The ongoing military conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has once again exposed that war and conflict not only carry significant human costs but also reveal deep structural vulnerabilities in the global economic and energy systems. The conflict has raised concerns about further escalation amidst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint, triggering volatility in oil and natural gas markets. As a result, major oil and gas producing states in the Gulf region have declared force majeure due to the lack of export pathways. While the objective of the US and Israeli-led “Operation Epic Fury” remains clear–that is, to limit Iran’s ability to project military power beyond its borders–the tactical approach adopted to achieve this has been to paralyze Iran’s command and control structure, particularly among its top political and military leadership. The early, coordinated, and targeted strikes appear to have functioned as “decapitation strikes,” aimed at disrupting decision-making and reducing Iran’s ability to coordinate a response, thereby weakening its ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against the United States, Israel, and their allies.
Iran’s strategy appears to be simple and focused on prolonging the conflict rather than pursuing rapid escalation and imposing high costs not only on the United States and its allies but globally by targeting critical infrastructure in the region. Iran is doing so by expanding the geographic scope of the conflict and striking targets in multiple Gulf countries aligned with the United States and rapidly destabilizing global maritime trade networks. The sporadic drone and ballistic missile attacks on critical infrastructure–such as energy systems, ports, airports, and defense bases–in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iraq, and Oman have one clear intent: to increase the operational and economic cost of the conflict and generate international pressure on the United States and Israel to halt the attacks. Iran’s current leadership appears ready to prolong the conflict. Tehran wants to exploit the geopolitical dynamics of prolonged warfare, well aware that prolonged military engagements often erode political support in the United States, as President Donald Trump is already witnessing. Tehran aims to create a broader geopolitical shock that reverberates far beyond the Middle East, affecting the global community with a clear strategic message: “If I go, I take everyone with me.” For net energy-importing economies such as India, whose growth trajectory and prosperity directly depend on uninterrupted energy supplies and stable maritime trade networks, the ongoing conflict raises urgent questions about vulnerability, resilience, and the need for strategic recalibration in an increasingly uncertain power-centric global order.
India’s Strategic Vulnerability
For India, the escalating conflict presents profound geopolitical shocks with immediate economic, strategic, and security implications. At the center of this vulnerability lies the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, barely 12 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point. Even minor disruptions in this corridor can halt shipping traffic and trigger major disturbances in global energy markets. The strait carries roughly 25 percent of global seaborne oil trade–around 20 million barrels per day in 2024–along with significant volumes of liquefied natural gas (LNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), chemicals, containers, and dry bulk cargo, including fertilizers, making it indispensable and critical to global energy, trade, and food supply chains. The recent military escalation in the region has already begun to disrupt shipping through the strait. Reports suggest that daily ship transits fell sharply–from an average of about 141 vessels in February to only a few vessels in early March–triggering ripple effects in global energy and shipping markets. With every passing day, the escalating conflict has renewed security risks in the Red Sea region as well–where Houthi rebels operate and targeted commercial shipping last year–driving up insurance premiums. Thus, the persistent threat of missile and drone attacks on maritime infrastructure has further heightened uncertainty for commercial vessels and energy carriers operating in the region.
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For India, the implications are particularly severe. Nearly 40 percent of India’s crude oil imports and about 69 percent of its LNG supplies transit through the Strait of Hormuz, underscoring the country’s structural dependence on this route. More broadly, India’s economic links with the region run deep: It accounts for 17 percent of India’s exports, supplies 55 percent of its crude oil, and generates 38 percent of its remittances. The vulnerability extends beyond energy. The Persian Gulf is also central to global fertilizer trade, with around one-third of global seaborne fertilizer shipments–approximately 16 million tons in 2024–passing through the region. Urea dominates this trade (67 percent), followed by diammonium phosphate (20 percent), monoammonium phosphate (9 percent), and other fertilizers (4 percent). India’s fertilizer security is therefore closely tied to the Gulf, with around 63 percent of nitrogen fertilizer imports sourced from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, while roughly 32 percent of diammonium phosphate imports also originate from the region. These disruptions have already begun to reverberate across global markets. Brent crude prices surged above US$90 per barrel, rising by about 27 percent and gas prices by nearly 74 percent between Feb. 27 and March 9. Shipping costs have also escalated sharply. Baltic tanker freight rates increased by 54 percent for dirty tankers and 72 percent for clean tankers, while bunker fuel prices rose by nearly 100 percent. War-risk insurance premiums for vessels transiting the region have doubled–from roughly US$250,000 per voyage for a US$100 million vessel to between US$500,000 and US$1 million–significantly increasing transportation costs.
