had died in detention, following a first attempt at suicide. This version was immediately rejected by the burkinabè authorities, who condemned the lack of transparency and claimed that they had not been officially informed about the incident. Following a complaint made by his family, the general prosecutor of Burkina Faso announced the opening of a judicial inquiry about ‘torture and assassination’ which qualified the affair as a serious attack on the rights of a burkinabè abroad.
The case provoked lively indignation in Ouagadougou. The Minister of Foreign Affairs summoned the Ivorian diplomatic representation, demanding that all light should be shed on the circumstances of the death. There was a lot of commentary on social networks by influencers and the media that are close to the AES. Some presented Alino Faso as a ‘sovereignty martyr’. The episode illustrates the way in which political and diplomatic tensions between the states are being prolonged in the digital space and are hardening relations between Côte d’Ivoire and its Sahelian neighbours.
A split that is not really impacting the populations
Even if Ivorian leaders do not smell like saints to their Malian and Burkinabè counterparts, it is likely that the populations themselves are less concerned about these tensions.
Carlos Dogba, a young Ivorian journalist who lived for over a year in Ouagadougou (from November 2023 until December 2024) let us know that he has never been concerned.
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‘Based on my observation, Ivorians are always welcome in Burkina Faso, and even in Burkinabè institutions. When you introduce yourself as an Ivorian, they welcome you with a smile, Dogba confided.
Similarly, Touré Moussa, a sheep trader for over 20 years between Côte d’Ivoire and Mali confided that his business has never been impacted.
‘I take sheep to Mali that I come back to resell in Côte d’Ivoire. I know that relations between the two countries are not cordial at present, but I have never had any problems with anyone.’
Irié Bi Brice, a young Ivorian living in Bamako for several years, affirms he can also go about his life without worrying, whilst at the same time avoiding political discourses as much as possible.
‘I have been in Mali for ten years. I studied here, and thank goodness, I have a well paid job here in Bamako. I’ve never had any problems with the Malians, they are adorable people. However, I know my place: I’ve avoided becoming involved in political life in Mali.’
Analysis and perspectives
For the Ivorian political analyst Modeste Koné, these tensions translate into much more than a diplomatic dispute: ‘What we are seeing today is the result of a combination of historical, security and political factors. The defiance of the Sahelian regimes towards Côte d’Ivoire is not restricted to the frequent accusations; it is inscribed in a process of the reaffirmation of sovereignty and of strategic reorientation towards ECOWAS. Social media, instances such as of the 49 Ivorian soldiers, and the creation of the AES, are more symptoms of a profound rupture which could deteriorate if no structured dialogue takes place.’
According to this analysis, the challenge for Abidjan is to maintain social and economic cross-border relations, whilst navigating a regional environment where institutional distrust is spiralling. ‘It is not only about classic diplomacy, but of real management of political perceptions and narratives which are circulating both on the ground and on digital platforms’, Koné adds.
His analysis underlines that Côte d’Ivoire is confronted with an unprecedented challenge: to maintain its stabilising role in West Africa whilst at the same time managing a growing fracture with its Sahelian neighbours. It is a test of its capacity to combine diplomatic influence, social cohesion and the control of information.
Translated from French by Stephanie Kitchen.
Gael Zozoro is an Ivorian journalist writing on social issues.
