Africa Cannot Afford to Delay Regulating Autonomous Weapons

Africa Cannot Afford to Delay Regulating Autonomous Weapons


As countries consider negotiations on autonomous weapons, Africa should draw on lessons from cluster munitions to demand stronger safeguards.

This week, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres urged delegates from over 120 countries to move towards negotiating binding rules on autonomous weapons that, once activated, select and strike targets without further human intervention.

Guterres’ plea at the Seventh Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva was to establish rules that minimise the ‘use and spread of these merciless weapons.’ Such arms are a high-stakes issue for Africa, where drones are already shaping conflicts.


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Africa’s experience with cluster munitions offers a warning for the autonomous weapons debate. Weapons that are foreign-manufactured, like cluster munitions, have imposed lasting humanitarian costs on Africa’s civilians.

Autonomous weapons, particularly in the context of artificial intelligence (AI), could exacerbate regulatory challenges, leaving civilians exposed and governments struggling to oversee their use effectively.

There are political and technical obstacles in regulating autonomous weapons. In October, the UN General Assembly approved draft resolution L.37, which calls on CCW states to negotiate additional rules on the use of autonomous weapons in conflict situations. This would include AI-enabled systems, which can increase the unpredictability of autonomous weapons.

These rules would preserve human responsibility and address the risk posed by the weapons without lifting existing obligations.

The draft resolution, co-sponsored by three African states – Egypt, Nigeria and Sierra Leone – was adopted by 163 votes to five, with nine abstentions. However, the CCW operates by consensus, allowing opponents to block agreement. The United States, Russia and Israel voted against the resolution alongside Belarus and North Korea, and disagreement persists over whether a new instrument should be legally binding.

The consequences of drones for civilian safety in Africa are dire. In Sudan, the UN Human Rights Office reported that over 1 630 civilians were killed by drones between January and October 2026. Other examples include Ethiopia’s Tigray region, where at least 57 civilians were killed in 2022. And in Somalia, drone attacks in 2024 killed 23 civilians, including 14 children.

Although these incidents do not establish autonomous targeting, they show the risks that unregulated use of autonomous weapons could compound.

International humanitarian law already applies to autonomous weapons. Allowing a digital system to assess the circumstances of an attack without human control can complicate compliance with these laws. The ability to assess expected civilian harm and recognise combatants’ surrender is key to compliance, and requires judgement of the particular context.

At the continental level, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2025 addressed AI misuse in conflict settings, asking for the development of a common African position and an African charter on AI. The PSC called for governance frameworks that align with international humanitarian law and establish meaningful human control.

In the 2024 Freetown Communiqué, representatives of the Economic Community of West African States supported negotiations on binding prohibitions and restrictions on autonomous weapons. Although the communiqué could not secure a clear negotiating mandate, it called for urgent talks to achieve meaningful human control.

However, translating such commitments into national positions is a work in progress. Voting patterns suggest the African position might not be as common as hoped, as illustrated by Burundi and the Republic of Congo’s abstentions in October’s UN vote, in which most African states backed Resolution L.37.

Although Burundi’s abstention was a positive shift after it voted against the proposal in December 2025, the AU will have to address differences among member states and ensure a common negotiating stance for Africa.

The CCW should aim to conclude with a decision on which autonomous systems are unacceptable and what restrictions apply to acceptable weapons use. African delegations in Geneva have called for binding prohibitions and restrictions on the use of autonomous weapons, rather than a general statement of support for international humanitarian law. Several entry points could enable the delegations to push for meaningful outcomes.

Legally, the International Committee of the Red Cross has renewed its call for prohibiting two categories of autonomous weapons: those whose effects cannot be sufficiently understood or predicted, and those designed or used to apply force against people. African delegations in Geneva can support establishing clear limits on autonomous targeting while preserving meaningful human control over the use of force.

In practice, continental and regional frameworks must ensure that assessable and meaningful human control is mandatory in any new military systems. Also, political leaders and militaries need to understand the effects and constraints of weapons while still allowing effective intervention and deactivation.

Procurement of such systems should require suppliers to disclose targeting functions and test results, with reassessment after software changes. A person nominally supervising a system offers little protection if they cannot understand or influence its actions. At the national level, countries must assess the legality of new weapons they develop, acquire or adopt, in line with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.