Debating Ideas reflects the values and editorial ethos of the African Arguments book series, publishing engaged, often radical, scholarship, original and activist writing from within the African continent and beyond. It offers debates and engagements, contexts and controversies, and reviews and responses flowing from the African Arguments books. It is edited and managed by the International African Institute, hosted at SOAS University of London, the owners of the book series of the same name.
Introduction
While the Gaza and Sudan crises are uniquely different in context, they are not isolated. They are intricately linked through shared diplomatic actors, overlapping alliances, and regional security concerns. The Quad, a diplomatic group of states including the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, leads Sudan’s peace process. At the same time, many of the same players are central to Gaza’s negotiations. This symbiotic relationship demonstrates the need for interconnectedness and a comprehensive approach. The question for policymakers is whether success in Gaza can catalyze progress in Sudan, or if it will divert attention and resources.
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As policymakers consider the future of peace in Sudan, it is crucial to understand how a durable peace agreement in Gaza could shape diplomatic efforts in the Horn of Africa. Much like interconnected gears in a complex machine, the outcomes in one regional conflict can set in motion changes–positive or negative–in another. This article explores the mechanisms, opportunities, and risks of such “spillover diplomacy “.
Geopolitical context
The objective of the Quad is to coordinate international efforts to end the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and to support a peaceful, Sudanese-led transition to civilian governance. On September 12, 2025, the Quad announced a Roadmap that aims for phased peace: a three-month humanitarian truce to allow aid access and reduce violence, and permanent ceasefire negotiations between the SAF and RSF, and a month-long political transition culminating in an independent civilian-led government. Yet, internal divisions–Egypt’s alignment with the SAF and the UAE’s ties to the RSF –have hampered unity. This is akin to a relay team where runners disagree on the direction of the track. Importantly, though, Egypt accepted the “declaration of principles” that places civilians–not generals–at the centre of postwar arrangements, while the UAE, which supports the RSF, also signed onto terms that call on all external parties supporting the belligerents to stop fueling the conflict. For either of them, diplomacy and political mediation have become the new tools to advance national interests, as evidenced in their roles in Somalia. Gaza’s peace, recently brokered by the US, Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, involved ceasefire guarantees, reconstruction funding, and humanitarian access. Egypt’s central role in both processes position it as a bridge between the Arab world and Africa. Diplomatic credibility gained in Gaza could, in theory, be leveraged in Sudan.
Drawing on Buzan and WaEver’s theory, adjacent conflict zones like Gaza and Sudan are “security interdependent.” Besides the people in the region having a strong cultural and religious affinity, arms flows, donor agendas, and alliances intersect across borders. The interconnectedness must be brought into policymaking, shaping the geo-strategic direction of the region. That means success or progress on one side will impact the other, and similarly, a lack of progress in one will also influence the other. Policymakers should therefore be conversant with this interrelatedness in their considerations. Given this certainty, the Quad must awaken from slumber to draw on the momentum from the Gaza deal.
Furthermore, The African Union, which has been missing in action, must be brought into the Quad to change it to Quad + 1. In this way, African concerns and ideas would be taken into account. While Sudan is a member of the Arab League, it is naturally an African country. Sudan is deeply embedded in Africa, with neighbouring countries that the ongoing war has severely impacted, including Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, the Central African Republic, and Libya. With over 3.8 million Sudanese displaced by the war, its neighbours are bearing the brunt. About 1 million Sudanese are estimated to be in Chad, while over 600,000 are in Egypt.
How could Gaza affect Sudan?
It is highly plausible that if the Gaza blueprint works, it could serve not only as a template but also as a beacon of hope for Sudanese negotiators, inspiring them to adapt its features–phased trust-building, humanitarian monitoring–to their own context. In fact, success in Gaza could restore faith in multilateral diplomacy, making negotiation seem less futile. It must be noted, however, that Sudan’s conflict is fundamentally different–an internal power struggle, not an occupation. Policymakers and the AU should beware of “template thinking,” where solutions are copied without regard for local realities.
With the United Nations operating on a shoestring budget for peace and security, and member states shifting priorities–such as the European Union refocusing on continental Europe due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict–there will be an increased scarcity of resources. It is often the case that after a significant storm, relief agencies focus on the hardest-hit area, leaving other lower -priority areas. Expectedly, the Gaza reconstruction would absorb significant Gulf states’ financial and diplomatic resources, risking “attention fatigue” for Sudan. But the Sudan situation cannot wait. So as soon as Gaza gains traction, it would be instructive to immediately stretch diplomatic efforts beyond Gaza, allowing mediators to refocus on Sudan. It would be essential to link diplomatic measures on both crises as soon as practicable, developing them into a short-term diversion and medium-term re-engagement.
Without a doubt, the Gaza peace deal would have ripple effects on the Sudan process in one way or another. Whether it’s seen as a victory for negotiation or a loss of sovereignty, it can influence Sudanese actors. If the latter occurs, there is a risk that the Sudanese factions may interpret external mediation as a threat to sovereignty, especially if the Gaza deal is perceived as imposed. Policymakers must be sensitive to local discourses and avoid one-size-fits-all messaging.