Given that 95 percent of India’s trade by volume and nearly 70 percent by value moves through maritime routes, disruptions in the Gulf create cascading pressures across the economy. Historically, oil price spikes have translated into rising food prices, while gas price increases directly affect fertilizer production and agricultural costs. Prolonged instability in the region, therefore, risks generating broader inflationary pressures and food security challenges for India, highlighting the structural vulnerability of global supply chains to disruptions in critical maritime chokepoints. These dynamics underline a deeper strategic reality: India’s energy and food security remain closely tied to the stability of West Asia. While the region will continue to remain central to India’s economic growth and prosperity, its persistent geopolitical volatility necessitates a broader strategic response. New Delhi must therefore navigate the crisis through a combination of diplomatic balancing, strategic energy diversification, and long-term geopolitical recalibration.
India’s Strategic Choices: The Madhyamā Mārga, or Middle Path
Having recognized the vulnerabilities arising from conflict and instability in West Asia, an important question arises: How should India navigate this evolving and complex geopolitical and security landscape? In an increasingly power-centric and polarized world order, sustained by dominance and violent conflict, and increasingly witnessing normative fatigue in multilateral institutions. In this context, India’s foreign policy choices need to be pragmatic, drawing upon deeper civilizational principles that have historically shaped its worldview and strategic culture. One such framework that resonates strongly with India’s strategic thinking is the Madhyamā Mārga, or Middle Path.
The Madhyamā Mārga, historically associated with the Buddhist philosophical tradition, emphasizes balance, moderation, and the avoidance of dogmatic extremes, rejecting both absolute existence and absolute nihilism. It places a premium on ethical restraint in the exercise of power and in global governance. When applied to contemporary geopolitics, the Madhyamā Mārga offers a useful strategic lens through which India can pursue strategic autonomy while navigating intensifying great-power competition. This philosophical orientation also highlights how the Bharatiya understanding of peace differs fundamentally from Westphalian notions, which largely define peace as merely the absence of war. In the Bharatiya conception, peace is understood more holistically as inner harmony, social balance, ethical conduct, and ecological responsibility. Peace therefore becomes a way of life for shared coexistence rather than a temporary political arrangement. This understanding naturally aligns with principles such as “horizontal multilateralism,” South-South cooperation, and dialogical governance structures, which prioritize cooperation, dialogue, and collective well-being over hierarchical power politics.
In contemporary geopolitical practice, the Madhyamā Mārga offers New Delhi a middle path to preserve strategic autonomy while navigating intensifying rivalries among major powers. Instead of aligning rigidly with competing blocs, India seeks to maintain flexibility by engaging multiple centers of power simultaneously. In this context, two closely related diplomatic approaches–depolarization and de-hyphenation–have become increasingly important components of India’s foreign policy. Depolarization seeks to reduce rigid geopolitical divisions that force states into binary alignments. In an international system increasingly shaped by competing power centers, it aims to maintain engagement with multiple actors while encouraging collaborative frameworks that mitigate confrontation and conflict. De-hyphenation, meanwhile, in the highly fragmented and complex world order of today, allows India to manage bilateral relationships independently rather than allowing one relationship to define or constrain another. Such an approach enables New Delhi to simultaneously maintain partnerships with actors that may themselves be geopolitical competitors, thereby preserving diplomatic flexibility.
Strategic autonomy in India’s contemporary foreign policy offers several practical illustrations of the Middle Path approach. New Delhi maintains deep strategic partnerships with multiple actors that are themselves engaged in geopolitical competition. India and the United States share a comprehensive global strategic partnership supported by a series of defense agreements–including the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA, 2016), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA, 2018), the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA, 2020), and GSOMIA–alongside expanding cooperation in defense technology, innovation ecosystems such as INDUS-X, and bilateral trade exceeding US$212.3 billion in 2024 in goods and services. At the same time, India maintains a Special Strategic Partnership with Israel, particularly in defense cooperation, innovation, and critical and emerging technologies. Parallel to these relationships, India continues to sustain historically rooted ties with Iran, characterized by cooperation on the development of Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which once completed will provide strategic connectivity to Central Asia and Eurasia while bypassing Pakistan. Although the sanctions on Iran have stalled the projects, taken together, these engagements illustrate how India navigates complex geopolitical rivalries through pragmatic balancing rather than rigid alignment.
