Africa As a Testing Ground for China’s Global Security Initiative

China’s Global Security Initiative aims to advance China’s geostrategic posture by building coalitions of actors that align with Chinese norms on international security and domestic law enforcement.

Launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2022, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) is one of a series of Chinese initiatives aimed at reshaping global governance structures to create a conducive environment for China’s resurgence as a Great Power.

While presented as a framework focused on cooperative security, non-interference, and defending the United Nations Charter–themes that resonate in Africa and the broader developing world–the GSI is firmly anchored in Chinese concepts of national security. The GSI Concept Paper issued in 2023 should thus be read together with the “2025 White Paper on China’s National Security” that lays out the linkages as part of the four pillars of Chinese national security:

Political (regime) security as the foundation
Economic security as the base
Military science, technology, culture, and social security as the guarantee
International security as the support structure

Initially characterized in general and ambiguous terms, the GSI is slowly taking on concrete features. At the Ninth Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in September 2024, Xi described the FOCAC 2025-2027 Action Plan as an “example of early GSI implementation.” Eight high-level China-Africa military exchanges subsequently took place between September 2024 and the Interministerial FOCAC Implementation Meeting in June 2025, including an event for 90 early career officers from 40 African countries hosted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army Command College in Nanjing.

Given how the GSI is being gradually mainstreamed into China-Africa relations, this has direct implications for China’s security cooperation efforts in Africa. The FOCAC Action Plan, for example, set a target to train 6,000 senior and 500 early career African military officers as well as 1,000 police by September 2027 when the next FOCAC Summit takes place.

African thought leaders warn about the risks of adopting certain features, such as absolute ruling party control over “national security work.”

or African governments, the perceived benefits of embracing the GSI include improved access to economic aid and infrastructure finance as well as more affordable and less restricted security hardware. Some African leaders, moreover, share China’s emphasis on regime security and continuity over citizen security.Other African thought leaders, however, warn about the risks of adopting certain features, such as absolute ruling party control over “national security work.” Africa’s bitter experience of dictatorial one party and military rule informs these concerns. This includes undermining norms of democratic civil-military relations and the principle of non-partisan security professionals serving the constitution, not a ruling party.

There are also concerns that African countries will get pulled into the currents of geopolitical competition since countering Western influence is central to GSI narratives and strategic framing. This risks undermining Africa’s professed tradition of non-alignment.

Unpacking China’s Global Security Initiative

The GSI is one of “three major initiatives” (san da chang yi, 三大倡议) put forth by China as complementary efforts to reshape a new international order. The Global Development Initiative (GDI), launched in 2021, aims to scale up Chinese development assistance across five core financing tools and instruments, including the South Cooperation Fund and the Multi Stakeholder Funding Platform. The Global Civilizational Initiative (GCI, quan qiu wen ming chang yi, 全球文明倡议), introduced in 2023, seeks to create alternative global norms and institutional arrangements that challenge the universality of democracy and human rights. These are laid out in China’s 2023 White Paper titled, “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions.”

The GSI is framed around six core principles:

To pursue China’s vision of common, comprehensive, and cooperative security
To respect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference
To abide by the United Nations Charter
To take seriously the legitimate security concerns of all countries
To resolve differences through dialogue and consultation
To maintain security in both the traditional and non-traditional domains

Closer examination of these principles highlights the distinctly Chinese features aimed at advancing China’s world view and differentiating it from its global competitors. First, the principles are designed to appeal to developing countries, including in Africa, who welcome the themes of cooperation, consultation, and non-interference. The GSI also invokes historical narratives of South-South solidarity, casting China as a champion of the Global South.

Second, the GSI prioritizes “indivisible security,” (an quan bu ke fen ge, 安全不可分割), founded on mutual respect for “legitimate security interests” and the idea that countries should not pursue their interests in ways that undermine others. The phrase “legitimate security interests,” however, can cover everything from territorial claims to regime security–a central concern for Africa’s dominant-party political systems. The GSI validates such claims (however defined) and assures African government officials of Chinese support. China, in turn, counts on African officials’ support for China’s security policies. Examples include China’s South China Sea claims–which several African countries have supported–though they were rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016.

In 2024, FOCAC members affirmed their support for China’s position on Taiwan, announcing that, “the issues relating to Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Xizang are China’s internal affairs, as observed in international law and the noninterference principle.”

The GSI is also concerned with “overseas interests protection” (wei hai wai li yi, 维护海外利益), which has intensified under the One Belt One Road initiative, known internationally as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This entails prioritizing the protection of Chinese investments, nationals, and interests with host nation security forces and an expanding number of Chinese security firms deployed around these investments.

Every FOCAC Action Plan since the BRI’s launch in 2012 has included a section on “overseas interests protection.” So too have the Action Plans of its parallel forums like the China Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), the China Latin America and Caribbean Forum (China-CELAC), and the China Central Asia Mechanism (CCAM). While FOCAC is the oldest of these regional affinity blocs, their programs, structures, and objectives are strikingly similar, enabling China to sequence the GSI across regions, using similar methods and tactics, and sometimes even the same institutional actors and personnel.

In 2024, China established the Global Security Initiative Center at the China Institutes for International Studies (CIIS) within the Chinese foreign ministry to report on GSI implementation. Its first assessment, released in July 2024, underscores the importance of China’s regional multilateral affinity blocs in mainstreaming GSI concepts into regional security cooperation, winning official endorsements, and strategic branding. The assessment also fleshed out the 20 priority areas for GSI cooperation.

Implementing the Global Security Initiative

Implementation of the GSI has unfolded across multiple primary tracks.

