Africa’s 2026 elections must navigate a diverse array of complexities from conflicts to entrenched incumbents, growing youth restlessness, and external actor influences for citizens to be heard.
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Africa’s diverse governance tapestry is reflected in the 11 countries planning to hold elections in 2026. Roughly half can be expected to be competitive, while the outcomes in the remainder are predictable. Both the continent’s second-largest country by population, Ethiopia, as well as some of the smallest, including the island nations of Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe are going to the polls.
In 4 of 11 countries (Uganda, the Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, and South Sudan), presidents have been in power for at least 15 years. In Uganda and the Republic of the Congo, leaders have held their positions for more than four decades. (In Denis Sassou-Nguesso’s case, this was split over two intervals.) The four cases of extended tenures were all enabled by incumbents sidestepping term limit restrictions over the years–and in doing so, incurring economic, political, and security costs for their countries.
Somalia and Ethiopia will be holding elections amid ongoing armed conflict. Meanwhile, Benin, The Gambia, and Zambia are attempting to reset their democratic institutions after varying degrees of authoritarian drift.
Many of the African countries going to the polls in 2026, accordingly, face fundamental democratic tests of crafting effective checks on the executive to enable power sharing and popular representation. Doing so is a formidable challenge for any society, and finding the right balance is not formulaic. In several of these cases, reformers who ushered in a democratic opening now pose a threat to democracy from the overconcentration of power in the executive.
Youth are front and center in every election, demanding more transparency, fairness, and responsiveness from Africa’s electoral processes.
Youth are front and center in every election on the world’s youngest continent this year, wanting to be heard and demanding more transparency, fairness, and responsiveness to citizens from Africa’s electoral processes. This is the case even in countries where there is an uneven electoral playing field, underscoring the deep aspiration for–and commitment to–democratic reform across the continent.
East Africa will be disproportionately represented, with 5 of the 11 elections on the continent occurring in this region. Beyond the direct effects this will have on shaping governance and security in this region, East Africa is also subject to growing Gulf State rivalries that will add another layer of intricacy to these elections.
With regional norms in flux across the continent, elections in even the smallest countries are likely to have wider governance and security ripples.
Here are some themes to look for in each.
In addition, five countries will hold their legislative elections this year: Benin (January 12), Cameroon (May), Algeria (June), Morocco (September), and Guinea (2026).
Uganda
Presidential and Legislative: January 15, 2026
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Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni is seeking his seventh term in office in the January 15 presidential election that kicks off Africa’s 2026 election calendar. He and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) party are running on the campaign theme of “Protecting the Gains: Making a Qualitative Leap into High Middle-Income Status.” This election cycle marks the 40th anniversary of the former revolutionary military leader’s tenure in power–the third longest on the continent, following Teodoro Obiang Nguema in Equatorial Guinea and Paul Biya in Cameroon.
The 81-year-old Museveni has extended his time in office by eliminating previously established term limits in 2005 and 2017. Museveni’s campaign this year is also shadowed by the increasingly prominent role played by his son, 51-year-old Muhoozi Kainerugaba. Now the Chief of Defense Forces following a series of rapid promotions, Kainerugaba is widely viewed as being groomed for the presidency as part of a carefully orchestrated hereditary succession.
The normalization of violence around elections in Uganda follows a pattern in the East African region.
As in the 2021 election, when the opposition faced up to 3,000 abductions and 54 fatalities (plus 18 who remain unaccounted for), the 2026 election process has been characterized by intimidation and violence directed against the opposition. Hundreds of opposition supporters have been detained, and opposition rallies often face active disruption, including roadblocks, arbitrary arrests, tear gassing, and the use of water cannons against supporters by police. Injuries and fatalities have been reported at multiple opposition campaign rallies with the police using live rounds at times.
The violence is so pervasive that the leading opposition candidate, Bobi Wine of the National Unity Party (NUP), has likened the campaign to a war zone. In May 2025, Kainerugaba publicly boasted of personally torturing Wine’s chief bodyguard, Edward Sebuufu (aka Eddie Mutwe), who had been abducted 5 days earlier.
The persistent intimidation has prompted the Chairperson of the Ugandan Electoral Commission (EC), Justice Simon Mugenyi Byabakama, to condemn the violence and reiterate that all presidential candidates are lawfully allowed to campaign anywhere in Uganda.
The normalization of violence around elections in Uganda follows a pattern in the East African region. Tight restrictions against the opposition campaigning in the run-up to the October 2025 Tanzanian elections were followed by an unprecedented level of abductions, arrests, and killings of an estimated several thousand opposition supporters and ordinary citizens, belying the claim of a 98 percent electoral tally in support of incumbent President Samia Suluhu Hassan.
Recent years have also seen greater levels of cooperation among East African governments in restricting acts of opposition and civil society solidarity. Even though he was not expected to be a candidate in 2026, longtime Ugandan opposition leader Dr. Kizza Besigye was abducted in Kenya in November 2024 and forcibly transported to Uganda, where he initially faced a military trial. He remains in detention under the charge of treason and the threat of the death penalty. Kenyan and Tanzanian lawyers who have attempted to represent or observe his trial have faced a series of roadblocks from doing so.
The past year has also seen heightened intimidation of journalists covering the Ugandan elections, including attacks, detention, and torture. At least 15 journalists covering the by-elections in Kawempe North in March 2025 were targeted by the Anti-Terrorism Task Force, causing several media outlets to pull their journalists from this coverage. This is particularly noteworthy in that the government has historically tolerated relatively greater space for independent media and the exercise of civil liberties, despite the NRM’s long dominance.
Even with these formidable obstacles, seven opposition candidates are contesting the presidential election in Uganda, where a winning candidate must obtain an absolute majority or move to a second round between the two leading vote-getters.
Only 90,000 out of 700,000 graduates each year can find employment in the formal sector.
Bobi Wine is by far the most prominent of the opposition candidates. As in the 2021 campaign, the 43-year-old candidate has drawn large crowds wherever he speaks. The popular reggae star has galvanized the youth vote around themes of restoring democracy and constitutionalism, fighting corruption, and creating jobs for youth through economic reform.
An estimated 33 million of Uganda’s 46 million population are under the age of 30, including 10.7 million voters. As in other African countries with large, youthful populations, young people are the leading edge of demands for political and economic reform.
Surveys indicate that unemployment and corruption are the leading concerns for Ugandan voters. Uganda ranks 140 out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index. The country’s overall unemployment rate stands at 12.6 percent, while youth unemployment is 43 percent. Only 90,000 out of 700,000 graduates each year can find employment in the formal sector. Uganda’s annual per capita income of $987 has grown by an average of 1.8 percent over the past 4 years.
Perhaps the most vital issue to watch in the 2026 election is the degree of transparency surrounding the vote counting. In 2021, rather than reporting electoral results by each polling station as required by law, the EC announced results by region. This limited the scope for validating these results and created widespread skepticism around the announced tally of a Museveni victory, with 58 percent of the vote in the first round of voting. While the exact figures remain disputed, the NUP did gain majorities in the key population centers of Kampala, Buganda (central Uganda), and Busoga (eastern Uganda). Opposition party members of parliament now collectively control roughly 100 seats out of the 556-seat legislative body.
The election in Uganda is in many ways a microcosm of the crosscurrents shaping the political space in Africa.
Reflective of the concerns for security and transparency, on November 25, 2025, faith leaders under the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda called for measures to safeguard peace, justice, and integrity in the elections. On December 3, Father Deusdedit Ssekabira, a Catholic priest from the city of Masaka, was abducted. The military confirmed nearly 2 weeks later that he was being held in a military prison for “subversive activities,” charges the Masaka Diocese has denied.
The election in Uganda is in many ways a microcosm of the sharp crosscurrents shaping the political space in Africa. Long-dominant parties are attempting to hold onto power despite waning popularity and growing demands for greater pluralism from a restive, youthful population that has known only one leader. The question for Ugandans is whether elections will be a catalyst for reform and democratic self-correction–or more of the same.
