On November 30, 2024, national media outlets conducted an interview with President Isaias Afwerki, discussing timely and important global, regional, and domestic issues. Second part of the interview follows.
Mr. President, various initiatives were taken to resolve the civil war in Sudan that broke out in April 2023, but they have not succeeded. Why? In view of General Al-Burhan’s working visit to Eritrea this week, what should be the role of the Sudanese people, Sudanese political forces, as well as the international community?
There are two concepts within this discussion that require careful articulation. First, the term “political forces” should be extracted from general rhetoric, and I will elaborate on this point later. There is also the phrase “international community”, which conveys a misleading impression of a cohesive global entity capable of shouldering responsibilities.
Returning to the situation in Sudan, the conflict has now dragged into its second year. This situation is, for evident reasons, a pressing issue in our region. Looking back at the tragic situation that has unfolded in the country, one must question whether this conflict is rational or justifiable by any standards. To fully comprehend the unfolding current reality, it is essential to examine the geopolitical significance of Sudan, along with the origins and dynamics of the raging internal strife.
The situation in Sudan is not a distant issue; it has indeed a direct impact on us. The Sudanese people have played a significant role in our struggle for independence and our nation-building efforts. Their contributions cannot be underrated. To understand the current dynamics, we must reflect on the state of affairs before and after the 1990s. How did we engage with Sudan during these periods? What was the nature of our bilateral relationship, as well as our regional interactions? Our stance during the discussions surrounding South Sudan serves as a pertinent example.
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was established in Asmara with the explicit aim of addressing the challenges in Sudan. Although it operated from Asmara, it ultimately did not achieve its objectives. The people of South Sudan were largely opposed to secession. Key figures like John Garang and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) advocated for unity, expressing a near-unanimous, 99% preference for a united Sudan, with secession seen as a last resort at 1%.
Regrettably, a myriad of complexities and external interventions—often driven by hidden agendas—led to the secession and subsequent independence of South Sudan in 2011.The primary goal of the extensive efforts and sacrifices made was to realize the vision of a ‘New Sudan’—a nation founded on the principles of citizenship, where individuals are not differentiated by ethnicity, tribe, clan, or skin color. This vision was widely discussed and resonated deeply within society. It was not a new invention, but rather a fundamental human aspiration. Had a conducive environment been established, this idea could have flourished in Sudan. However, certain individuals within the regime, motivated by religious and other agendas, were not willing to embrace this idea as a solution. Their actions—both direct and indirect—contributed to the secession of South Sudan in 2011.
The situation in Sudan, which has persisted for 30 years since 1989, has become increasingly intolerable for its citizens. Numerous conflicts and developments have unfolded during this period, and we have been firsthand witnesses to these events. Since the arrival of Osama bin Laden in Sudan until 1996, the emergence of various alliances signaled troubling developments. Nevertheless, we remained optimistic and continuously sought to contribute to positive solutions.
At the end, a popular uprising (Intifada) erupted. This uprising was spontaneous, not organized or led by any political party. It would be inaccurate to suggest that we anticipated this eruption. The ongoing challenges faced by the Sudanese people culminated in this spontaneous uprising, which succeeded in ousting the regime.
The key question is: what were the aspirations of the people? Despite its spontaneous nature, the uprising demonstrated the political maturity and consciousness of the population. The citizens were acutely aware that the existing system was not compatible with aspirations and needs of the country.
The situation in Sudan is primarily the sovereign matter of the Sudanese people. However, as we live in the same neighborhood, close consultations to explore viable solutions is imperative due to the obvious ramifications. Our past experiences have provided important lessons in this regard. We recognize that to foster peace in Sudan, it is imperative for us engage actively in this process. This commitment is not merely based on perceived concerns; rather, it stems from the understanding that stability in Sudan can yield positive outcomes for our own nation. For this reason, we submitted a proposal in mid-2022, which represents our modest contribution and fulfills our responsibility to promote the mutual interests of both countries.