India’s strategic choices, therefore, can be understood by the interaction of identity, ideas, interests, and institutions. India’s identity as a civilizational state–historically shaped by pluralism, dialogue, and intercultural exchange–provides an intellectual foundation for its engagement with diverse regions and cultures. The guiding ideas of India’s foreign policy draw on civilizational principles of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam and Madhyamā Mārga, which emphasize coexistence, moderation, and shared responsibility. New Delhi’s interests involve balancing strategic autonomy with pragmatic cooperation and collaboration with like-minded partners, particularly in areas such as energy security, economic growth, regional stability, and connectivity across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Institutions serve as the platforms through which these identities, ideas, and interests are operationalized. In this context India actively participates in a range of multilateral, minilateral, trilateral, and bilateral frameworks–including the G20, Quad, IMEC, I2U2, India-France-UAE, and Global South platforms such as BRICS, IBSA, the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), the India-Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor–alongside its calibrated engagement with the Gulf states, Israel, and Iran–reflect a strategy of flexible coalition-building to promote cooperative approaches to global governance. Such engagement reflects a preference for horizontal multilateralism, aiming to create a multipolar world where cooperation is structured through horizontal networks of partnerships rather than hierarchical power arrangements dominated by a few major powers. Thus, the call for multipolarity alone is insufficient without depolarization, which is a necessary precursor for creating the conditions for “equitable interdependence,” moving away from a complex web of dependence.
In this sense, the Madhyamā Mārga provides both a philosophical foundation and a pragmatic strategic approach for navigating the uncertainties of a power-centric and polarized world. By balancing material interests with normative principles and maintaining engagement with multiple centers of power, New Delhi seeks to act as a stabilizing actor in an increasingly fragmented international system while preserving its strategic autonomy. Within this broader strategic thinking, Africa assumes an ever-increasing central role in India’s evolving geopolitical outlook and strategic calculus. As India’s deep dependence on one geographical region for its energy needs has exposed structural vulnerabilities, it’s high time now for New Delhi to diversify its economic partnerships, secure energy supplies, and strengthen maritime connectivity. In this regard, the African continent offers vast opportunities for India that closely align with its pursuit of strategic autonomy. At the same time, Africa’s demographic potential, growing economic and diplomatic influence within the Global South provides an important platform through which India can build strong consensus to collaborate and operationalize its Middle Path approach–balancing material interests with cooperative engagement while contributing to the emergence of a more inclusive and depolarized international order. Since the crises and conflicts driven by the Global North are likely to have severe ramifications for the Global South, the fate of nearly 85 percent of the Earth’s population cannot be left to the decisions of a few actors. Against this backdrop, Africa and India need to rethink their partnership in order to re-energize the Global South and strengthen its capacity to influence global governance and decision-making.
Why Africa Is Key to New Delhi’s Strategic Autonomy
Africa offers India a sense of optimism at a time of deep global uncertainty. The contemporary international environment demands greater stability, cooperation, and strategic foresight, yet the world appears increasingly marked by fragmentation and despair. Norms and institutional frameworks that once underpinned the international order–particularly those associated with multilateralism and long championed by the United States and the broader West–are themselves witnessing erosion. The very actors who once advocated a rules-based international order now appear to be gradually undermining it, contributing to a weakening of global governance structures. Therefore, at a moment when the international order urgently requires collaborative mechanisms and collective responses to crises, a fundamental paradox emerges: Who will chart the way forward when multilateral institutionalism itself is in retreat? Increasingly, the global landscape resembles a competitive arena where states are positioned against one another, a trajectory that risks escalating into dynamics reminiscent of mutually assured destruction (MAD).
Against this backdrop, both India and African states, structural dependencies within the global economic and security architecture often translate into deep strategic vulnerabilities. The ongoing crises have deepened the existing asymmetries in the international system, compounding the structural vulnerabilities for national and human security. Consequently, the current regional landscape makes it imperative for countries of the Global South to articulate coordinated responses and alternative frameworks for cooperation to mitigate the risk. Within this context, Africa assumes growing importance for India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. Strengthening Indian-African partnerships offers New Delhi an opportunity to diversify its diplomatic, economic, and security engagements while contributing to a broader Global South effort to navigate an increasingly polarized international order.
Africa offers a viable pathway for insulating India from recurring supply shocks while creating avenues for diversifying energy partnerships within the energy-rich states of the continent. In many ways, Africa represents a potential strategic buffer that can help India mitigate disruptions arising from instability in West Asia and other conflict-prone regions. African producers provide an important alternative. Major African countries from which India imports crude oil are Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, and Libya. Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, and South Africa export significant amount of petroleum, oil and lubricants. Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Mozambique are the top LNG suppliers to New Delhi. These states can help India diversify its energy basket and reduce overreliance on West Asian supplies. Experts increasingly recommend that India maintain diversified long-term supply arrangements to prevent any single geographic region from dominating its energy imports. Africa therefore serves as an important strategic hedge, providing a viable buffer for energy procurement during periods of geopolitical instability.