Republic of the Congo
Presidential: March 22, 2026
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Sassou-Nguesso extended his rule by sidestepping age- and term-limit restrictions.
The 2026 election in the Republic of the Congo is expected to generate a predictable outcome as President Denis Sassou-Nguesso seeks to perpetuate his 41-year hold on power in Africa’s third-largest oil-exporting country. The 82-year-old Sassou-Nguesso is Africa’s third-longest serving leader.Sassou-Nguesso extended his rule in this Central African country of 6 million people by sidestepping age- and term-limit restrictions in 2015, enabling him to contest his fifth consecutive presidential term in 2026. (There was a 5-year interregnum in Sassou-Nguesso’s rule from 1992 to 1997, when the Congo’s multiparty era was introduced.)
Sassou-Nguesso was declared the winner of the 2021 presidential election with 88 percent of the vote, in which the main opposition parties boycotted due to unfair conditions. The vote was marked by low turnout and voters’ names left off voter registries. Sassou-Nguesso’s party, the Parti congolais du travail (PCT) and its allies gained control of all but 29 seats in the 151-seat National Assembly.
The 2026 election is on track to replicate previous campaigns, given Sassou-Nguesso’s sway over the key levers of power in the country.
Members of Congo’s Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI) are selected by the National Assembly, giving the ruling party an advantage in shaping elections. An illustration of this is that opposition parties are sometimes denied certificates of recognition, barring their registration. In June 2025, the Ministry of Interior suspended 15 opposition parties. Several of these were planning to form a coalition, the Rassemblement des forces du changement (RFC), to contest the upcoming elections.
Even with these institutional strictures, opposition candidates are still subject to intimidation. Lassy Mbouity, the leader of the Socialistes congolais, was abducted on May 11, 2025, and found in critical condition 10 days later. Mbouity has filed at least five complaints to the High Court, to no avail.
The stifled political landscape in the Congo has contributed to its economic doldrums.
Sassou-Nguesso appoints all national judges in the country, and the courts, in turn, have been supportive of the President’s interests, including upholding the convictions of leading opposition figures such as Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko and André Okombi Salissa, on charges that are widely viewed as politically motivated, further winnowing the competitive playing field.
Protests are also effectively banned, given that state authorities have refused to authorize requested permits. Those who have protested have been met with violence and arrest at the hands of the country’s armed forces.
The Congo’s media landscape is similarly tightly controlled by the executive branch. Leadership of both state media and the Conseil supérieur de la liberté de communication (CSLC), the media regulator, is appointed by the president. Media outlets that do not comply with the CSLC’s directives are subject to losing their accreditation.
Despite the restricted environment, several opposition candidates will be contesting the 2026 presidential election. In addition to Lassy Mbouity, these include:
- Mathias Dzon, a former finance minister and candidate in the 2021 election. His party, the Union patriotique pour le renouveau national (UPRN), gained eight seats in the National Assembly.
- Alexis Bongo, a journalist and talk show host, is seen as a moderate focusing on economic issues and appealing to youth.
- Anguios Nganguia Engambé, President of the Parti pour l’action de la République (PAR), who is campaigning on a platform of social justice, democratic transparency, and national development. He has contested in multiple previous elections.
- Pascal Tsaty Mabiala, leader of the Union panafricaine pour la démocratie sociale (UPADS).
The stifled political landscape in the Congo has contributed to its economic doldrums, whereby the country is subject to the “paradox of plenty.” Despite generating roughly $2 billion in revenue annually from oil exports, human development remains stunted and lags behind other lower middle-income countries. In fact, real per capita income in the country has declined by 28 percent since 2015. Expenditures on health and education have dropped over the past decade, while electricity remains unreliable. Levels of inequality are among the highest in Africa.
The Congo’s economic underperformance is, in part, linked to its reputation for entrenched corruption. The country ranks 151st out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Systemic patronage and embezzlement diminish fiscal flexibility and contribute to electricity and water shortages, salary and pension delays, and high levels of debt.
Sassou-Nguesso has long maintained close ties with China and Russia, which have been deeply involved in the Congo’s hydrocarbon and mineral sectors. China has provided financing for major investment projects, often in exchange for oil and timber. In the process, the Congo has accumulated an estimated $3.2 billion in debt to China. Russia, meanwhile, has a 90-percent stake in the Pointe Noire-Makoulou Pichot oil pipeline, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has affirmed that the Congo is “a key priority of [Russia’s] foreign policy in Africa.”
The Congo also attracts global energy giants such as TotalEnergies, Perenco, Chevron, Eni, and Lukoil.
This political immobility–and the disenfranchisement of Congolese citizens it creates–is incurring compounding costs on national development.
While there may be little suspense as to the outcome of the country’s 2026 presidential election, there is growing intrigue regarding the intraparty succession battle that is intensifying. Competing camps are vying to take over the mantle of party leadership when Sassou-Nguesso steps down. The most prominent of these is the President’s 50-year-old son, Denis Christel Sassou-Nguesso, Minister of International Cooperation. He has, up to now, struggled to win over party leadership, however. He faces competition from Jean-Dominique Okemba, Secretary General of the National Security Council. Another contender is Jean-Jacques Bouya, Minister of State for Regional Development, Infrastructure and Road Maintenance, and Sassou-Nguesso’s cousin. The strong family connections (Sassou-Nguesso’s daughter is also a presidential advisor) suggest that some form of plan for hereditary succession is likely in the cards.
The 2026 elections are set to maintain the status quo in the Congo and, with succession planning fully underway, the Sassou-Nguesso dynasty could persist for the foreseeable future. This political immobility–and the disenfranchisement of Congolese citizens it creates–is incurring compounding costs on national development. In a country where nearly half of the population is under the age of 18 and youth unemployment has hovered above 40 percent, this may also have implications on stability.
Benin
Presidential & Legislative: April 12
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The 2026 presidential election in this coastal West African country of 14.5 million people holds significance not only for its democratic trajectory but also for its governance and security implications for all of West Africa.
President Patrice Talon is stepping down following the completion of his second, and constitutionally limited, term. This is significant given the growing propensity for African incumbents to extend their tenures in office. Talon’s decision to step down was not assured, as he had regularly pursued constitutional amendments to circumvent legal restrictions barring a third term. That he feels compelled to pass the torch speaks to a measure of enduring restraints on the head of state within Benin’s political space.
Talon’s legacy of consolidating power in the executive will be a challenge to democratic checks and balances in Benin for some time to come.
Nonetheless, the election will be a further test of Benin’s democratic resiliency. During his tenure, Benin’s most wealthy man turned politician has systematically restricted political participation in this country that had championed West Africa’s shift toward democracy in the early 1990s. Restrictions include exorbitant party registration fees, a “certificate of conformity” that allows the ruling party to exclude selective parties, the use of a special court to prosecute terrorism crimes to try political opponents and journalists, and requirements that political candidates gain the endorsement of members of the National Assembly (dominated by Talon supporters due to such barriers). These measures have severely curtailed opposition representation in the National Assembly since 2019 and handicapped aspiring national political contenders.
Given these barriers to opposition party participation, the 2026 contest begins with a tilted playing field. The Constitutional Court has approved only two candidates to contest the April presidential election. Romuald Wadagni will be representing the ruling coalition of the Bloc républicain (BR) and the Union progressiste le renouveau (UPR). The 49-year-old former Minister of Economy and Finance has been a leading actor in the Talon administration. With a background in the private sector, Wadagni is credited with contributing to government policies that have helped Benin realize steady economic growth while maintaining the country’s sovereign credit rating. Real per capita incomes in Benin have increased by 27 percent over the past 10 years, and infant mortality rates have declined by 25 percent, to 46 per 1,000 births.
