Africa: Can Africa Bolster Its Bargaining Power At the EU-AU Summit?

At this week’s Luanda summit, several thorny issues relating to the security partnership must be confronted head-on.

On 24 and 25 November, leaders from 82 member states of the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU), two of the world’s largest geopolitical blocs, will converge in Angola’s capital Luanda for the seventh EU-AU Summit. The event marks 25 years since the inaugural summit in Cairo.

The partnership spans trade, climate, development and health, but it is the vital peace and security pillar that has been strained in terms of cooperation. In an increasingly fragmented and fluid international order – which has seen the EU seek to become a more distinct geopolitical actor on security and defence – the summit is a crucial opportunity to reaffirm the value of multilateralism.

Since the EU-AU ministers’ meeting in May on the 2030 Joint Vision, the partnership has gained momentum. The meeting’s lengthy Joint Communiqué refers to shared peace and security concerns, the need for ongoing dialogue and cooperation on country- and region-specific crises, and strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture.

However, further progress at the leaders’ summit this week may be tempered by an inability to move past the rhetoric of a ‘partnership among equals’ – given the inherent power asymmetry between the two organisations. The EU, with its significant financial and institutional capacity, inevitably sets much of the agenda. Can the AU find a way to increase its bargaining power?

These tensions are most evident in the realm of peace and security, particularly in the matter of funding for African-led interventions. The EU has long been the single greatest source of external financial support to the AU in this regard, highlighting its commitment to a safer and more stable Africa, and a partnership based on common values.

However, Europe’s own immediate security environment has changed considerably in recent years, with the ongoing war in Ukraine and an increasingly shaky transatlantic partnership with the US. Europe now has new political priorities and a bolder strategic outlook concerning its place in the world.

This thinking informed the EU’s 2021 transition from the African Peace Facility to the European Peace Facility, which underpins its financial support to the AU. Whereas the former focused on capacitating African institutions to take the lead in addressing conflict, the latter enables the EU to pursue its international security interests in a more flexible way. That means African priorities now compete with Europe’s other global concerns.

The European Peace Facility’s greater flexibility also means the EU can directly engage with Africa’s regional organisations, member states and ad hoc military coalitions, essentially bypassing the AU. While considerable financial and political support is still provided to the AU and its security structures, the EU has positioned itself as a more autonomous actor in Africa.

The AU could have played a far more decisive role in shaping the EU’s transition to the European Peace Facility during its year-long legislative process. However, administrative shortfalls in the AU meant this critical window of opportunity was missed.

Beyond financing, the AU and EU often view security through different lenses. The African agenda is closely linked to boosting state legitimacy, reducing socioeconomic marginalisation and improving governance. Although the EU affirms these goals in its support to the AU, Europe’s security priorities are counter-terrorism and combatting foreign interference and hybrid threats.

Another complicating factor is Africa’s own shifting security landscape and the gradual deinstitutionalisation of its approach to conflict. While the AU once played a decisive coordinating role in authorising and deploying peace support operations, there is now a clear shift towards sub-regional, ad hoc military coalitions.

Interventions like the G5 Sahel, and arguably even the Southern African Development Community missions in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, point to more short-term, crisis-specific, and securitised responses that circumvent the AU.

The prevailing global geopolitical environment also considerably impacts cooperation between EU and AU leaders. Unlike two decades ago, Africa’s security landscape is now characterised by the jostling for influence among an array of external actors. China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf States have boosted their profiles in Africa as prominent peace and security actors, often displacing the continent’s traditional European partners.

Russia especially exemplifies these tensions. Although the country is frequently discussed in AU-EU meetings, it rarely appears in formal communiqués. It was mentioned euphemistically as a ‘third state’ associated with private military companies and mercenaries in the Sahel in the October meeting of the EU Political and Security Committee and AU Peace and Security Council.

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