Moscow is less welcome than other powers, but many Africans are still making up their minds.
Key findings
- On average across 38 countries, 36% of respondents say Russia’s economic and political influence on their country is “somewhat positive” or “very positive,” while 23% say it is somewhat or very negative. But a plurality (42%) do not offer an assessment. Across 24 countries we see a modest 3-percentage-point increase in positive perceptions since 2019/2021.
- Regionally, Russia gets its highest marks in Central Africa (50% positive) and West Africa (43%). Southern Africans (27%) and East Africans (26%) are much more restrained in their assessments.
- At the country level, 88% of Malians describe Russia’s role as positive, far surpassing all other countries. Majorities agree in only three other countries: Cameroon (60%), Guinea-Bissau (55%), and Côte d’Ivoire (55%). The least favourable views of Russia are seen in Zambia (15%), Lesotho (14%), Eswatini (14%), and Botswana (13%).
- Younger Africans (38% of 18-to 35-year-olds) are significantly more likely to express positive views of Russia than those aged 56 and above (30%).
- Despite Russian leaders’ increased focus on the continent, these efforts do not appear to be paying dividends in terms of shaping public opinion. People are learning more about Russia, but they don’t necessarily like what they see. Across 24 countries where we can compare Round 10 findings with Round 8 (2019/2021), more people now assert an opinion, but the increase in negative assessments (+6 percentage points) is about twice the change in positive reviews (+3 points).
- On balance, perceptions of Russia improved over the past five years in Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, Senegal, Togo, and Tunisia while worsening in 12 countries.
- Russia records the smallest share of positive assessments among the major continental and global actors considered. Positive perceptions of Russia fall far below those for China (62%), regional organisations (56%), the African Union (AU) (55%), the United States (52%), and the European Union (50%).
- There is no consistent pattern in how opinions about other countries are changing over time. While both positive and negative assessments of Russia’s influence have increased compared to 2019/2021, perceptions of China’s engagement have been high and quite steady, while the United States has been losing ground.
- Although Russia’s low positive ratings in part reflect the large proportion of citizens who have not yet formed an opinion, among those who do offer an assessment, the ratio of positive to negative views is also far lower for Russia (1.5 to 1) than for other global powers, especially China (3.5 to 1).
- But Africans do not necessarily see a need to choose favourites: People who assess Russia’s role positively are also more likely to give China, the United States, and the AU positive marks – and vice versa.
- Fully 70% of Africans have heard about the Russia-Ukraine war, ranging above nine out of 10 citizens in Cabo Verde (98%), Seychelles (94%), and São Tomé and Príncipe (91%).
- Among those who have heard about the war, more than seven in 10 (72%) say their country should remain neutral. Mali is the only country where a majority favour one side (72% for Russia).
- While positive attitudes toward Russia show no association with many indicators of support for democratic institutions and norms, support for military rule is a modest exception: On average, those who hold favourable views of Russian influence are somewhat more likely to see military rule as an acceptable form of government, a relationship that is statistically significant in 11 of the 38 surveyed countries.
Follow us on WhatsApp | LinkedIn for the latest headlines
Russia’s engagement with Africa has grown over the past decade, marking the country’s return to a continent where it played an important role during the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s presence in Africa declined sharply in the 1990s due to economic and political instability at home. Since the early 2000s, under President Vladimir Putin’s rule, Russia has sought to rebuild political, military, and diplomatic ties with African countries as part of a broader effort to reassert itself as a global power. Analysts describe the primary goal of Russia’s efforts in Africa as hastening the advent of a multipolar world, reducing Russia’s international isolation and re-establishing itself as a global power. In so doing it seeks to undermine Western and U.S. influence while also securing access to resources (Siegle, 2021; Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). While still limited, Russia’s recent engagements have helped resurrect its role as an “active player” in several African states for the first time since the end of the Cold War (Giustozzi & Lewis, 2024).
Unlike China’s engagement on the continent, which is centred on trade, infrastructure, and development finance, Russia seeks to wield influence primarily through lower-cost tools such as security cooperation and arms sales, diplomatic engagement, and (dis)information campaigns. It has signed military cooperation agreements with more than 201 African countries, relationships that often include weapons transfers, military training and contractors, and advisory support, especially in countries facing conflict or instability (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023; Lindén, 2023). But in practice, Russia’s resources are limited, especially by war-related demands at home and Western economic sanctions.