Like many regions around the world, Sudan faces a significant challenge in the way of nationbuilding. While the political journey of Sudan since gaining independence in 1956 has been relatively unique and more successful relative to many regions in Africa, it has not been without its difficulties. The emergence of the issue surrounding South Sudan presented a substantial obstacle. As the South Sudan situation remained unresolved, additional challenges arose, particularly in regions such as Blue Nile, Kordofan, Darfur, and Eastern Sudan.
Later, the accession to power by the National Congress Party – “Muetemer Watani – further disrupted the nation-building process and severely undermined Sudan’s economy. Their actions isolated the country and compromised the interests of its people, ultimately leading to a significant degradation of Sudan’s status.
In the event, the Sudanese people declared that they have had “Enough”. What is the way forward? There are no new (miraculous) novelties; the only viable solution lies in the concept of nation-building. Sudan must evolve into a nation that embodies the citizenship aspirations of all its people. But how do we achieve this? Despite numerous initiatives and efforts to address the issues at hand, the problems remain unresolved. The root cause does not lie with the Sudanese people themselves but rather with external interference. The notion of “Huruya Weteqeyr” (The Forces for Freedom and Change) emerged from various quarters.
What does “Huruya Weteqeyr” represent in the first place? Historically, there were traditional political parties. What role did they play in this context? Is it necessary to discuss these old political parties at this juncture? Can we instead focus on new political parties? For now, let us set these considerations aside; there is no need to debate this issue at this juncture.
The Sudanese people are fully aware of their needs and have successfully removed the previous regime, expressing a collective desire for a bright future where they can thrive in peace. In this context, the Sovereign Council has assumed responsibility for the transitional period. It is essential to focus on the nature of the Sovereign Council itself rather than the identities of its members. When the popular uprising occurred, the Sudanese Army took on the critical role of maintaining order to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. Thus, the Sovereign Council is entrusted with this trusteeship by default, acting as a bridge to guide the Sudanese people towards their desired future. The notion that other individuals or groups can assume this responsibility or effectively resolve the ongoing challenges may complicate matters further.
It is evident that no other entity can provide innovative or exceptional solutions. But, this does not mean that the Sovereign Council is the sole decisionmaker. For those familiar with Sudan’s history, the Sovereign Council represents the most viable solution, and we have affirmed our position on this matter without any ambiguity or equivocation. The Sovereign Council is the body entrusted with steering the country towards the path/destiny of stability and internal peace. This is the central premise. Dwelling on the viewpoints of groups such as “Huruya Weteqeyr”, as well as the traditional political parties, will not be constructive at this juncture. Necessary discussions or agendas can be revisited or accommodated once the Sovereign Council fulfills its entrusted responsibilities.
In the current situation in Sudan, rivalry among political forces and individuals is unproductive and will not lead to any solution. Internal acrimonies and rivalries only opens the door to external agendas and meddling, which is detrimental to prevalence of enduring peace. The ongoing meddling has caused the situation to spiral out of control, leading to a scenario where the core issues facing Sudan are no longer in the hands of its people.
New political forces have emerged recently. We have to ask who are these new political forces and what basis are they organizing conferences and holding meetings? Such activities appear to be entirely driven by external agendas, particularly given Sudan’s pivotal role in the region.
The primary agenda involves utilizing Sudan as a strategic platform or springboard to expand interferences from Libya to Chad, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Numerous “initiatives” – which are in essence bazaars of meddling – have emerged that primarily serve external agendas. Such initiatives facilitate external interventions, which we strongly oppose. The situation in Sudan must be approached with utmost seriousness.
In May 2022, we submitted a proposal that advocated for the Sovereign Council to assume responsibility for the transition. Needless to emphasize, the matter fundamentally concerns the Sudanese people, who are well-acquainted with their own circumstances and do not require external advice. However, sharing our perspectives on the matter cannot be misconstrued as improper. Our proposal was not controversial, and it was accepted by the Sovereign Council. We never claimed that our proposal is the best possible option; if there are better alternatives, we encourage their presentation. We submitted our proposal in the spirit of making our modest contribution; without any publicity or media fanfare. The feedback we received indicated that our proposal was well-received and recognized by the Sovereign Council as a viable starting point.
