As Moscow courts African governments with promises of trade, investment and security cooperation, Accra must guard against opaque deals, resource dependence and commercial relationships that leave the country carrying more risk than reward. Ghana’s growing economic engagement with Russia presents an opportunity, but one that demands considerably more scrutiny than diplomatic declarations of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation might suggest.
Recorded bilateral merchandise trade reached US$506.5 million in 2025, according to a compilation based on UN Comtrade data. Yet Ghana exported just US$44.9 million worth of goods to Russia, compared with imports of US$461.7 million, leaving a merchandise trade deficit of approximately US$416.8 million. The imbalance raises an uncomfortable question at the ongoing Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow on October 28 and 29: is Ghana building a relationship that will strengthen its productive capacity, or one that risks entrenching its position as a buyer of foreign goods while struggling to expand its own exports?
Deeper trade is not necessarily better trade, and a growing number of bilateral agreements does not automatically translate into economic transformation. Without clear safeguards, Ghana could find itself importing more, exporting relatively little and assuming commercial or strategic obligations whose long-term costs exceed their immediate benefits. The summit should therefore be approached with commercial discipline, not diplomatic enthusiasm alone.
An imbalance that demands attention
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Russia’s trade with Africa reportedly reached US$27.7 billion in 2025, according to figures attributed to the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for African Studies. Moscow is seeking to expand its commercial footprint through agriculture, fertilisers, energy, mining, manufacturing and technology.
For Ghana, there are legitimate opportunities in these areas. Reliable access to fertilisers and industrial inputs can support production, while investment in processing and manufacturing could help diversify exports and create employment.
But the current structure of bilateral trade reveals a relationship in which Ghana’s export presence remains comparatively small. In the 2025 UN Comtrade-based compilation, Russian shipments to Ghana included approximately US$337 million in mineral fuels and oils and US$63 million in fertilisers. Ghana’s recorded exports were concentrated in oilseeds and other plant products, worth about US$33.5 million, cocoa products at US$6.2 million, and fats and oils at US$4.9 million.
These imports may serve legitimate economic needs. The concern is whether Ghana can turn them into the basis for a more productive domestic economy, or whether the relationship will simply reinforce an existing dependence on imported goods. There is also a data question that policymakers should resolve.
The Ghana News Agency reported in July that bilateral trade had risen from US$247 million in 2022 to more than US$800 million in 2024, citing the Russian ambassador. That figure differs from the 2025 customs-based compilation. The discrepancy may reflect different reporting methods or coverage, but it underlines the need for a consistent official series before the government makes ambitious claims about the relationship’s growth. A partnership cannot be evaluated properly when its underlying numbers are not readily reconciled.
The danger of paying too much for strategic friendship
Ghana should be particularly cautious where commercial agreements intersect with security assistance and strategic interests. In the Central African Republic and Sudan, investigations into companies linked to the Wagner Group have raised concerns about opaque gold and diamond operations and the relationship between Russian security networks and resource extraction. US authorities sanctioned several Wagner-linked entities over alleged illicit commercial activities, including gold dealings in the Central African Republic.
Mali offers a different warning. Russian security assistance has expanded under the military-led government, yet the continued threat from armed groups and allegations of abuses by Russian-linked personnel have raised questions about the results delivered by the partnership. These cases do not establish that Ghana is negotiating similar arrangements. Nor do they mean that every Russian company or investment carries the same risks. They do, however, demonstrate why governments should not treat security assistance, commercial investment and diplomatic support as interchangeable benefits whose value can be assumed rather than measured.
Where security and business interests overlap, governments must establish precisely what each party is providing, what it receives in return, and whether the terms serve the public interest. For Ghana, that means resisting any arrangement in which access to strategic assets, preferential concessions or long-term financial obligations is granted without transparent valuation, independent scrutiny and enforceable safeguards.
The danger is not limited to outright corruption. A legally signed agreement can still be commercially disadvantageous if the state underestimates its fiscal obligations, overvalues the assistance received or fails to account for the opportunity cost of the resources committed.