Paul Hounkpè, who leads the Forces cauris pour un Bénin émergent (FCBE) party, is slated to be the sole opposition candidate. Hounkpè was the Minister of Culture under former President Boni Yayi. He was his party’s vice-presidential candidate during the tightly restricted 2021 presidential elections. He is also the former mayor of Bopa.
The most notable electoral storyline, however, is of a candidate who will not be on the ballot.
The most notable electoral storyline, however, is of a candidate who will not be on the ballot. Renaud Agbodjo, the leader of Benin’s largest opposition party, Les Démocrates, was barred from competing by the Constitutional Court on one of the Talon-era technicalities that he did not obtain a sufficient number of endorsements from members of parliament. Agbodjo was seen as a formidable opponent with considerable name recognition from having defended high-profile opposition politicians, including Boni Yayi, who faced arrests on what are widely seen as politically motivated charges.
While 2026 will see the inauguration of a new president, Talon’s legacy of consolidating power in the executive will be a challenge to democratic checks and balances in Benin for some time to come. As part of a package of constitutional amendments and revisions to the electoral code, presidential terms have been extended from 5 to 7 years, a senate will be established of which some members will be appointed by the president, and the minimum threshold for party participation in the National Assembly has been increased to 20 percent–making it even harder for opposition parties to gain representation.
The stakes of Benin’s 2026 election were soberly punctuated by an attempted coup by a group of mid-level military officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri on December 7, 2025. Several people were killed in the attempt, and the coup plotters temporarily gained control of the national television and radio stations before being apprehended or chased away by loyalist troops with support from ECOWAS forces, including the Nigerian Air Force and special forces from Côte d’Ivoire. The prospect of a return to military government in Benin recalls the 18-year repressive and economically stagnant era of Mathieu Kérékou, which spawned Benin’s democracy movement in the early 1990s.
The coup attempt has far-reaching regional implications. The rollback of the attempted putsch was a welcome respite for ECOWAS, given that 5 of the West African regional bloc’s 15 member states have succumbed to coups since 2020. At the same time, the revelation that the coup plotters may have been aided by the military juntas in neighboring Niger and Burkina Faso reflects an apparent effort on the part of the Sahelian juntas to normalize military takeovers within the West African region.
The attempted coup in Benin follows a sustained, Russian-sponsored information operation that disseminates baseless claims of progress by the Sahelian military juntas to foster disillusionment within the coastal West African democracies. The messaging campaigns are paradoxical, given the deteriorating security, economic, and political environment in each of the three junta-led countries–and the tangible risk that Bamako and Ouagadougou could fall to jihadists. The cult-of-personality surrounding Burkina Faso’s junta leader, Ibrahim Traoré, is the exemplar of these campaigns.
Installing a military government in Benin would also provide the military juntas in landlocked Niger and Burkina Faso greater access and control of key transport arteries to the coast.
Another threat emanating from Benin’s Sahelian neighbors is the spillover of militant Islamist groups into northern Benin in recent years. There have been an estimated 375 fatalities linked to these groups in northern Benin over the past year. The most active of these militant groups is believed to be the Katiba Hanifa faction of the JNIM coalition, which has attempted to gain a foothold by promoting divisive intercommunal messages, extortion, and illicit trafficking of wildlife and forest products from the W and Pendjari National Parks along Benin’s northern borders.
Mobilizing to respond to this violence has been a major focus of the Benin government and military. Preventing the spread of this security threat further south and stabilizing northern Benin will be a central priority for whoever wins the 2026 presidential contest. The credibility of the electoral process and the degree of legitimacy it garners the winning candidate will be integral to mobilizing and sustaining popular support needed to effectively combat the militant threat.
Despite Benin being one of the smallest countries in ECOWAS, its 2026 presidential election will be a bellwether for the region–shaping not only Benin’s democratic trajectory but also the reach of politicized militaries in coastal West Africa, the momentum of the militant Islamist threat, and the influence of Russia in further undermining the region’s democratic governments to enhance its influence on the continent.
Djibouti
Presidential: April 2026
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Djibouti’s April 2026 presidential election is unlikely to produce any surprises. In power since 1999, President Ismail Omar Guelleh is pursuing a sixth presidential term in this country of 1.2 million people. Situated along the strategic Bab al Mandab Strait between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Djibouti sits astride one of the world’s maritime chokeholds through which some 12-15 percent of worldwide trade and 30 percent of container ship traffic passes.
Despite Guelleh’s clear path to holding the presidency, Djibouti must navigate considerable political instability.
The 77-year-old Guelleh’s prolonged tenure has been facilitated by a series of constitutional amendments bypassing presidential term limits. This includes a hastily approved revision pushed through the National Assembly by Guelleh’s Union pour la majorité présidentielle (UMP) coalition in November 2025 that removed the age limit of 75 years for presidential candidates.
Guelleh’s continuation in office is also likely assured in that, thus far, no opposition candidates are contesting the election. The ostensible opposition, holding 7 of the 65 seats in the National Assembly, has also endorsed Guelleh.
The two most vocal opposition parties, the Mouvement pour le renouveau démocratique et le développement (MRD) and the Alliance républicaine pour la démocratie (ARD), have boycotted elections since 2016, citing the lack of impartiality of the Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI). The opposition continues to demand that the government respect the terms of a 2014 agreement regarding institutional and democratic reforms. The MRD has described elections in the country as a “charade,” claiming “the people of Djibouti are deprived of their right to freely choose their leaders.“
The electoral playing field, in fact, is heavily tilted. CENI is dominated by Guelleh loyalists. Independent media are unable to operate within the country, and Djibouti is ranked 168th out of 180 countries in Reporters Without Borders’ annual World Press Freedom Index. Journalists who are critical of the government are subject to intimidation and arrest, and freedoms of association, assembly, and speech are largely not upheld.
In the 2021 presidential election, Guelleh was declared the winner with 98 percent of the vote.
Despite Guelleh’s clear path to holding the presidency, Djibouti must navigate considerable political instability in 2026. Guelleh has faced recurring health concerns, which fueled speculation that he may step down prior to the 2026 polls. There are also expectations that Guelleh is preparing to have his 61-year-old stepson, Naguib Abdullah Kamil, succeed him. Kamil is the Secretary General of the Prime Minister’s Office.
The ruling coalition comprises a delicate balance of political, geographic, and ethnic interests.
This has caused strains within the ruling coalition that comprises a delicate balance of political, geographic, and ethnic interests. This includes former opposition parties such as the Front pour la restauration de l’unité et la démocratie (FRUD), which had taken up arms against the government. These tensions were apparently one of the factors in the resignation of one of Guelleh’s senior advisors, Alexis Mohamed, in September 2025. Mohamed attributed his resignation to the country’s “regression in democracy, the lack of transparency in economic and diplomatic agreements, and the marginalization of the republic’s institutions and the nepotistic management of the state.” In his statement, Mohamed also refused to condone a constitutional amendment that would enable Guelleh to again sidestep term limits. Term limits are an “essential foundation of any democracy,” he wrote.
These intraparty tensions follow a pattern of periodic arrests of senior political and security figures in recent years on a variety of alleged charges that are widely considered to be politically motivated.
While buffered from electoral competition, the government faces domestic pressures from substantial disparities in income, access to services, and job opportunities. An estimated 34 percent of the population is in poverty, and 73 percent of youth are unemployed despite Djibouti having the highest annual per capita income levels ($3,276) in East Africa.
Djibouti’s economic prospects are closely tied to regional stability–and the use of its ports. Djibouti still handles over 90 percent of Ethiopia’s trade, despite Addis Ababa’s efforts to diversify. Djibouti’s port revenues earned from Ethiopia, meanwhile, account for roughly 70 percent of Djibouti’s GDP. The upsurge in attacks on vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea by Houthi militias operating out of Yemen and Somali pirates, therefore, have added to Djibouti’s economic challenges.