There are certainly additional points that could enhance the proposal and accommodate necessary suggestions and improvements. However, there is no substitute for the framework that we originally proposed in mid-2022 and that can be examined today by any interested person. We are, therefore, not inclined to engage in unproductive discussions. In the event, wrangling at this stage will not be fruitful and we should not dwell on pronouncements and opinions of diverse political parties and combatant forces etc., regardless of whether they hail from the East, Blue Nile, Kordofan, or Darfur. As I stressed earlier, it is essential that the Sovereign Council take responsibility for realizing the aspirations of the Sudanese people. This does not mean that the Sovereign Council should seize or control power; rather, it suggests that the Sovereign Council should guide the Sudanese people towards a stable situation. Once stability is achieved, the Sudanese people will determine what is best for their future.
Accordingly, we should refrain from engaging in discussions about meaningless meetings and initiatives that may lead to endless debates, whether they occur within a specific country, the UN, the African Union, or regional organizations. Proliferation of initiatives often prolongs the situation and complicates the issues at hand. Time is of the essence and should not be wasted in fruitless efforts.
Those who have alternative political views, philosophies, ideologies, or options should prepare their proposals for the posttransition period. Individuals with diverse economic, cultural, social, military, or security programs can present their ideas then.
Our position on these matters is longstanding and consistent. Recently, Al Burhan visited Asmara, where we focused on this issue; we had no other agenda. We have not extended any special support to him or assumed a position on his side. It must also be recalled that Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) was visiting Asmara frequently until the very last moment before the war erupted. We shared our perspectives equally with both of them while also considering their viewpoints. It is surprising that despite all these consultations, conflict ensued. Outsiders may offer their speculative interpretations or analyses, but neither side has a clear explanation for the outbreak of the war. There were no justifications whatsoever for resorting to armed conflict. Even those claiming to understand the reasons fail to provide valid answers.
In our view, the conflict is in essence a proxy war. The complexities of the ongoing situation are extensive, involving factors such as geography, military mobilizations, logistical supplies, diplomacy, and media coverage. External interventions are exacerbating and prolonging the conflict, with various actors exploiting the situation for their own interests. This is often presented under the pretext of “humanitarian concerns”, with exclusive focus on lingering starvation and displacement while glossing over the fundamental underlying causes and enduring solutions.
Genuine efforts had been undertaken since 2021/22 when our proposal was presented, the desired transition to enduring peace and stability would have been smoothly achieved and the conflict that ensued avoided. The suffering of the Sudanese people has been unnecessarily prolonged by proliferation of meaningless meetings which have only resulted in prolongation of the conflict, the sufferings and displacement of the people, and the expansion of makeshift refugee camps.
I call this hypocrisy and the shedding of crocodile tears. Why do we postpone addressing a problem that could be resolved today until next year? This procrastination is perpetrated by those who claim to represent the people. Such actions are illogical and unacceptable.
External meddling must cease if we are to resolve this issue. The core concern is not about supporting or opposing Al Burhan, nor is it about conspiring against Hemedti; rather, it is the welfare of the Sudanese people that must take precedence. Despite Sudan being the breadbasket of the region, makeshift camps continue to be set up here and there. Sudan possesses abundant resources, and the Sudanese people do not wish to abandon their homes unless they are forced to do so. They are capable of addressing their challenges without external assistance. Unfortunately, fomenting internal strife will only serve external agendas and vested interests.
In this context, we have no choice but to fulfill our moral obligation. This is not an act of charity; rather, it was our duty to submit our proposal at the appropriate time. However, excessive external meddling complicates the situation.
The interventions are coming through various routes: Libya, Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.
In our recent meeting with Al Burhan, we reaffirmed our position: there must be constructive contributions from all regional stakeholders. Eritrea, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other neighbouring countries should engage in meaningful consultations, not only to address the situation in Sudan but also to tackle other pressing issues in the region. Collective efforts can yield significant results, and this has been a central theme in our discussions.
