Two decades after replacing the OAU, the AU’s record is best measured not by communiqués but by how fast it converts rules into results on the ground.
In March 2022, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorised the transition from AMISOM to ATMIS in Somalia — a reminder that, two decades after the African Union (AU) replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Union’s rules are judged by execution, not intent. This article argues that the AU’s legal and institutional redesign shortened the warning-to-decision cycle and raised the credibility of enforcement, but performance still hinges on finance, logistics and political will. Where mandates are matched with money, enabling capabilities and enforceable timelines, outcomes improve.
What Changed — And When
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The OAU was created in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963 to advance decolonisation and continental solidarity under a strict non-interference norm. The AU’s Constitutive Act was adopted in Lomé on 11 July 2000, entered into force on 26 May 2001, and the Union was inaugurated in Durban on 9 July 2002 — a pivot from liberation to integration and governance. Two provisions reset legitimacy thresholds: Article 4(h) authorises intervention in cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity; Article 4(j) permits intervention at the request of a member state. The PSC Protocol was adopted on 9 July 2002, entered into force in December 2003, thus moving the Union from summit-to-summit diplomacy to a standing, rules-based pathway from early warning to decision.
From Principles to Instruments
To avoid the OAU’s cycle of declarations without follow-through, the AU assembled the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): a standing PSC, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund. This design shortened the distance from information to decision; the friction now lies in turning mandates into deployable plans backed by predictable multi-source financing, strategic lift, medical support and interoperable units across regional brigades. ASF doctrine and exercises have expanded, but progress remains uneven across regions.
Tests of the New Doctrine
The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) from 2003 to 2004was the AU’s first major mission helped stabilise Bujumbura and key axes before the handover to the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in June 2004. It showed early gains but exposed gaps in airlift and medical evacuation that would recur across theatres.
Similarly, in Darfur in Sudan the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was launched in 2004 to monitor a ceasefire and protect civilians. AMIS improved access and deterrence around patrol routes but suffered from chronic funding gaps and limited airlift. These constraints drove the 2007 handover to the hybrid UN-AU mission UNAMID, an early lesson that legitimacy without logistics yields brittle gains.
In Comoros in Operation Democracy in March 2008 the AU-supported regional action and helped restore constitutional order on Anjouan. The episode illustrated AU/REC burden-sharing and the value of clear, time-bound objectives when political consensus exists.
In the Central African Republic, MISCA (Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine) helped to secure Bangui and key corridors in 2013-2014, although it depended heavily on partners for allowances, equipment and lift. Re-hatting as the UN’s MINUSCA in 2014 reflected a pragmatic division of labour when AU resources were stretched, resulting in continental political traction paired with UN sustainment.
The AU’s most ambitious operation in Somalia (ANISOM, established in 2007) shifted in April 2022 to a transition mission with phased handover to Somali forces.
Compared to the OAU era, the AU is now faster at deciding and steadier at monitoring compliance. Yet structural bottlenecks persist: strategic airlifts and medical support remain scarce, funding is volatile, and standby-force readiness varies across regions. The decisive variable is not broader mandates but the tight coupling between mandate and means — funding models, enabling capabilities and interoperable standards that make “rapid deployment” credible.
Coups and Political Will: Why This Matters Now
Since 2020, the AU has suspended Mali (2020, 2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023) following military takeovers. The paper sequence is clear: condemnation, suspension and a roadmap back to constitutional order. However, deterrence works only when the legal stance is paired with calibrated sanctions, time-bound mediation and credible consequences that regional partners help enforce; when member-state preferences diverge, pressure dilutes and transitions drift.
Security shocks in the Sahel and the Horn, fiscal pressure among partners and a leaner UN footprint have raised the premium on speed and enforceability for African-led operations. Design transitions around metrics, not dates; bind drawdowns to area-security benchmarks and verified local capacity; blend assessed contributions with ring-fenced partner support to stabilise funding; and standardise modular regional force packages. To keep incentives aligned, link predictable financing to periodic PSC reviews of progress against agreed benchmarks.
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Policy Design for the Next Phase
The AU should embed measurable handover milestones into every PSC authorisation and review them quarterly. It should also establish partial autonomous financing for missions (for example through import levies) to reduce volatility while protecting partner confidence. Operationally, missions should pre-position enabling capabilities — airlift, medical evacuation and engineering — via pooled regional hubs. Standardise ASF readiness metrics and modular force packages should be used to reduce time from mandate to first boots on the ground.
Between 2000 and 2004 the AU rewrote the rules; the impact can be observed in Darfur, Bangui, Moroni and Mogadishu, not communiqués. Matching mandates with money, logistics and measurable timelines is the difference between principled intent and real-world outcomes across AU theatres. The comparative advantage to preserve is not expansive authority but execution at speed with enforceable follow-through.
Bakr Hazem Al-Zubaidy is a Lecturer at the College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, specialising in political history and the study of regional and international organisations. Email: [email protected].