In several countries, Russia’s security ties have been channeled through Kremlin-backed private military companies (PMCs) such as the former Wagner Group (which was formally absorbed by the Russian Ministry of Defense and rebranded as Africa Corps in 2023). Wagner, and now Africa Corps, have operated in countries such as Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Sudan. They typically provide regime protection, military training, site security, and political consulting services, often in exchange for concessions in extractive industries (Lindén, 2023; Götz & Gejl Kaas, 2024). Such arrangements have helped African governments underwrite the costs of Russian support while entrenching its political influence.
At the same time, Russia’s trade and commercial footprint on the continent is still quite modest in comparison to other global powers. Concentrated in agriculture, mining, and hydrocarbon sectors, annual trade with the continent is estimated at just $18 billion, compared to $64 billion for the United States and $254 billion for China (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Russia lacks the financial capacity to fund large-scale development or infrastructure projects across the continent.
Nonetheless, Africa has become increasingly important to Russia since it escalated the war with Ukraine in 2022 (Lindén, 2023). Moscow has sought African diplomatic support, or at least neutrality, in international forums such as the United Nations. Some degree of success is evident in the fact that while few African countries openly support Russia, many have abstained from votes condemning its actions. These voting patterns reflect strategic non alignment, domestic political considerations, and Russia’s targeted influence efforts (Götz & Gejl Kaas, 2024).
African governments and elites have often been open to Russia’s growing presence on the continent. Part of Russia’s success in re-establishing its influence has been its effectiveness in co-opting struggling leaders, providing security in the face of political instability. But Russia’s anti-colonial message and efforts to disrupt a global order that it portrays as built on unequal relationships may have resonated well beyond the West African coup countries. And Russia’s (as well as China’s) policy of non-interference in local politics, or even outright preference for non-democratic systems, has been welcomed by many would-be autocrats in an environment of increasing challenges to democracy (Siegle, 2021; Council on Foreign Relations, 2023).
Russia’s motivations, and its growing influence, have raised alarms not only among Russia’s economic and political competitors, but also among democracy advocates (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Russia and the PMCs, especially Wagner before its transition, have been tagged as leading purveyors of disinformation campaigns (reported in more than 20 countries) and other deliberate efforts to undermine democracy on the continent (reported in 28 countries) (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024a). Russia’s willingness to extend its influence by co-opting and propping up some of the continent’s most isolated and undemocratic leaders directly undermines democratic development (Siegle, 2021; Lindén, 2023).
In this context, how do ordinary African citizens view Russia and its influence in their countries? In its Round 10 surveys (2024/2025) in 38 African countries, Afrobarometer included Russia for the second time in a battery of questions about the positive or negative influence of major international actors and foreign powers.
The findings are revealing. As in Afrobarometer Round 8 (2019/2021), Russia again receives the fewest positive evaluations among all of these actors. This is in part because a plurality of respondents will not commit to either a positive or negative assessment of Russian influence in their country, suggesting that in many countries, people are still in relatively early stages of forming opinions about this re-emerging global power.
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
But there is enormous cross-country variation, from highs in Mali to lows in Botswana, that speak to Russia’s complex and varied engagement across the continent. Russia’s low ratings are not only about unformed opinions: Among those who offer assessments, the ratio of positive views to negative for Russia is just 1.5 to 1, which compares quite poorly with China (3.5), the United States (2.6), and other global powers. And as more people form opinions, Russia may be losing further ground. On average since Round 8 (2019/2021), the increase in the proportion of negative opinions has been about double the increase in positive views.
But at least some of Russia’s messages, especially those promoting multipolarity and non alignment with the West, may be resonating with African publics: Among those who have heard of Russia’s war in Ukraine, a large majority urge their own governments to remain neutral. And Africans do not seem to buy into the idea that they must choose sides or prefer one foreign power over another: Attitudes about foreign and international actors are positively correlated. People who are more positive about Russia also tend to be more positive about the United States, China, and the European Union, and vice versa.
On the other hand, to the extent that Russia seeks to downplay or even undermine democratic commitments on the continent, their inroads appear to be limited, at least when it comes to popular attitudes. We find that greater support for Russia does not align with less support for many core institutions and tenets of democracy, with one critical exception: Those who regard Russia as a positive influence are somewhat more tolerant of military rule as an alternative to democracy. And with its focus on establishing footholds in places such as Mali, where instability and weak institutions have left openings for military intervention, Russia may be realising some success in selected countries, even if its reputation across the continent is still decidedly mixed.
Aubrey Ghambi Aubrey Ghambi is a research assistant for Afrobarometer.
Alfred Kwadzo Torsu Alfred Kwadzo Torsu is the Data Analytics Lead at Afrobarometer, where he focuses on using data to guide and shape effective policies.
Carolyn Logan Carolyn is a senior advisor at Afrobarometer.