Africa’s geographical position means that, from a logistical perspective, energy shipments from African countries face fewer maritime chokepoints compared to supplies originating in the Persian Gulf and offer India important alternatives in maritime trade and logistics. They also involve shorter distances than shipments from major exporters such as the United States, Russia, or Australia in the context of energy supplies. This geographical advantage has already attracted strong international interest in Mozambique’s LNG sector, where approximately 75 percent of export capacity has been locked in through long-term contracts with buyers in Europe and Asia, even before projects reach full production. Significant volumes of LNG are expected to enter global markets by late 2026, particularly from major blocks such as Area 1 in the Rovuma Basin. For India, this emerging energy geography in East Africa offers promising opportunities to diversify supply sources, strengthen maritime connectivity across the western Indian Ocean, and enhance long-term energy security.
Further, any disruptions in the Red Sea compound the vulnerability of existing shipping routes connecting India with Europe and the United States. In such circumstances, maritime traffic can be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa, ensuring continuity of trade even though the route involves longer transit times and higher costs, but any trade is better than no trade at all. Moreover, African ports and markets can also function as complementary nodes within global logistics networks, helping sustain India’s export sectors–including pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, and manufactured products–that are particularly sensitive to instability in West Asia, which is one of its largest markets, as well. Another critical area in which Africa contributes to India’s strategic resilience is the supply of agricultural inputs and commodities. North African countries are among the world’s major producers of phosphorus and nitrogen-based fertilizers, which are critical for New Delhi’s agricultural productivity and food security. Thus, strengthening long-term partnerships with these states can help India mitigate supply disruptions caused by geopolitical tensions or conflict-related constraints in global fertilizer markets. In this sense, cooperation with Africa contributes not only to energy security but also to the stability of India’s agricultural economy and food security.
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Cooperation and collaboration in the maritime domain represent another strategic arena for Indian-African engagement amidst increasing instability and conflict. African littoral and island states occupy key positions along sea lanes that connect the wider Indian Ocean region with the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions. Therefore, constructive engagement with African partners in areas such as port development, refueling facilities, information sharing, maritime domain awareness, and anti-piracy operations can strengthen the security of shipping routes across the western Indian Ocean. Such cooperation complements India’s broader maritime strategy aimed at Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR) ensuring the stability and openness of sea lanes that are critical for global commerce and security.
Conclusion
The growing issue-based convergence between India and Africa is not limited to economic, security, or strategic considerations. It also reflects deeper normative linkages that shape their engagement in current world affairs. In this context, African identity, ideas, interests, and institutions, anchored in Africa’s philosophical traditions–particularly the ethics of Ubuntu, which emphasizes relational coexistence, and the East African idea of Harambee, or collective effort–resonate strongly with India’s Madhyamā Mārga approach to global engagement. Both traditions put a premium on balance, cooperation, and shared responsibility over hierarchical power politics, providing a normative foundation for deeper Indian-African partnerships within the broader framework of Global South engagement in an increasingly polarized world. While India’s partnerships across the African continent have historically been shaped less by geopolitical rivalry and more by a shared vision of equity in development cooperation, capacity building, and South-South solidarity, strengthening energy and maritime partnerships with African states will not only enhance India’s energy security but also align well with New Delhi’s broader strategy of depolarized, dialogical, and cooperative engagement across the Global South. In this sense, Africa emerges not merely as an energy partner but as a strategic space where India’s Madhyamā Mārga finds deep resonance with African traditions to counter complex geopolitical and security realities–grounded in depolarization, de-hyphenation, and horizontal multilateralism–which can serve as a practical expression of a Global South strategic outlook in a rapidly transforming world order. Taken together, these economic, strategic, and normative dimensions demonstrate that Africa is increasingly central to India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. The continent represents not merely an alternative source of energy or trade but a key partner in building a more diversified and resilient global engagement strategy. By deepening partnerships with African states across energy, maritime, agricultural, and diplomatic domains, India can reduce its exposure to geopolitical disruptions while simultaneously contributing to the emergence of a more balanced, cooperative, and inclusive international order.
Raghvendra Kumar is a Non-Resident Fellow in FPRI’s Africa Program and a Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of International Relations and Peace Studies, Nalanda University, Rajgir, Bihar, India. He holds a PhD and MPhil in African Studies from the University of Delhi, along with a Bachelor’s and a Master’s degree in Political Science from Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi. His expertise lies in Africa’s maritime security, the blue economy, and geoeconomic competition, particularly in the continent’s coastal and island states.