In the process of building out its rail and port infrastructure, Djibouti has incurred $3.4 billion of external debt (amounting to 66 percent of its gross domestic product). Around 45 percent of this debt is owed to China, making Djibouti the world’s most exposed borrower of Chinese lending.
Djibouti must also manage expanding Gulf state competition for influence in East Africa, including over control of ports and trade routes. Concerns about the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) DP World’s control over the port of Doraleh, led Djibouti to revoke this port agreement in 2018–in a case that is still working its way through the courts. Guelleh has characterized the UAE’s growing ambitions in East Africa as “deeply destabilizing for the region.”
Djibouti, meanwhile, has welcomed increased investments from Saudi Arabia, including a $12.7 billion oil refinery and the creation of a major logistics hub with a 92-year lease in Djibouti’s International Free Trade Zone.
Djibouti has been a steady contributor to regional security efforts in Somalia. Djibouti maintains 1,800 troops in Somalia as part of the African Union’s peace force, helping the government combat Al Shabaab. Djibouti also funds a separate 300-strong unit to help secure Somalia’s president and key infrastructure.
While there is unlikely to be much drama over the outcome of Djibouti’s 2026 election, this belies the complex juggling of competing domestic, regional, and international interests that Djibouti must manage to maintain its sovereignty and advance Djiboutian interests. Guelleh has been adept at managing this multilayered chessboard. The persistent erosion of democratic institutions over the years, however, has resulted in a weak political foundation from which Djibouti will eventually be forced to manage the transition from Guelleh, thereby heightening the risks.
Ethiopia
Parliamentary: June 1, 2026
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The practices employed during these polls will shape Ethiopia’s electoral norms for years.
Ethiopia will hold its first national elections since the end of the devastating conflict with Tigray in 2022, which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. This, along with Ethiopia’s limited legacy of competitive elections, underscores the importance–and daunting challenges involved–of this country of 130 million people holding elections in 2026.Ongoing frictions surrounding Tigray and clashes between federal forces and other armed, ethnically based separatist groups in Amhara and Oromia make the electoral environment even more fraught. A central priority for the elections, therefore, will be how to ensure security to enable voting (and enfranchisement) in as much of the country as possible, especially in areas where jurisdictional boundaries, such as Western Tigray (also known as Welkait), remain contested.
With roughly 500,000 troops with the Ethiopian National Defense Force and 30,000 officers under the Federal Police, the government has considerable capacity to provide this security. However, opportunities for spoilers abound.
Drawing on experience from the 2021 election conducted during the Tigray conflict, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) has developed an ongoing classification system of the feasibility of conducting elections subject to security conditions. As a benchmark, voting took place in 436 of the 547 parliamentary constituencies in the past election.
The persistent security tensions are, in part, symptomatic of a fundamental flaw in Ethiopia’s constitution. Established in 1991 under the minority Tigrayan-dominated Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the constitution enshrines an ethnic federal model for the country. Despite the advantages of devolving power closer to local communities in a populous and diverse population, by overlaying ethnic, regional, and political jurisdictions (including the right to secede), the ethnic federal model creates centrifugal pressures on the state incentivizing fragmentation. History has repeatedly shown such models to be inherently unstable. A central feature of the fighting in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia is the unwillingness of ethnic militias in these regions to lay down their arms and integrate under a unified military chain of command.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali is seeking to extend his leadership through these elections by maintaining a parliamentary majority with his Prosperity Party. Ethiopia’s Federal Parliamentary Assembly is a bicameral body with a 547-member House of People’s Representatives (HPR), which is directly elected and selects the prime minister. The 112 members of the House of the Federation (HoF), Parliament’s upper house, are indirectly elected by regional councils.
Abiy has fashioned an image as a reformer and modernizer to his supporters. At the same time, he is criticized for consolidating power and being intolerant of dissent.
Upon taking office in 2018, Abiy facilitated the release of thousands of political prisoners and opened political and civic space in a country that has only known various versions of authoritarian government. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission was established to provide independent oversight of government actions and has issued reports critical of the Abiy administration, including during the Tigray conflict. The Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission, similarly, was created in 2021 to facilitate a broader dialogue toward finding consensus on challenging national issues such as identity, state formation, and the federal system.
Abiy has championed the privatization of state-owned enterprises in the telecommunications, aviation, and energy sectors. This includes the completion of the 6,450 MW Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2025 that dramatically expands energy capacity in the country. Macroeconomic reforms, including freeing the exchange rate, have helped stimulate exports and attract foreign direct investment. Per capita incomes in Ethiopia have grown by 23 percent since 2018, though remain under $1,000 per year.
Critics, meanwhile, contend that political space under Abiy has diminished in recent years. Journalists regularly face intimidation or arrest for critical reporting. An estimated 43 journalists were detained over the past year, mostly when reporting from the conflict-affected regions of Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. In April 2025, the Prosperity Party-dominated Parliament passed legislation that increased journalists’ liability for inaccuracies in their reports. It also increases the scope for government interference in reporting by shifting responsibilities for media oversight from a semi-autonomous regulatory body to a political appointee of the prime minister.
Parliament also adopted draft legislation in June 2025 for a Civil Society and Media Act that would grant the government sweeping powers to limit civil society organizations, especially those focused on governance oversight–paralleling the restrictive conditions of the EPRDF. Over the past year, Ethiopian authorities have suspended five prominent human rights groups. At times, even the work of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has been sidelined.
Despite these challenges, there are 23 opposition parties accredited for the 2026 elections. A revision to the Ethiopian Electoral, Political Parties Registration and Electoral Code of Conduct law passed by the HPR in July 2025 lowered the threshold for party participation in parliament from 15 percent to 10 percent, creating more opportunity for opposition parties. Numerous opposition parties have formed coalitions to enhance their national reach as they attempt to expand their representation from just 99 seats in the HPR. These coalitions have adopted a range of platforms, including strengthening democratic processes, elevating peacebuilding initiatives across the country, and deepening national unity, among others.
The election must balance the quest for greater enfranchisement within an ethnic federalism model that accentuates polarization.
Some of the regionally based ethnonational parties remain skeptical of contesting the elections or are calling for a postponement pending further reforms or improved security. Several of these parties exert significant influence in specific regions, though not nationally. The most prominent of these is the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The NEBE revoked the TPLF’s legal status as a political party in May 2025 for failing to hold a general assembly as required for its re-registration. This may create opportunities for other less prominent political parties in Tigray to gain representation–or further deepen perceptions of disenfranchisement within the region–adding further uncertainty to the elections.
Ethiopia’s 2026 elections are also shaped by increasingly complex regional dynamics. With East Africa’s largest economy at roughly $150 billion and an expanding trade portfolio, Ethiopia has been seeking to diversify its reliance on the ports of Djibouti, through which 90 percent of landlocked Ethiopia’s imports and exports flow. Concerns that Ethiopia may establish a port in Berbera, Somaliland, or attempt to seize Assab in Eritrea have ratcheted up tensions in the region. Eritrea, which still has troops in Tigray, has made overtures to the TPLF. Egypt, unhappy about the construction of the GERD on the Nile, has simultaneously elevated its support to Somalia.
Ethiopia is also a target of Gulf State rivalries, though Addis has a long tradition of balancing its regional and international partnerships. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has developed especially close ties with Ethiopia, having committed $2.3 billion in financial support, renewable energy, and infrastructure projects. This includes a $400-million project to construct the road network to the Port of Berbera in Somaliland. Addis’ closer ties to the UAE also fuel speculation that Ethiopia may become a staging ground for support to the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan–and, inversely, for deeper ties between the Sudan Armed Forces and Eritrea. Saudia Arabia, meanwhile, has been increasing its presence in neighboring Djibouti.