Ultimately, peace must prevail across our entire neighborhood, which comprises four components: The Nile Basin, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf. This entire region must be at peace; as true peace is achieved through collective effort. One cannot claim to be an “island of peace” while the rest of the region faces turmoil, and Sudan is a pivotal part of this dynamic. This is what we discussed with South Sudan during our recent meeting at an International Summit. The meeting had no other purpose than to foster mutual understanding and encouraging South Sudan’s positive contribution. I emphasize this because the situation in Sudan requires a detailed understanding. The international community has no compelling reason to intervene.
Recently, Ramtane Lamamra visited Asmara to discuss the situation in Sudan. We welcomed him and shared our proposal, engaging in a three-and-a-halfhour discussion to convey our thoughts.
What is the benefit of the “aid business”? What does Sudan and the region gain in the continuous displacement of the people? Clarity on these matters is emerging with time. All actors, particularly the Sovereign Council, must bear their responsibilities.
Following Al Burhan’s visit to Asmara, some have alleged that Eritrea seeks to support him… that Eritrea has its own agenda. What agenda could we possibly have? Why would we assist Al Burhan? Against whom would we be acting? Our primary interest lies solely in the well-being of the Sudanese people and the stability of Sudan. The interests of the Sudanese people must come first. Any other intentions appear designed to deliberately complicate the situation. Over the past two years, there have been efforts to keep the issue unresolved by establishing forums in various locations to obstruct viable solutions.
As I have emphasized earlier, the deliberate prolongation and attendant suffering of the people cannot be accepted passively. In the event, it is imperative that we enhance our efforts. All our previous engagements with various countries, including discussions with Al Burhan, center around a singular, clear position articulated in the proposal we presented to the Sovereign Council two years ago.
Mr. President, the people of Ethiopia continue to suffer from persistent internal conflicts. Furthermore, tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia regarding Somaliland have escalated concerns in the region. Some parties, including certain media outlets, are attempting to depict the Tripartite Summit between Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia as an alliance directed against Ethiopia. What insights can you provide on this matter?
Most of messages disseminated through various social media platforms and other media outlets are misleading and largely speculative. It is in fact distortion and disinformation. In today’s context, distortion and disinformation have become weapons in their own right. What does it mean to label this alliance as being against Ethiopia? I would ask which Ethiopia they are referring to. Does this emanate from concern for Ethiopia, or is it merely intended to stoke conflict? They speculate about the Tripartite Summit while distorting its objectives so as to foment discord. This is a clear indication of an external agenda at play.
Anyone genuinely interested in analyzing the issue would not arrive at such conclusions. On what basis can one claim that this is an alliance against Ethiopia? How? And quite sadly, such peculiar speculations have come to be accepted as “normal”. This acceptance stems from a lack of objective questioning. In any case, which Ethiopia is being referred to? There are so-called experts who specialize in spinning false narratives. Why do they not choose to view the situation from a constructive perspective? Why frame it as a conspiracy? Presenting this as an alliance against Ethiopia serves no purpose other than to further external agendas.
The Tripartite Summit did not invoke any new issues. We visit Egypt, and officials from Egypt visit us routinely and periodically to discuss our common concern: the stability of our region.
Regional destabilization stems from imbalance. Therefore, all countries in the region must play their part in fostering stability. We urge Egypt to fulfill its role in this regard. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and other regional players should also contribute to this effort. It is essential that we resolve our own problems in the region without extraneous intervention. For over 30 years, we have worked tirelessly to deter such outside interference across various issues.
How should water resources in the region be managed? This is a critical discussion. Why is the Nile issue a source of conflict? Where does the problem originate? Why are there speculations about an alliance between Eritrea and Egypt?
One of the tools for fomenting discord is speculative lies revolving around the Millennium Dam. Much has been said about the Nile. During the armed struggle, it was referred as the Tana Beles Project, managed by Salini, an Italian company. The agenda of that project may warrant further elaboration at some appropriate time. Rumours were rife; one of which claimed that “Egypt wanted to sell water to Israel through the Suez Canal.”