Sanctions and the cost of commercial exposure
The geopolitical environment adds another layer of risk. Russia’s war against Ukraine and the sanctions imposed in response have complicated some transactions involving Russian counterparties. Depending on the parties and activities involved, businesses may face restrictions affecting payments, correspondent banking, shipping, insurance and access to particular markets. Ghanaian firms pursuing opportunities in Russia must therefore undertake careful due diligence on their counterparties, financing arrangements and contractual obligations. Transactions must comply with applicable sanctions and other legal requirements, while payment mechanisms should be demonstrably reliable.
This is not an argument for excluding Russian businesses. It is an argument against assuming that every commercially attractive offer is necessarily executable or that the political relationship will shield Ghanaian companies from the consequences of a transaction that encounters legal or financial obstacles.
The government should also avoid creating new dependencies in essential supplies. Russian fertilisers, fuel and other commodities can be useful components of Ghana’s import mix, but reliance on a narrow range of suppliers exposes domestic producers to geopolitical disruption, shipping difficulties and price volatility. Diversification is not a rejection of Russia. It is insurance against uncertainty.
Investment must mean more than importing equipment
The strongest argument for deeper relations with Russia would be the prospect of investment that expands Ghana’s domestic productive capacity. That is also where the government should be most demanding. Agriculture, agro-processing, fertiliser distribution and blending, energy infrastructure, manufacturing and technology offer potential areas of cooperation.
But a shipment of machinery is not the same as the establishment of an industrial facility, and an investment memorandum is not evidence that capital has been committed.
Proposed projects should be assessed against their financing costs, expected employment, local procurement, technology transfer, export potential and fiscal implications. Where public guarantees or other contingent liabilities are involved, those exposures should be disclosed and independently evaluated. Mining agreements require comparable scrutiny. The country should know who ultimately owns a concession, how production and exports will be verified, what taxes and royalties are due, and how environmental obligations will be enforced.
These standards should apply to Russian investors just as they apply to companies from China, Europe, the United States or elsewhere. The objective is to secure investment on terms that benefit Ghana, not to confer special treatment on a foreign partner because of its geopolitical importance.
The risk of confusing diplomacy with delivery
The Moscow summit will generate declarations, meetings and potentially a package of agreements under the wider Russia-Africa Partnership Forum framework. But Ghana should resist the temptation to count signed documents as economic achievements before their substance has been established. Every significant agreement should have a clear implementing agency, financing arrangements, a realistic timetable and measurable targets. Progress should be reported publicly, with responsibility assigned for resolving delays or failures.
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The government should also assess what Ghana is committing in return. An agreement that attracts foreign investment but grants excessive tax concessions, weakens regulatory control or creates expensive future obligations may deliver less than its headline value suggests. The appropriate measure is the net economic benefit after financing costs, incentives, risks and public obligations have been considered.
A more demanding partnership
President John Dramani Mahama has said Ghana welcomes investment from all countries and seeks arrangements that deliver fair returns to both parties. That approach is consistent with a foreign policy that avoids exclusive geopolitical alignment. But non-alignment is most valuable when it gives a country the capacity to negotiate firmly with every partner. It loses practical meaning if the pursuit of diplomatic relationships takes precedence over commercial discipline or the protection of national interests.
Ghana should therefore enter the Moscow summit with a clear set of priorities: better access for Ghanaian exports, productive investment rather than import dependence, transparent contracts, sustainable financing, technology transfer and safeguards against deceptive recruitment and other forms of exploitation. It should also insist on reliable data against which the results of the relationship can be judged. Without a consistent trade and investment baseline, it will be difficult to distinguish genuine progress from diplomatic optimism.
Russia may offer useful markets, capital and expertise. But those opportunities must be evaluated against their actual returns, not the expectations surrounding them.
The greatest danger is not that Ghana will engage Russia. It is that the country could deepen that engagement without adequately assessing what it stands to gain, what it may have to surrender and who will bear the cost if the promised benefits fail to materialise. The Moscow summit should be an opportunity to negotiate better terms, not a reason to suspend scrutiny. For Ghana, the test of partnership is not the scale of its diplomatic warmth but whether the relationship strengthens the economy, protects national interests and delivers measurable benefits to its citizens.