Ethiopia’s 2026 elections, therefore, represent a multitiered balancing act of storylines. Given its limited experience with competitive elections, the practices employed during these polls will shape Ethiopia’s electoral norms for years to come. This will be the case despite persistent fighting in certain regions of the country, which creates opportunities for spoilers and could inhibit voting. The election must simultaneously balance the quest for greater enfranchisement within Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism model that simultaneously accentuates polarization. Ethiopia is navigating each of these domestic concerns within increasingly choppy regional crosscurrents. How the country manages its elections while juggling these contending interests will reveal much about Ethiopia’s political maturation–and its enduring stature in the region.
Somalia
Presidential: June 2026
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Somalia’s 2026 elections are framed by its formidable security challenges. A 2025 offensive by Al Shabaab reversed previous territorial gains made by the government and put the militant group in a position to potentially take control of Mogadishu. In the northeast of the country, the international terrorist network of the Islamic State retains a base in Puntland State. The threat of attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea by the Houthi rebels and Somali pirates, meanwhile, continues to dampen maritime traffic through one of the world’s most important shipping chokeholds. The outcome of Somalia’s electoral process, in short, has far-reaching implications for the region and internationally.
Somalia is heading into its sixth cycle of presidential elections since the reconstitution of a United Nations-backed government, continuing a process launched 25 years ago. While imperfect and indirect, these electoral engagements have facilitated five changes of leaders and parties. Notwithstanding its ongoing fragility, Somalia’s periodic stocktaking of its national leadership is noteworthy, given that the country was long considered a failed state.
President Hassan Sheihk Mohamud, the first leader in Somalia’s political history to secure a second nonconsecutive term, is seeking to extend his time in office. Under Mohamud, Somalia was selected for a term on the United Nations Security Council (after a 50-year absence) and has joined the East African Community. The growing recognition of the progress in Somalia’s state-building process facilitated in 2023 the lifting of the arms embargo on the country in place since 1992. Fiscal policy reform, undertaken as part of an IMF-led debt relief program, saw Somalia’s external debt decline from 64 percent of gross domestic product in 2018 to 6 percent in 2023.
Mohamud’s efforts to amend the country’s provisional constitution, establish a new electoral system, and redraw the federal map, meanwhile, are seen by many as a unilateral push to remake Somalia’s federal system to centralize executive power within the presidency and extend Mohamud’s time in office beyond his May 2026 mandate. This has deepened mistrust between the federal member states (FMS)–especially Puntland and Jubaland–and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) at a time when the security threat posed by al Shabaab requires a united front.
The key issue to watch in Somalia’s elections is whether the process is seen as sufficiently inclusive that all federal members states will participate.
In 2021, the security apparatus split along clan lines following the former president’s proposal for a term extension.
The current political crisis in Somalia is the latest iteration highlighting structural challenges in Somalia’s federal system. Somalia’s federal structure was enshrined in the country’s 2012 Provisional Constitution. The document is ambiguous regarding the respective authorities vested in the federal and state governments, however. Successive national leaders have attempted to govern Somalia as a unitary state with a dominant executive. This has resulted in persistent friction between the FGS and FMS.
The self-declared independent State of Somaliland has rejected any role in Somalia’s federal structure since the fall of the dictatorial Siad Barre government in 1991. Somaliland has been self-governing ever since, even though it has received limited international recognition.
Uncertainty over how fundamental aspects of the election will be run (including dates for when preceding local district and parliamentary elections will take place), has amplified tensions surrounding the elections. A key point of contestation revolves around whether the country should adopt a system of universal suffrage for voting or continue its indirect method whereby clan leaders select 101-member electoral colleges for each of the 275 seats in Parliament. Parliamentary members then choose the country’s president.
In an effort to show the feasibility of direct elections, the FGS organized local elections for 390 posts in Mogadishu’s district councils on December 25, 2025. Supported by a 10,000-troop Somali National Army presence, the polls saw a strong voter turnout, reflecting the desire of ordinary Somalis to participate in the voting process.
While universal suffrage is broadly recognized as desirable, holding direct elections has raised multiple concerns. There are genuine risks that al Shabaab would target political candidates, election organizers, and voters in a direct election–as it has in past indirect polls. State leaders also have reservations that the FMS would lose influence in a direct selection process. Critics see the lack of preparations for nationwide direct elections, including an outdated electoral registry, as a pretext for postponing the election and extending Mohamud’s term. Observers, moreover, worry that Mohamud supporters would be overrepresented if direct voting were to take place in 2026, given the relatively higher levels of insecurity in outlying parts of the country relative to the urban areas, such as Mogadishu, from which Mohamud draws considerable support.
Disagreements over the FGS’s proposal for it to administer district-level elections, a function typically managed by the FMS, led to clashes between federal forces and Jubaland troops in December 2024. This resulted in dozens of troop fatalities and the retreat of hundreds of federal forces across the Kenya border.
Some signs of compromise were seen in August 2025 when the FGS and certain opposition parties agreed that members of parliament would be directly elected by voters, though the president would still be elected indirectly by Parliament. This proposal has not been endorsed by all FMS, however.
In total, there are 57 officially recognized political parties in Somalia. Parties that receive 10 percent of parliamentary votes qualify for representation in Parliament.
Somalia is the target of considerable attention from external actors.
Given its strategic location on the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, Somalia is the target of considerable attention from external actors and rivalries for regional influence.
Türkiye is Somalia’s most significant regional security partner. Through its TURKSOM military base in Mogadishu, Türkiye trains Somali infantry and paramilitary police forces and supplies military equipment, including attack helicopters, drones, and armored personnel carriers. Under a joint naval force and defense agreement, Türkiye also assists in securing Somalia’s coastline and provides intelligence support.
Turkish oil exploration efforts identified reserves of up to 20 billion barrels of oil in two offshore pilot oil blocks in Somalia in 2025. Turkey’s oil exploration agreement with Mogadishu grants Turkish firms 90 percent of hydrocarbon revenues. Turkish firms also manage the Aden Adde International Airport, in which they retain an 87-percent share as part of a 20-year lease. Both Turkey and its sometimes partner, Qatar, have ideological affinities with the Muslim Brotherhood in Somalia.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has also been an important source of military support to the federal government in Mogadishu, primarily in the form of armored personnel carriers. The UAE–a staunch opponent of the Muslim Brotherhood–has over $600 million of investments in Somalia across a range of port development and infrastructure projects. These are largely focused on the States of Jubaland and Puntland, where the UAE has been helping to develop the Bosaaso Port. In January 2026, however, the FGS announced the cancellation of all bilateral security and defense agreements with the UAE, citing national sovereignty concerns.
The UAE, meanwhile, has over $500 million of investments in Somaliland, focused on and around the Port of Berbera, for which DP World has negotiated a 30-year concession.
Given the threat of regional spillover from al Shabaab, Somalia’s neighbors–primarily Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti-deploy roughly 11,000 troops through the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
Egypt has committed to providing up to 10,000 troops in support of AUSSOM and provides Somalia weapons, including anti-aircraft guns and artillery. Egypt’s security engagements in Somalia are widely considered to be a check on Ethiopia, given Cairo’s concerns over Addis’ construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile and interests in establishing access to the Port of Berbera in Somaliland.
The United States and other regional and international partners have provided direct military support to Puntland State’s campaign against an Islamic State base in northeastern Somalia. The base is seen as a hub for the terror group’s global financial operations as well as a gateway for funneling foreign jihadists into Somalia and the continent more generally.
Within a fluid and highly complex environment, the key issue to watch in Somalia’s elections is less on the electoral outcome as much as whether the process is seen as sufficiently inclusive that all federal members states will participate. Additional compromise between the FGS and FMS will likely be needed if a potentially violent rupture is to be avoided. Doing so would preserve the country’s federal framework and a basis for cooperation in the fight against al Shabaab and international terrorist networks. Absent this, Somalia is at risk of greater political fragmentation and insecurity over the course of this year.
