Washington, DC — In February, U.S. Congress passed a one-year extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). This came after a year of foot-dragging which resulted in the temporary lapse of the trade preference program. Meanwhile, China extended duty-free access to 53 African countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations.
The juxtaposition of these two approaches tells very different stories about how each country sees Africa, and how each one expects to be seen back. For 26 years, AGOA has been the centerpiece of the U.S. trade relationship with sub-Saharan Africa. At its best, it has anchored real industries: apparel in Lesotho and Madagascar, automobiles in South Africa, cut flowers in Kenya, agricultural exports across the region.
Since AGOA was enacted in 2000, U.S. exports to AGOA-eligible countries have nearly tripled, growing from $5.8 billion to $16.5 billion in 2024. It demonstrated that preferential access could translate into jobs, capacity, and integration into global supply chains. It has also revealed its limits. AGOA’s narrow product coverage, its short renewal horizons, and its disconnection from a broader U.S. commercial engagement strategy have meant the program never grew into the strategic instrument it could have been. The current extension, however necessary, does not change any of that.
On Capitol Hill, there is strong bipartisan support for a longer reauthorization window for AGOA. Earlier this year, the House passed a 3-year extension with overwhelming bipartisan support (340-54). Congress is also considering various proposals to modernize AGOA, but progress has thus far been stalled as legislators wait to see President Trump’s vision for the program’s future. There are signs the administration may be ready to articulate that vision.
In recent months, the Trump administration has grown more publicly outspoken regarding its work on AGOA renewal. In April, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee during a hearing examining President Trump’s 2026 trade agenda and committed to working with Congress on a “multi-year [AGOA] authorization.”
Following Greer’s congressional testimony, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) opened a comment period to solicit input from the public on the modernization of AGOA. With the comment period now closed, USTR is expected to release its formal modernization recommendations informed by public input soon. These steps, alongside the administration’s recent “Trade over Aid” UN declaration , which embraces mutually beneficial and profitable trade partnerships, are cautiously optimistic signs that AGOA renewal is being prioritized.
However, the President’s May proclamation formalizing the extension that was passed by Congress and reinstating Gabon’s eligibility was a reminder that the current authorization expires in six months. That does not provide a lot of runway for a comprehensive AGOA modernization and long-term reauthorization that must make its way through both chambers of Congress, particularly in a midterm election year with a compressed legislative calendar and lawmakers facing a long list of competing priorities.
America has a structural trade penalty toward Africa. China has a structural premium.
While the current short-term extension has kept AGOA on life support, China’s policy has no expiration date. Washington should be honest about what that contrast says. New ONE Campaign analysis found that simply being an African country reduces
U.S. exports by 52% and U.S. imports by 82%. Meanwhile, Chinese exports to African countries (all else equal) are 15% higher than to comparable countries elsewhere. America has a structural trade penalty toward Africa. China has a structural premium. For the United States, the upside for deepening our engagement with the region is concrete. More than 450.000 American jobs are already tied to U.S.-Africa trade.
Aircraft is the largest single U.S. export to the region, supported by manufacturing jobs at Boeing and across its U.S. supplier network. Apparel firms like SanMar, a Washington-based supplier to Levi’s and Walmart, have used AGOA to cut their sourcing exposure to China from 46 percent to just 6 percent. And the demographic dividend is compelling: by 2050, one in four people on the planet will be African, driving one of the fastest-growing consumer markets for U.S. goods and services.
The American firms that build durable commercial relationships now are the ones that will be positioned to compete when that growth arrives.
African countries are not standing still. In 202512 of the 20 fastest-growing economies in the world were in Africa. Aware of what they have to offer, African countries are taking bold steps to increase their competitiveness in the global marketplace. The African Continental Free Trade Area is building the largest free trade area in the world by number of countries. African governments and entrepreneurs are working to add value on the continent, not simply ship raw materials off it. The audience for industrial investment, infrastructure financing, and serious commercial partnership has rarely been more receptive. The question is who will be standing there when those investments are made.
China has made its answer clear. Beijing’s zero-tariff regime is unconditional, comprehensive, and indefinite. That posture is not without its own costs and complications, and African partners are not naive about them. But the predictability is real. So is the scale.
A modernized AGOA starts with a long-horizon reauthorization. Business and investors need predictable, multi-year market access; factories are not built on two-year timelines. A reauthorization of at least 10 years, paired with stable eligibility criteria and an updated product list, is the minimum threshold for the kind of investment AGOA was designed to catalyze.
Africa is choosing partners. The United States still has a narrow window to be a serious one.
Duration alone is not enough. A modern AGOA also must align with the African Continental Free Trade Area, the most consequential economic integration project on the continent, with clearer rules on regional cumulation and active support for intra-African value chains and value addition where products originate. And it has to be matched by commercial seriousness from Washington: a U.S. presence on the continent sized to the opportunity, the Trade and Development Agency, Export-Import Bank, and State Department working from the same playbook, and clearer priority sectors where the U.S. sees mutual advantage in agribusiness, energy, logistics, digital services, critical minerals, and the apparel and manufacturing base AGOA already supports.
A structural trade penalty does not undo itself. This asymmetry developed over decades. It will take comparable seriousness, sustained over comparable time, to reverse. The 1-year extension bought time. It did not buy a strategy.
Africa is choosing partners. The United States still has a narrow window to be a serious one.
Rodney Kazibwe is Director of U.S. Government Relations for The ONE Campaign where he works on trade and global economic development programs.
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