Analysis of the situation
Empirical evidence shows that regional actors have limited diplomatic capacity, sometimes demonstrating conflicting interests. This is evident from the apparent lack of action from the United Nations Security Council and the African Union to proactively address the Sudan conflict. Success in Gaza will either inspire confidence in the Quad roadmap or drain international resources. It is therefore critical for key institutional bodies to achieve coherence by establishing unified strategic objectives across conflicts.
If the Gaza peace deal holds, reconstruction will attract huge investment, potentially diverting Gulf financing from Sudan. In any case, Gaza will receive greater international attention and resources, so the Quad and regional policymakers should consider integrative regional planning–linking Sudan’s recovery to broader trade and energy corridors in the region.
Having achieved independence in 1956 from Britain, Sudan’s sovereignty issues shape its political discourse. If Gaza’s peace is seen as externally imposed, it could fuel resistance to mediation in Sudan. Policymakers must frame peace as an Afro-Arab-led, pragmatic victory, not a Western imposition.
Mapping future scenarios
Best case
In the best-case scenario, we envisage the Gaza peace to hold, granting the Arab architects, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, prestige, a strong diplomatic standing, and high moral ground. This would reenergize the Quad, motivating it to do more. The mechanisms, such as diplomatic credibility, could be easily transferred. Institutional learning from Gaza could be applied to Sudan, potentially leading to regional stability and attracting investment. Such a deal could garner international support for the Sudan to achieve a monitored truce and begin a transition to civilian rule. It is therefore an opportunity for policymakers to institutionalize cross-regional learning and coordinate investment strategies.
Most likely case
In what seems most likely, the Gaza peace deal will be fragile, raising optimism, but divisions will persist. One major obstacle to peace is that Hamas has not agreed to fully disarm, as evidenced by its reassertion of control in the Gaza Strip. There is no alternative security force in place yet, which could give rise to the emergence of competing militias. Shifting positions in international solidarity and regional dynamics, such as escalation in Lebanon and Yemen, could change the trajectory of the peace deal. In such a situation, there will only be symbolic references to Gaza with limited practical replication and the continued fragmentation of the Quad. Sporadic ceasefires and humanitarian gains would characterize the situation in Sudan, but no comprehensive settlement. In this scenario, where Gaza’s peace is fragile and divisions persist, policymakers must maintain diplomatic pressure. They should focus on incremental humanitarian improvements and ensure that the momentum for peace is not lost.
Worst case
In the worst-case scenario, the Gaza deal fails to hold. This would deepen regional rivalries, including the Sudanese factions, which would erode cohesion and confidence in the Quad. This would trigger a situation where the Sudanese factions exploit divisions, while the media and donors focus on Gaza. The outcome would be a worsening crisis in Sudan, leading to the collapse of the Quad roadmap. Policymakers must guard against diplomatic fragmentation and ensure Sudan remains on the agenda.
Conclusion and the way forward
It is highly plausible that a spillover will occur if the Gaza peace deal holds. Success in Gaza can inspire the Quad Roadmap for Sudan, but local dynamics will be decisive. As each situation is different, it should not be assumed that Gaza’s solutions will work in Sudan. Each conflict has unique drivers. Because of the potential competition for attention and resources, Quad cohesion would be critical for the effectiveness of peace efforts in Sudan. Undoubtedly, the competition for resources favours Gaza, so there should be intentional efforts to allocate resources to Sudan.
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There is no alternative to the crucial role of domestic agency in the peaceful resolution of the Sudan crisis. As a result, Sudanese actors must see peace as being in their strategic interest. Civil society organizations should lead the mobilization of the Sudanese populations towards this goal. The Kandaka (strong woman) spirit that helped to topple a three-decade-old dictator, Omar al-Bashir, should be invoked to unite the Sudanese in building their country. A pragmatic inter-Sudanese process must include the diaspora as well. Drawing on the Sudanese diaspora support would strengthen internal engagement and advocacy for peace across the country. Messaging would be tailored to local contexts, invoking the patriotic spirit, respecting sovereignty and preventing perceptions of external imposition.
The role of international actors is equally crucial, especially at the initial stages. The Quad should immediately establish a joint verification and reconstruction task force for Sudan, using and adapting the Gaza template as much as possible. Egypt and Saudi Arabia could leverage diplomatic capital from Gaza to restart Sudan talks, but this time, they are bringing the African Union to the table. An Afro-Arab initiative would be more palpable than a sole Arab process. Once this is achieved, the Quad will become Quad +1.
For policymakers, there is a fierce urgency for the Quad +1 to leverage the momentum from the Gaza peace agreement and bring the warring parties in Sudan to a peace deal. Like a relay, the baton must be passed quickly, resources balanced, and local agency augmented to lead the internal process. While the future of Sudan may be contingent on the Gaza peace deal, it is the decisiveness of politicians and policymakers in the months ahead that will determine whether the fires in Sudan can be put out anytime soon.
Seth Appiah-Mensah is a veteran international peacekeeper with decades of experience working for ECOWAS, the AU and the UN. He is a scholar-practitioner who has published on African peace and security issues. Currently, he focuses on writing and teaching at universities.