São Tomé and Príncipe
Presidential and Legislative: September 2026
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São Tomé and Príncipe will be heading to the polls for its eighth cycle of presidential elections since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1991.
Africa’s smallest nation by population size, roughly 240,000 people, will be heading to the polls for its eighth cycle of presidential elections since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1991. The two island archipelago in the Atlantic Ocean that lies on the Equator, roughly 250 kilometers off the coast of Gabon, has a history of competitive elections.
São Tomé and Príncipe operates under a hybrid presidential and parliamentary model. The president is directly elected for a five-year term, limited to two terms. The president serves as commander-in-chief, directs foreign policy, approves legislation passed by the National Assembly, and acts as an impartial arbiter to ensure the smooth functioning of state institutions. This role is currently held by Carlos Vila Nova from the Acção Democrática Independente party (ADI). Nova won 57 percent of the second round of presidential elections in 2021.
The 55 members of the National Assembly are elected to four-year terms. The National Assembly selects the prime minister who serves as the head of government, implementing policy, and leading the country’s day-to-day functions. The ADI secured 30 seats in the 2022 parliamentary elections and selected Patrice Trovoada as prime minister. In January 2025, however, President Nova dismissed Trovoada for prolonged absences and selected Américo dos Ramos, also from ADI, as the new prime minister.
Both presidential and parliamentary elections will be held in 2026.
The ADI and the Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe – Partido Social Democrata Social Democratic Party (MLSTP-PSD) have historically been the two major parties that have dominated elections in São Tomé and Príncipe. There have been multiple transitions of power between the parties and, at times, they have “co-habitated” with the president represented by one party and the prime minister from the other.
While parties have yet to formally put forward their candidates for the 2026 elections, it is expected that Nova will seek a second presidential term.
Elections in São Tomé and Príncipe are widely seen as free and fair. The Comissão Eleitoral Nacional (CEN) operates independently with members selected from the National Assembly. Independent media are able to cover elections and candidates without fear of reprisals and São Tomé and Príncipe is regularly recognized for having one of the most open environments for journalists and civil society leaders in Africa.
São Tomé and Príncipe’s tranquility was roiled in November 2022, however, when four people were killed in an assault on a military barracks in an apparent coup attempt. While details remain murky, the coup plotters were evidently part of a disbanded South African/Angolan apartheid-era militia known as the Buffalo Battalion. While there was no evidence that the attack was linked to any political party, a key issue for the 2026 elections will be to demonstrate that this violence was an isolated aberration rather than an ongoing feature of national politics.
Because of São Tomé and Príncipe’s strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea–near valuable offshore hydrocarbon reserves, illicit trafficking routes from Latin America to Europe, and periodic pirate attacks–São Tomé and Príncipe’s 1,300-strong security forces have maintained ongoing security partnerships with neighboring African coastal countries, the European Union, Portugal, and the United States. São Tomé and Príncipe is also a party to the Yaoundé Protocol, an effort by 25 West and Central African to improve cooperation to curb illicit trafficking and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. As part of Zone D (along with Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon), it conducts joint patrols with neighboring countries.
Despite a track record of solid elections, recent years have provided political, security, and geostrategic disruptions in the tiny archipelago.
Russia has shown growing interest in forging closer ties to São Tomé and Príncipe in recent years–part of a wider effort to expand Russia’s naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea. The overtures led to the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2024, covering training, arms supply, logistics, and joint exercises in exchange for Russian naval and air force visits. Russia has also proposed helping São Tomé and Príncipe monitor its 160,000-square-kilometre territorial waters using radars and drones.
Despite a track record of solid elections, recent years have provided political, security, and geostrategic disruptions in the tiny archipelago. The 2026 elections will be an opportunity for São Tomé and Príncipe to reassert its democratic credentials and reputation for stability.
Zambia
Presidential and Legislative: August 13, 2026
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Zambia’s President Hakainde Hichilema is seeking a second term in office, leading this landlocked southern African country of 22 million people.
His 2021 victory, with 59 percent of the vote and galvanized by a strong youth turnout, was a significant breakthrough for the six-time candidate and his United Party for National Development (UPND). The outcome was particularly significant given concerns over democratic backsliding under President Edgar Lungu, who led Zambia from 2015 to 2021. Lungu’s tenure was marked by the arrest of political opponents, the weakening of judicial independence, the deployment of security forces and party militias to intimidate political opponents, and the politicization of independent government bodies.
Early priorities for Hichilema, therefore, included abolishing the law that criminalizing defamation of the president, removing political militias from markets and bus stations, strengthening of the independence of the Anti-Corruption Commission and other oversight bodies, and passing the Access to Information Act.
Hichilema also inherited a deeply strained economy characterized by high inflation, a kwacha that had lost 50 percent of its value, low investor confidence, and elevated youth unemployment. Unable to sustain its high level of debt, Zambia defaulted on its debt repayments in 2020.
A businessman-turned politician, Hichilema achieved notable successes during his first term. This included the negotiation of a debt restructuring under the G20 Common Framework, reduced fiscal deficits, a decline in inflation from 24 percent to 9 percent, and improved transparency in government procurement. Zambia’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, in turn, improved from 117 to 92 (out of 180 countries) since 2021. Zambia has simultaneously seen a net increase of foreign direct investment from 1.7 percent to 4.7 percent of gross domestic product between 2021 and 2024.
Despite these achievements, Hichilema has been the subject of growing concern over diminished space for dissent in Zambia. Raphael Nakacinda, the secretary general of the main opposition party, the Patriotic Front (PF), was sentenced in May 2024 to a 6-month prison term for defaming the president in 2021, under the same law that Hichilema abolished in 2022. This was one of a pattern of arrests against members of opposition parties for making critical or false statements against the government. They have faced charges ranging from hate speech to seditious practices. The government has also invoked the 2021 Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act to push back against online critics, raising concerns of misuse of security tools for political objectives.
Independent media have also faced growing pressure under the Hichilema government, with 60 percent of surveyed journalists and bloggers indicating that they have experienced increased harassment, intimidation, and arrests. These reprisals are often associated with media outlets hosting opposition party members.
The effect of these restrictions has been to chill open debate, dialogue, and oversight in Zambia.
The effect of these restrictions has been to chill open debate, dialogue, and oversight in Zambia. Concerned that growing intolerance could destabilize this long-peaceful country, the Zambia Catholic Bishops Conference issued a statement in November 2025 urging political leaders to “take decisive steps in restraining and guiding their supporters… and [to] work toward preserving the harmony that has defined our nation for generations” as the country draws nearer to the 2026 elections.
In December 2025, Hichilema signed into law constitutional changes that expanded the National Assembly from 167 to 280 seats. Hichilema contends that the expansion in constituencies was needed to provide better service delivery to Zambia’s growing population. However, critics argue that the move is intended to further solidify UPND’s control. The UPND holds roughly half of the seats in the current National Assembly.
These changes are occurring at a time of fragmentation within the political opposition. Three opposition parties–the Republican Progressive Party, the New Nation Party (formerly the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy), and the Party for National Unity and Progress–have already endorsed Hichilema’s 2026 candidacy, citing his record as an economic reformer.
The PF is the country’s leading opposition party with 55 seats in the current National Assembly. However, Zambia’s most prominent opposition leader, former President Edgar Lungu, passed away in June 2025. Prior to his death, he had negotiated an alliance between his PF party and the Tonse Alliance (a coalition of 11 smaller parties). However, these prospective partners have now decided to go their separate ways.
Zambia’s test will be whether there is sufficient space to accommodate all voices, so that the outcome can be embraced by all Zambians.
The Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) has a reputation for independence and administrative capacity. The ECZ has been active in the 2 years prior to the election and launched its general election roadmap to foster transparency in July 2025. Voter registration in late 2025 was extended by 2 weeks to accommodate demand. As a result, 758,000 new voters were registered, bringing the total number of eligible voters to 3.5 million.