Integrating the GSI within FOCAC

The GSI Concept Paper envisions China’s regional multilateral organizations, such as FOCAC, as the institutional architecture through which it can roll out the GSI.

Official African endorsements of the GSI were first registered in August 2022 at the Eighth Ministerial Meeting on FOCAC Implementation. These were subsequently reinforced at the Ninth FOCAC in September 2024. Endorsements of the GSI are also included in all the bilateral agreements China and African countries have reached since 2022. In the process, they popularize and brand the GSI, underscore China’s convening power and receptivity on the continent, and move African countries closer to China’s positions vis-à-vis its competitors.

Mainstreaming the GSI into FOCAC’s military and security program features heavily in these exchanges.

Mainstreaming the GSI into FOCAC’s military and security program also features heavily in these exchanges. FOCAC offers an established platform to showcase new or existing Chinese security cooperation programs as falling under the GSI umbrella to increase its momentum.This mirrors GSI mainstreaming in other regional affinity blocs and Chinese-led security organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, which many African countries have attended since GSI was launched.

Lungani Hlongwa, a former South African Navy officer and China military specialist, notes that “FOCAC provides a structure through which to provide targeted security hardware as part of bilateral ties” while channeling GSI-related financial allocations to FOCAC’s China Africa Peace and Security Forum and Chinese defense dialogues to popularize the GSI.

Joint Operations and Law Enforcement

Ugandan Special Forces and over 30 Chinese commandos conducted a joint operation in January 2022 that led to the capture and deportation of four Chinese nationals alleged to be part of a criminal ring. This was but one of a growing number of joint operations Chinese and African security forces have conducted in Africa to address perceived Chinese security priorities. This emphasis on joint operations highlights the growing importance China is placing on extending its reach globally and fits the mold of activities that have been integrated into the GSI framework.

Similar activities have occurred elsewhere, including joint patrols with Central Asian countries under the China Central Asia Mechanism (CCAM), joint interdiction with Middle East partners under the China Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), and joint law enforcement centers with Latin American countries under the China-CELAC Forum.

The mainstreaming of the GSI also entails creating new joint security programs such as the Ethiopia China Law Enforcement Center, established in 2024, and the proposed creation of the Ghana China Police and Law Enforcement Academy. In July 2025, Somali security officials completed law enforcement, internal, and border security training in China under the GSI, making them the latest in a growing list of African law enforcement personnel that have received training under the GSI label. These trainings borrow heavily from CCAM’s Lancang and Mekong River Integrated Law Enforcement and Security Center.

Host Country Security Protection for Belt and Road Assets

Roughly 40 African countries have some contact with Chinese police institutions.

The GSI also prioritizes securing host country support for Chinese interests such as protecting Belt and Road assets. Examples include the 2022 Ethio-Sino agreement to protect major Belt and Road projects such as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and the Kenya-China initiative to set up an elite police force to protect the Chinese-funded Mombasa-Nairobi SGR. This security model–which combines Chinese funding, technology, and police expertise with host country force deployments–is being normalized in Africa, where roughly 40 countries have some contact with Chinese police institutions. The model draws on the Sino-Pakistani Cooperation Agreement under which Pakistani forces protect the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, a cornerstone of the Belt and Road in Asia. Taken together, these activities constitute what the GSI Concept Paper calls “common and cooperative security.”The growing involvement of China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in GSI security cooperation underscores the priority placed on these domestic security institutions. The ministry helped establish the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum (Lianyungang Forum) to promote the GSI among police institutions around the world. In September 2024, the Forum convened police leaders from over 122 countries and regions.

The MPS launched the China East Africa Ministerial Conference on Law Enforcement for senior law enforcement leaders from the eight East African Community countries in 2024. Chinese Minister for Public Security Wang Xiaohong told his counterparts at the event that his ministry would work with them on GSI implementation. In September 2024, he signed an agreement on joint law enforcement with the 14 member states of the East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization.

Working Through Existing International Institutions

China is also working through existing organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, and the United Nations to legitimize and win international support for the GSI as a means to shape international security debates outside its regional affinity blocs. China, for instance, has used its contributions to the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund to channel security-related assistance mainly to Global South countries, including for counterterrorism. This agency was established in 2016 through a Chinese pledge to commit $200 million to the United Nations over the next 10 years. However, China has been less successful in inserting explicit GSI language into United Nations documents.

African Perspectives on Chinese Security Cooperation and the GSI

Some African governments regard the GSI as an additional source of security assistance in a resource constrained environment. Others are less sanguine and warn of the policy implications and risks of such cooperation. Some of these are informed by concerns over certain features of China’s model of security governance and their applicability in Africa, like the emphasis on regime security and party supremacy over the armed forces.

While loyalty to the principle of an apolitical military remains firm among many African governments and polities, the chief concern is that the frequency, depth, and breadth of China’s security engagement might entrench the opposite. This is especially the case in situations where China’s security governance models have appeal among African ruling parties. “By using the military to decimate the opposition, ruling parties in some sub-Saharan African countries have effectively created one-party states,” says popular Africa-China blogger, Amodani Gariba. “Though the economic cooperation China has with Africa has had a tremendous impact on Africans, China’s ambitions to extend its ties into military cooperation could worsen the already bad governance situation on the continent.”

Other concerns center on China’s increased exports of domestic security wares such as advanced police and riot control equipment and surveillance systems that have increased alongside the GSI. Bulelani Jili, an expert on the proliferation of Chinese surveillance systems in Africa, warns that China’s model of prioritizing state actors over the private sector and civil society raises serious concerns in both authoritarian and democratic settings.

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