In 1993, I traveled to Cairo with Meles to participate at the OAU Summit for the first time. We exchanged views on those rumours.
Melles asked for my opinion whether he should raise the matter with the Egyptian authorities. My frank opinion was that this was not necessary in view of other pressing matters in our first attendance of the OAU Summit. He agreed with my opinion.
Later in the afternoon, Melles was visibly upset. I asked him what was wrong? .
“I should have followed your advice. I just met Omer Suleiman and spoke to him about the rumor,” he told me.
He continued: “You know what he said to me?”
“He asked me who I was to even broach the issue. But I’ll show him; I will bring him to his knees,” he asserted.
This is how the problem developed. Subsequently, there was a push to rebuild the Ethiopian Air Force, directly related to the Nile issue. Then, the Millennium Dam became a focal point. Statements were made about subduing the Egyptians, akin to Turkey’s actions with Iraq and Syria. When such perilous ideas are raised, one must consider their ultimate trajectory. Shortly thereafter, they began sending their MiG fighter planes to Bulgaria and Romania for maintenance. However, this was not solely Meles’s issue; other players were ready to exploit the scenario. They offered to construct the Millennium Dam for him. Therefore, when construction commenced in 2011, it was not just an Ethiopian initiative; it was a direct continuation of the Tana Beles project. Numerous issues arose later, including utilization of the Setit River, which we ultimately opted to abandon. I have digressed into these details in very broad terms in order to underline the historical perspectives.
The Millennium Dam is slated to produce 5,000 to 6,000 megawatts of energy. However, what real value would 6,000 megawatts have for Ethiopia? Essentially not much, in view of its aggregate needs. Issue is why would Ethiopia risk conflict with Sudan and Egypt over this?
Spite of the pronounced intention of selling electricity to neighboring countries, the fact is 6,000 megawatts would barely meet a quarter of Ethiopia’s energy needs. Total output of 30,000 to 40,000 megawatts would be necessary to truly support Ethiopia’s development objectives. In this context and in relative terms, it is plainly unreasonable to go to war over a project like the Millennium Dam.
I am dwelling on these details to dispel the erroneous notion that the Tripartite Meeting represents an anti-Ethiopia alliance. Why would Ethiopia be marginalized? What motives do we have to conspire against Ethiopia? Why would we invite various parties solely to attack Ethiopia? Such ideas are unfounded. Ethiopia has every right to seek stability. We have no interest in entertaining notions that foment regional tension and instability. We cherish agendas of regional cooperation, coordination and complementarity and we are prepared to engage in open discussions with all interested parties.
It is quite easy for certain parties to disseminate false information, instigate unrest, and escalate tensions to serve external agendas. They seek out topics under the guise of news, aiming to provoke crises. Their motivations and agendas are clear, but we should not engage with or entertain these misleading agendas.
We have come a long way, avoiding involvement in such dramas. Indeed, all the meetings we have conducted have nothing to do with Ethiopia. Ethiopia is facing its own challenges, and we do not aim to exacerbate its internal problems. If there is an alarming situation in Ethiopia, it should concern us as well, and it requires consultations for resolution. This is not a secret. However, if someone is accusing us of conspiring against Ethiopia, they must be out of touch with reality. Such inciting narratives must be countered by our media outlets and the public events we organize.
Continuous distortion and the twisting of facts have become ingrained these days. We need to debunk these false narratives. We must challenge these falsehoods and demonstrate their fallacy and inaccuracy.
Any agenda regarding the Millennium Dam, the Nile Basin, or other regional issues do not originate from local actors; they are driven by external agendas. These entities seek to stir up conflict to destabilize our Neighborhood and undermine peace and stability. We cannot stand by idly while this occurs. It is our duty to counter such disinformation by presenting the truth and making our constructive goals known. This remains a priority in our efforts., True, we normally avoid entanglement in unnecessary acrimony. This does not mean that we will keep mum in the face of preposterous lies and distortions.
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