Zambia’s 2026 electoral process represents a mosaic of contrasts. The election is likely to be among the most transparent and well-run on the continent this year. Moreover, the incumbent has a strong economic track record to run on, despite ongoing challenges to create enough jobs for the country’s large youth population. The test will be whether there is sufficient space to accommodate all voices, including those who are critical, so that the outcome can be embraced by all Zambians.
Cabo Verde
Presidential and Legislative: October 2026
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Elections in the 10-island archipelago of half a million people are expected to maintain a high standard of transparency and electoral integrity. With a history of free and fair elections, Cabo Verde consistently ranks as Africa’s most democratic country in Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World survey. It has alternated power between the two leading and evenly balanced political parties: the Movimento para a Democracia (MpD) and the Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde (PAICV) since it transitioned to a multiparty system in 1991.
The country’s legacy of independent institutions provides a solid foundation from which to conduct elections.
Cabo Verde’s hybrid presidential and parliamentary model shares executive responsibilities. The directly elected president serves as commander-in-chief, oversees legislative process with veto authority, and serves as a mediator in reaching consensus. The prime minister, who is selected by the National Assembly, acts as the head of government, implementing policy and leading the country’s day-to-day functions. The power-sharing model depends on cooperative relations between the respective executive authorities. Currently, these positions are held by different parties, reflecting the political balance within Cabo Verde’s polity. President José Maria Neves is from the PAICV, and Prime Minister Ulisses Correia e Silva is with the MpD.
Neither party has yet put forward its candidate for the October presidential polls. In 2021, Neves won with 52 percent of the vote. The MpD has confirmed that Prime Minister Silva will again lead their legislative slate of candidates into the parliamentary elections in April. The MpD controls 36 of the National Assembly’s 72 seats, while the PAICV holds 29. The results of the respective elections will determine whether the country will continue the shared governance arrangement or if one party will control both executive roles.
The country’s legacy of independent institutions provides a solid foundation from which to conduct elections. The Comissão Nacional de Eleições has proactively employed measures to ensure the accuracy of information and counter false claims ahead of the elections via a social media-focused electoral information verification unit. The judiciary is widely viewed as independent, facilitating the unbiased consideration of any electoral appeals by candidates. Judges to the nine-member Supreme Court are selected by three separate mechanisms–the president of the country, the National Assembly, and the Supreme Council of Magistrates–fostering judicial autonomy. Journalists can cover the candidates and issues without intimidation ahead of the elections.
Cabo Verde’s economy has grown robustly in recent years, with annual economic growth of 7.2 percent in the past year. Annual per capita incomes of $4,475 are among the highest on the continent, with tourism accounting for roughly 20 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.
Sitting off the coast of West Africa on a major maritime trade route between Latin America and Europe, Cabo Verde faces a variety of maritime security challenges, however. It is exposed to transnational organized crime, with its ports used for the illicit entry of arms, finances, and drugs. The archipelago is also a target destination for African migrants seeking to transit to Europe.
Cabo Verde is an active member of the Yaoundé Protocol, the maritime security mechanism coordinating 25 Central and West African governments’ efforts to combat illicit trafficking and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. It hosts the Multinational Maritime Coordination Center for Zone G (including The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal) and conducts joint patrols in its zone.
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Cabo Verde’s election is on track to extend its stable, power-sharing model of governance, which blends transparency, competitiveness, and accountability–pillars that have contributed to its economic prosperity and security.
Gambia
Presidential: December 5, 2026
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The country is struggling to exit the gravitational pull of consolidated executive power.
President Adama Barrow is seeking a third term in The Gambia’s 2026 election. The move has created considerable turmoil in this tiny coastal West African country of 2.6 million people, given that Barrow had galvanized popular support for his candidacy against longtime autocrat Yahya Jammeh in 2016 on pledges of democratic reform. Among these pledges was the promise that Barrow would only serve a single term and that he would seek a constitutional reform to institute presidential term limits as a corrective to Jammeh’s repressive 22-year rule.
Instead, Barrow sought and gained a second term in 2021. Proposed constitutional amendments to institutionalize term limits in 2020 and 2025, moreover, have not garnered the requisite three-quarters of National Assembly votes, due to a lack of support from Barrow’s party. Critics contend that without explicit term limits and other institutionalized checks and balances, power could again become entrenched–enabling the 61-year-old Barrow to extend his rule indefinitely.
Upon taking office, Barrow embarked on security sector reforms to redress the abuses of the Jammeh government, including the alleged deaths of 240 regime opponents by security forces under Jammeh’s rule. This led to the development of a national security strategy and a security sector reform strategy in 2020 that, collectively, institutionalize norms of military professionalism. These reforms have been stymied, however, by the failure to adopt a new constitution, which is necessary to create the authorities to undertake the reforms.
The challenges of prosecuting former Jammeh officials linked to abuses led the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to set up a special court in December 2024 to try crimes committed during Jammeh’s reign. A 500-troop strong ECOWAS mission in The Gambia, ECOMIG, has remained in the country since 2017 with a mandate to support security provision and security sector reform.
Barrow is credited with restoring space for civil society and independent media. Since Barrow came into office, The Gambia’s ranking on Reporters Without Borders’ annual Press Freedom Index has improved nearly 90 places (from 145th in 2016 to 58th out of 180 countries). The country’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has similarly progressed from 145th to 96th (out of 180 countries).
Nonetheless, there have been several instances in recent years when journalists have faced intimidation and detention on charges of defamation for their critical coverage. Civil society requests to protest on issues criticizing the government, similarly, are at times rejected by the Inspector General of the Police.
Barrow’s government has endeavored to recover state assets of $362 million believed to have been stolen during the Jammeh era. In the process of liquidating some of these assets–including expensive cars, aircraft, and real estate–critics have accused the government of lacking transparency and selling the assets at below-market prices to government officials.
The Barrow government has also faced strong criticism for removing Auditor General Modou Ceesay from his post in September 2025, only 3 years into his 9-year term. The action sparked angry protests and arrests on the streets of Banjul. The government has been accused of enabling preferential access to foreign exchange and government-backed loans to those with close ties to the government.
The allegations are especially sensitive since an estimated 53 percent of Gambians live below the poverty line–a legacy, in part, of Jammeh’s coup and extended military rule that caused the economy to stagnate for more than two decades. While annual per capita incomes have risen by 24 percent since 2016, they remain around $750.
Barrow faces a fragmented opposition. There are 19 registered political parties, and presidential candidates must secure at least 50 percent of the vote or face a second round against the runner-up. The most prominent opposition figure is the 77-year-old Ousainou Darboe from Barrow’s old United Democratic Party (UDP). (Barrow was forced to leave the party after breaking his promise to only serve one term and institute term limits.) Darboe came in second to Barrow in the 2021 elections, garnering 28 percent of the vote.
The selection of Darboe as the standard-bearer of the UDP triggered a pushback from the party’s younger members, who are demanding more rapid change in a country where 60 percent of the population is under the age of 25. This led to the creation of a new political platform, Unite Movement for Change, under the 40-year-old Talib Ahmed Bensouda, Mayor of Kanifing (west of Banjul). Bensouda has emphasized improving access to basic services such as water, electricity, education, and health care, noting that an estimated 12,000 young Gambians attempt to migrate to Europe every year due to limited opportunities.
Other declared candidacies include Mama Kandeh of the Gambia Democratic Congress, who received 12 percent of the vote in the 2021 election, and Bakary Badjie, leader of the United Gambian Front.
Often forgotten, Gambia had a nearly 30-year era of democratic governance from 1965 until 1994, during which time the principles of rule of law and respect for civil liberties were readily enjoyed.
Gambia’s 2026 election will be a norm-setter for the country as it attempts to navigate between two distinct governance eras since independence. The country is struggling to exit the gravitational pull of consolidated executive power exerted during Jammeh’s coup and ironfisted governance from 1994 to 2016. Often forgotten, Gambia also had a nearly 30-year era of democratic governance from 1965 until 1994, during which time the principles of rule of law and respect for civil liberties were readily enjoyed. Given the tensions over these competing governance models within West Africa, the path taken by Gambia will likely have larger ripple effects.
South Sudan
Presidential: December 2026
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The primary question shaping South Sudan’s electoral process in 2026 is whether elections will be held at all. South Sudanese politicians have postponed scheduled elections in 2015, 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024, citing limited financial and logistical capacity to execute a national election in this expansive country of 12 million people. They have also been unable to execute the fundamental prerequisites to an election, such as a census, a voter registry (last revised in 2008), and a permanent constitution. As a result, President Salva Kiir has remained in power since 2009 despite having won only one election, held prior to South Sudan’s independence in 2011.
The failure to hold elections reflects the limited political will of incumbent South Sudanese politicians.
The failure to hold elections reflects the limited political will of incumbent South Sudanese politicians. They have little incentive to organize elections that may alter the status quo, which enables them to retain their positions indefinitely–and the prestige, influence, and financial benefits that accompany them.
The inaction also signals the impunity these political leaders feel from the need to periodically obtain a popular mandate, thereby affirming legitimacy for their continued time in power. The lack of commitment of these politicians to meet this minimal threshold of democratic governance, in turn, reflects the inability of South Sudanese citizens or international partners to generate sufficient pressure to establish this norm in Africa’s youngest nation.
The costs to South Sudan’s stability and development from this political stasis have been high. Rather than employing political forums for resolving differences, South Sudanese politicians have long relied on private militias. This has kept South Sudan in a near-perpetual state of conflict since 2013, in which an estimated 400,000 people have died. For much of the past decade, South Sudan has maintained the ignominious designation of having a greater percentage of its citizens classified as refugees (roughly a third) than any other country in Africa. This underscores the persistence and enduring fear generated by this violence, despite periodic ceasefires and peace agreements.
South Sudan ranks at the very bottom of the United Nations’ Human Development Index, and infant mortality rates have risen since independence, to 72 deaths per 1,000 live births–the highest in Africa. These abysmally low socioeconomic indicators have persisted despite the country generating an estimated $1.6 billion in oil revenues annually on average for much of the past decade. South Sudan also ranks 180th (out of 180 countries) in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.
These economic strains have been exacerbated by the devastating conflict in neighboring Sudan, through which most of South Sudan’s oil flows. As a result of the Sudan conflict, South Sudan has absorbed an estimated 870,000 South Sudanese returnees who had been seeking refuge in Sudan, as well as 421,000 Sudanese refugees.
The repeated election postponements have occurred within a broader context of the Kiir government making little effort to build democratic institutions or norms, despite self-determination being one of the driving justifications for South Sudan’s secession from Sudan in 2011.
The most basic of these is power sharing. Kiir has regularly limited the space of the political opposition, especially his longtime rival Riak Machar. The two were the leading political and military actors within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in South Sudan’s decades-long fight for independence. However, high levels of distrust and unwillingness to compromise between the two led to the outbreak of conflict in 2013 and Machar having to flee the country. As part of the 2018 revitalized peace agreement, Machar became the first vice president (among four others) in 2020. In practice, Kiir has largely governed unilaterally with limited input from opposition parties. Clashes between security forces linked to Machar and the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) in Upper Nile State in March 2025 resulted in Kiir placing Machar and his senior allies under house arrest, facing charges of treason, murder, and crimes against humanity.
In addition to Machar’s SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-IO) party, there are half a dozen other opposition parties or coalitions, some of which are armed.
While a reconstituted bicameral Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) was stipulated as part of the 2018 peace agreement, the TNLA was only reappointed in 2021. Since then, it has only met periodically, even though this branch of government was conceived as coequal to the executive branch. The composition of its 550 members heavily favors the ruling party as part of a quota system.
The judiciary, by and large, does not operate as an independent body. It is regularly subject to executive influence, faces a shortage of judges, and facilitates the arbitrary targeting and detention of individuals on political grounds. Concerns over South Sudan’s legacy of impunity and the ability of the courts to provide impartial justice led to the provision for a hybrid African Union-South Sudan court in both the 2015 and 2018 peace agreements. However, the hybrid court has never been operationalized due to persistent efforts by South Sudanese authorities to block its creation.
Despite these constraints, the judiciary has taken some tentative steps toward reform. In 2025, it adopted a roadmap for building a more credible, effective, and autonomous judicial system. This includes reforms in court administration, judicial training, ethical standards, transparency, and public access to legal services. The Supreme Court also finalized and validated a new Code of Judicial Conduct, setting clearer ethical rules designed to improve judicial professionalism and strengthen internal accountability. Notably, in April 2025, it partnered with the United Nations to deploy mobile courts to address conflict-related crimes in Unity State, where formal judicial infrastructure is lacking. These courts have delivered judgments on cases that had been pending for years, helping reduce backlogs and demonstrating an expanded judicial presence outside major towns.
The NEC has been perpetually underfunded, which has limited the ability of its members to travel and conduct the necessary pre-election planning steps.
The National Elections Commission (NEC) was reconstituted in December 2023 (ahead of the planned 2024 elections). Comprised of representatives from the main political parties, civil society, the business community, and other stakeholders, the NEC has visited all 10 states in South Sudan, conducted trainings, and engaged in consultative efforts. However, the NEC has been perpetually underfunded, which has limited the ability of its members to travel and conduct the necessary pre-election planning steps.
Reflective of the uncertainty heading into the 2026 elections, the government announced in December 2025 that the 2026 polls would proceed without the prerequisites of a census or permanent constitution. The announcement has been rejected by many civil society actors who are concerned that an election with such loose parameters would be highly prone to abuse. Electing a president and representatives whose authorities are not well defined would also be a recipe for persistent differences in interpretation, an opening to usurpations of power, and inherent institutional crises.
Mirroring the country’s political fragmentation, South Sudan’s security sector more resembles a collection of militias advancing the interests of individual political actors–rather than a unified security force whose mandate is to evenhandedly protect all citizens. Sudan’s security actors are widely seen as predatory and responsible for persistent attacks on citizens.
There is limited space for independent media to operate in South Sudan. The National Security Service (the country’s intelligence agency) has intimidated, detained, and murdered journalists and civil society leaders. Nonetheless, some South Sudanese journalists continue to report and inform the public on major developments in the country.
South Sudan’s state weakness, the limited legitimacy of its political leadership, hydrocarbon wealth, and strategic location connecting north, central, and east Africa have also made South Sudan a target for foreign influence. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has provided a $13-billion loan to be repaid over 20 years, during which time the UAE will be able to purchase discounted oil from South Sudan. (The oil sector accounts for 90 percent of government revenue.) The loan amounts to double South Sudan’s gross domestic product and five times its external debt, raising questions over the country’s ability to repay. China, similarly, is a major stakeholder in South Sudan oil companies Dar Petroleum Operating Company and Greater Pioneer Operating Company.
South Sudan is also reportedly allowing the UAE to transship weapons through South Sudan as part of the Emirates’ support of the Rapid Support Forces’ military actions in western and southern Sudan.
The primary stakeholders demanding credible elections in South Sudan in 2026 are civil society leaders and ordinary citizens–those most disenfranchised by the repeated postponements and subject to the country’s misgovernance, insecurity, and underdevelopment. Genuine progress will be dependent on these citizen actors gaining more of a say over the electoral process. Faith-based organizations, professional associations, and civic bodies are particularly critical to building nonpartisan rules, public consensus, and collective momentum for such reforms if South Sudan is to break its current downward spiral.
Assessing progress in 2026, then, should be measured not just by whether an election takes place but to the extent that citizen groups are involved and there are advances toward the foundations of credible elections, including an agreed-upon constitution, a fully funded election commission, and a genuinely independent judiciary.